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Cybernation: The Trauma That Awaits Us

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DISSENT

THE YOUNG RADICALS: A SYMPOSIUM

Michael Walzer James T. Burnett Roger Hagan
Jeremy Larner Staughton Lynd Julian Mayfield
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C. WRIGHT MILLS

At the age of 46 C. Wright Mills is dead of a heart attack. His friends knew he had been very ill for some years; yet the news came to us as a particular shock, for what characterized Mills above all was his enormous vitality, and it seemed hard to believe that a man with so incredible a life force could cease to exist.

Mills was in the very front rank of modern sociology. Even as he was its most severe critic and perhaps because of that, he helped to revitalize it and make it more aware of its problems. In a period in which emphasis on methodological precision and conceptual clarity sometimes threatened to obscure the humanistic character of sociology, Mills emphasized that abandonment of this heritage threatened to degrade it to a mere science of manipulation. Above all Mills stressed the need to bring together knowledge and social criticism. He pleaded for a radical, an engaged, social science. He had high regard for the calling of social criticism, and he attempted to live up to it in his own books.

Though deeply concerned with politics, Mills was not himself a political man. Like certain "woolly" types, whom he intensely admired, he was too much of a "loner" to bend himself to the necessary disciplines of political activity. And this is perhaps why he remained throughout his life a rather isolated man. Those of us whom he called his friends were proud to be that, precisely because he granted friendship with difficulty. In recent years political disagreements relaxed somewhat the bonds between him and us; we were no longer as close to him as we once had been. But now, as we recall our loss, we remember in how many ways Mills helped DISSENT in its first years of struggle. He was a precious ally in those years when we of DISSENT fought an uphill battle against all those who, in Mills's telling phrase, had joined the "American Celebration." Without Mills this magazine would not quite have become what it in fact became. And for this, and many, many other things, we will remain gratefully attached to his memory.

L. C.

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DISSENT

VOLUME IX
SPRING 1962

NUMBER 2

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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AMONG OURSELVES

There is a good deal of DISSENT news, and a large part of it pleasant.

• Our special issue on New York was a decided success. We had two printings, totalling 11,000 copies, and only a few hundred remain. It was widely reviewed and commented on; Grove Press plans to reissue it as a paperback book, with some deletions and additions. You can still order a copy (see ad, back cover).

• Our financial report for the year 1961 shows that DISSENT did the largest volume of business in its history; predictably, expenditures also went up. The recent price rise to 95¢ per copy was dictated by increases in the cost of printing and mailing.

• Our subscription list, while still far from satisfactory, is the largest in our history—as is also the total number of copies printed. The last issue, featuring several pieces on the Kennedy Administration, received the widest newsstand distribution we have ever attempted—the results are still to be checked.

• The Fall issue will feature a special section (perhaps it will take over the whole number) on Latin America.

• There's been a reorganization of our editorial board. Irving Howe has been formally designated as editor. Horst Brand, who has written for us in the past on economic subjects; Ned Polsky, who wrote the notable piece on the beats and hipsters for the New York City issue; and Stephan Thernstrom, a young writer and student who did the study of civil defense in the last number—these have been added to the editorial board. Milton Sacks, busy with other duties, moves from editor to Contributing Editor. And four distinguished writers, veteran contributors to DISSENT, are added to our roster of Contributing Editors: Lionel Abel, the playwright and political and literary critic; Paul Goodman, the man of letters whose work has recently stirred so much discussion; Harold Rosenberg, the political, literary, and art critic; and Daniel M. Friedenberg who has been widely acclaimed for his reports on Cuba, Africa, etc. These four writers have steadily helped us over the years and we are delighted to add their names to the masthead.

• From Australia comes an interesting, well-edited magazine called . . . *Dissent*. It has roughly the same editorial outlook that we have here in America, and we wish it long life and prosperity. The more *Dissents*, the merrier.

• We are planning a number of long-range projects for future issues. But about this, more later.

•

There remain the usual, seemingly unavoidable problems:

• We don't get enough—or enough first-rate—general essays of the kind that can be held for several issues, if need be, and which make an editor's life (especially if he's working on spare time) somewhat easier. Such essays are

(continued on page 193)

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JOURNAL OF THE QUARTER

Irving Howe

CYBERNATION: THE TRAUMA THAT AWAITS US

It is hard to imagine that anything written these last few months could cast so harsh a light on the future of our society as *Cybernation,* a pamphlet written by Donald Michael and published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California. This pamphlet not only brings together authoritative data concerning automation and related developments; it makes clear that changes of enormous scope are now occurring in our economy. When President Kennedy recently became indignant because electrical workers had won a 25-hour week, he was being not merely reactionary but also naive and irrelevant. For very soon the real question will be whether industrial workers will have *any* hours of work. Or if that be too extreme, the question is: How many millions of workers in how many industries will find themselves jobless because of the persistent advance of automated devices?

The term cybernation is used by Mr. Michael to refer to:

a) *automation,* "devices that automatically perform sensing and motor tasks, replacing or improving on human capacities for performing these functions" and

b) *computers,* "devices that perform, very rapidly, routine or complex logical and decision-making tasks, replacing or improving on human capacities . . . etc."

What Mr. Michael proceeds to show is that the blend of automation and computers involves "potentialities . . . that are unlimited," with "extraordinary implications for the emancipation or enslavement of mankind." Given the planlessness and incoherence of American society, there seems little reason to suppose that cybernation will in the near future lead to our "emancipation."

Whole areas of employment will soon be wiped out by cybernation, and not merely in the way most of us imagine. "If the building trades were to be automated, it would not mean inventing machines to do the various tasks now done by men; rather buildings would be redesigned so that they could be built by machines." Cybernated systems "perform with a precision and a rapidity unmatched in humans." They can make judgments based on instructions programmed into them; they can remember and search their memories for appropriate data; they can detect and correct errors in their own performance; and they are beginning to perceive and to recognize.

The immediate social consequences will be enormous. Not only will many factory workers and farm laborers lose their jobs; so too will office workers,

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sales personnel, and middle executives. A few random examples:

- The U.S. Census Bureau was able to use 50 statisticians in 1960 to do the tabulations that required 4,100 in 1950.
- Bell Telephone has handled a 50 per cent increase in business during the past 10 years with only a 10 per cent increase in personnel.
- Production jobs in the chemical industry have fallen off three per cent since 1956 despite a rise in output of 27 per cent.
- Macy's has tried out its first electronic sales girl: a machine smart enough to dispense 36 items in 10 separate styles and sizes, and to make correct change (while rejecting counterfeit money) for one- and five-dollar bills.

As usual, it is the Negroes who have suffered the most immediate and painful effect of these social changes. Working in heavy industries at unskilled jobs, they have been the easiest to replace by machines, and because of bias in hiring and lack of educational opportunities they find few chances to gain new skills or jobs.

The effect upon middle management is also likely to be severe, for computers can already perform many of the tasks usually assigned to it. Where, asks Mr. Michael, will these middle managers go? Lacking any capacities other than for their office routines, they will find it even more difficult than factory workers to adapt to new circumstances.

Cybernation, as Mr. Michael remarks, "may contribute substantially to further social disruption." The vast number of adolescents preparing to enter the job market—three million will be starting the quest for jobs each year at the end of this decade, as against two million now—are certain to contain many semi-permanent unemployed, particularly among the Negroes. "If they loaf, almost inevitably they are going to become delinquent." For—

> Threatened institutions often try forcibly to repress groups demanding changes in the *status quo*. Imagine the incentives to use force that would exist in a nation beset by national and institutional frustrations and bedeviled by anarchic unemployed-youth movements. Imagine, too, the incentives to use force in view of the reserves of volunteer "police" made up of adults who can vent their own unemployed-based hostility in a socially approved way of punishing or disciplining these "children."

Nor does Mr. Michael offer much hope in regard to the piece-meal solutions usually advanced for coping with automation. "It is commonly argued that with the growth of population, there will always be more need for people in the service industries . . . [But] service activities will also tend to displace workers by becoming self-service, by becoming cybernated, and by being eliminated."

Retraining of displaced workers? Max Horton, Michigan's Director of Employment Security, remarks:

> I suppose that is as good as any way for getting rid of the unemployed—just keep them in retraining. But how retrainable are the mass of these unskilled and semi-skilled unemployed? . . . Most important, is there a job waiting for them when they have been retrained?

A shorter work week?

> This would retain the consumer purchasing capacity for X workers in those situations where the nature of the cybernation process is such that X men would do essen-

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> tially the same work as X plus Y men used to do. But when the task itself is eliminated or new tasks are developed that need different talents, shorter shifts clearly will not solve the problem. The latter conditions are the more likely ones as cybernation becomes more sophisticated.

Mr. Michael concludes that "the government will probably be faced for the indefinite future with the need to support part of the population through public works." Given the present social attitudes toward such programs, they are likely to be severely damaging to the self-regard of those who must resort to them; furthermore, such programs have always provoked bitter political struggles, and are certain to do so in the future. What then, asks Mr. Michael, would be the effects on the attitudes of a society when a significant part of it is overtly supported by public works programs? His answer is marvelously laconic:

> *Whatever else the attitudes might be, they certainly would not be conducive to maintaining the spirit of a capitalistic economy.*

The consequences of all this are almost impossible to reckon, but a few obvious ones may be worth noting:

1) We face the danger of drifting into a society in which there will appear a new and fierce class division: not merely between owners and workers or rich and poor, but between various skilled elites living in prosperity and a stratum of permanent unemployables, consisting particularly of older workers, the young and the Negroes.

2) The power and size of the trade unions seem certain to decline, even if they were—which they probably will not—to undertake bold steps to meet the new conditions.

3) The social discrepancies between advanced and underdeveloped nations will become still more startling, and a still greater cause of bitterness, as the advanced countries enter the cybernetic age while the underdeveloped ones still struggle to move into industrialism.

4) The problem of government intervention in economic life will become a sharper issue in political conflict than it has been these past few decades. Nothing important can be done to cope with cybernation short of large-scale and long-range economic planning; yet for a significant fraction of the American people such planning has become anathema, demagogically linked to Communism.

The expectations of social peace so cherished by American liberals seem hardly realistic once these prospects for our domestic economy are consid-

---

ALL'S FAIR IN GHOSTS AND WAR

"Washington, Jan. 25 (AP)—Gen. Thomas D. White disclosed a personal secret today.

"At a Senate hearing into charges that anti-Communist speeches by military officers are being muted by the Pentagon, General White was asked whether it was proper for low-ranking personnel to censor generals and admirals.

"General White, former Air Force Chief of Staff, said with a grin that he might be letting out a secret of the inner circle, then went on to say:

" 'I rarely personally wrote a speech.

" 'I have heard there were low-level personnel who reviewed the speeches, but the truth is, they were relatively low-level persons who wrote the speeches in the first place.' "—From the N. Y. *Times*, Jan. 26.

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ered together with the probable difficulties the United States will encounter in foreign affairs. What strikes one with great force is that the political Right is preparing itself organizationally and ideologically for the battles of tomorrow, while the liberal Left, all too bemused with back-stair manipulations in Washington, does little to ready its followers in the trade unions and the political organizations. It is a dangerous situation, for in ways none of us could quite have anticipated, the viability of capitalism, even in its recently modified forms and at a moment when all too many people have begun to accept it as an eternal given, will soon again be at stake.

Henry Pachter

SOVIET POLITICS AFTER THE 22nd CONGRESS

An Editor's Speculations

Khrushchev always reminds me of Prussia's Sergeant-King, Frederick William, who used to exclaim "but ye ought to love me" while caning his subjects. No doubt, he would rather be loved than feared and prefers voluntary to forced assent. Unfortunately he fears dissent more than he needs democratic concurrence, or more accurately: The power structure of the Communist regime is endangered every time an opposition finds a focus for discussion. The regime must therefore alternate between relaxation and tightening, democratization and vicious attacks on the opposition, decentralization and recentralization.

In the days when the Marxist phraseology had not yet worn thin, these zigzags of Soviet policy were discussed in ideological terms, with factions presenting "platforms" and advocating distinct "lines." Even then a naive observer outside the Party's inner circle might experience some surprises, with left oppositions adopting rightist platforms, Stalin carrying out the program of his opponents and the latter forming "unprincipled blocs." Looking back upon the history of the twenties and thirties, we now see that much of it was a struggle for power rather than a fight for a policy. By now even the ideological trimmings have been discarded; the brutal, naked fact of one man's drive for pre-eminence is frankly avowed, and its methods are exhibited for all to see. In the days of Stalin an opposition was at least allowed to publish the platform to be denounced; today we read the condemnation but have no way of knowing what is being condemned. People are vilified, accused and shamed for crimes which no one knows.

We hear that certain figures are "anti-party," but all we know is that they are leaders capable of offering alternatives to Khrushchev. We are

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supposed to believe that Molotov of all people—the same Molotov who was not afraid to deal with Hitler and was the engineer of Stalin's coexistence policy after the war—is opposed to Khrushchev's policy of coexistence; or that Albania of all the major powers threatening to launch us into a nuclear holocaust is eager to declare war on the United States. What coexistence? All we know is that Molotov, while in power, was a rather cagey man who for all his knottiness somehow managed to find a modus vivendi with the Chinese as well as the Western powers. His successor, Khrushchev, rekindled the threat of war over Berlin which Molotov had put to rest, and for all his coexistence talk cannot get along with the Chinese. It was not Molotov who allowed the disarmament talks to fail and who interrupted negotiations about the test moratorium with a bigger blast than ever. It was not Molotov who threatened a dozen countries with extinction and spoke of states within reach of his medium range ballistic missiles as "hostages."

Again we are supposed to believe that the Chinese are spoiling for the kind of nuclear showdown which would flatten their country. But then we hear conflicting reports, saying that, on the one hand, we are lucky to have the Russians instead of the Chinese as adversaries in Laos because the former are eager to make a deal with us such as the Chinese (those who remember Korea will understand) are never able to close; on the other hand this implies that the invasion of Laos was controlled by the Russians in the first place. All of which is rather bewildering for anyone who tries to understand the present troubles of the "peace camp" in terms of ideology or policies.

The picture becomes even more confused when we look at the people who are behind these supposed policies. We have no reason to doubt that the 20th, 21st, and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU were all solidly behind Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence and de-Stalinization. With the exception of a few old-timers, dyed-in-the-wool Stalinists and "anti-Party" diehards, there was 100% unanimity; and we have heard profound sociological analyses of this new spirit as an expression of the mood of the new Soviet bourgeoisie. But meanwhile it has been necessary to remove more than half of the Central Committee members and to replace them by new members who presumably are more than 100% for this same policy and express the spirit of the new Soviet bourgeoisie even more adequately. Their new independence, of course, soars Gagarin-like in the more-than-unanimous votes they gave Khrushchev and in the star role he has played as speaker on every important question. It is only logical that the more "collective" the leadership is, the less it finds it necessary to speak with several voices.

Now it is understandable that the Soviet people should accept this bunk. Not only are they deprived of independent sources of information; more importantly, they have a genuine stake in the belief that all this is true and that they can look at themselves with respect again. They are told it was all Stalin's fault, and they are ready to believe it with the same fervor the German people show in believing that Eichmann expiates for all of them. But why should we in the West believe it?

The professional Kremlinologists also have a stake in these theories, or

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rather a duty: the public expects of them a certain profundity, which demand in turn cannot be satisfied unless every flea which is hopping from one Soviet citizen to the other is endowed with sociological significance. The newspaper writers also have a stake in believing the story of big political decisions, because explaining them is their bread and steak. The Western statesmen are interested in having the public believe it because differentiating among various Soviet factions is one way of justifying negotiations which otherwise only would seem reasonable to common sense—and plain common sense is excluded from the motivations of Western statesmen. It would be common sense, of course, not to negotiate now if the Soviet leaders really were at each others' throats, or it would be common sense to dispatch an Ambassador to China if the Mao government had really fallen out with Khrushchev. On the other hand, it is only common sense to negotiate with the man who so obviously is the one power in the Kremlin which counts and who so obviously has crowded out, vilified, ridiculed, and reburied all his rivals. But let us not quibble over the paradoxical rationale that has been provided for the negotiations; let us be thankful that the negotiations are going on for no matter what good or bad reasons.

The plain fact, it seems to me, is that Khrushchev has achieved ascendancy over all his rivals, that he has populated the ruling bodies of the Party, the Union and the individual Republics with his retainers, that his opponents either have no platform or have been prevented from publishing any, and that there is no focus or person around which an opposition could rally. He has successfully identified his potential rivals with all the stink of the Stalin era and with the war scare. Excellent politician that he is, he has managed to exploit the deeply felt yearning for peace and the fermenting discontent with bureaucratic rule. He has monopolized every issue which might make a meaningful platform for an opponent, and he has prepared his own canonization as the intrepid slayer of the Stalinist dragon. The personality cult again is invading the history books. Already we hear that it was Khrushchev who won the battle of Stalingrad. We are made aware of a great difference between him and Stalin in determining the succession: Stalin never claimed to have made it by his own devices; his myth was the succession by Lenin's choice. Khrushchev, however, does not pose as Stalin's elect but as a self-made man: which certainly honors him.

This has, however, one drawback. It places Khrushchev in the same category as Mao, Tito, Castro and Nkrumah who all won by their own devices. He can claim eminence not by virtue of charismatic or ideological leadership, but only as leader of the biggest, oldest and most advanced of the Communist countries. In the program which the 22nd Congress adopted, an additional reason was claimed: the Soviet Union is closest to the final state of Communism.

Just as in domestic policies Khrushchev had to abandon the show of "liberalization," so he had to reintroduce the ideological police into Soviet relations with the various People's Democracies. The attempt at "multi-centered Communism," hailed by many Soviet experts in the West as a great step away from doctrinal rigidity, has failed doubly: just as Stalin preferred to expel Tito rather

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than admit varieties within Communism, so Khrushchev had to expel Hoxha to forestall open insubordination; and secondly—a thing that must have hurt the true believers even more—he had to substitute state-to-state relations for the preferred form of party-to-party relations.

At the point where ideology was reintroduced to strengthen the Soviet Empire, it tended to embitter a difference which was already leading to revolt. The break of diplomatic relations with Albania meant first of all the withdrawal of an Ambassador whose high party rank no longer gave him power to rule the Albanian apparatus. (It will be remembered that the quarrel with Tito in 1948 also turned on this point: what rights should the Soviet Ambassador enjoy in the Yugoslav Party?) Even more significant is the withdrawal of a respected Party functionary from the Embassy in Peking and his replacement by a career policeman. This no longer is "multi-centered Communism" but the acknowledgment of national Communisms. By trying to impose his dictatorship over the Empire, as he had done inside the Soviet Union proper, Khrushchev created for himself problems of discipline and ideology he could not handle, while simultaneously destroying the sacerdotal and even the theological foundations of his power inside Russia.

In recent Western comment, attention has often been drawn to the paradox of Stalin's memory. The Chinese who had every reason to curse the late tyrant, now are the ones who nostalgically recall his days when the unanimity of world Communism was held sacred. But the paradox goes deeper: inside the Soviet Union, too, the old-timers must try to rally in the name of the man who did everything to destroy the Party; they have no other rallying point unless they go back to Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin. But here another paradox arises: To debunk Stalin, Khrushchev may have to rehabilitate the old opposition; but he cannot re-create the old Party tradition without either giving the Party democracy, or himself occupying the place of the opposition. With the places of honor in Party history, therefore, the role of the opposition, too, will soon be pre-empted by a new tyrant who again will try to destroy the Party and like Stalin must fail. Stalin's system, it will be remembered, was to play the factions of the Party against each other and then to destroy them together; to play Party, military and police against each other and then to destroy them together; an unending merry-go-round because whatever numbers he liquidated, he always had to find some organization to rule the country with.

Khrushchev likewise has liquidated the factions, using each of them and appropriating their various platforms. To depose the "anti-party group" he had to get the support of the army; later he succeeded in depriving it of its political head and of all political influence. Now, apparently, it is the Party's turn to be devaluated, though not yet to be depoliticized. The Party —that means thousands, nay hundreds of thousands of young Communists who grew up after the war and cannot possibly be connected with Stalin's crimes; but it also means their older leaders who tremble that they might be reminded of their previous errors; and it certainly means the tradition of infallibility which alone can give such a ruling Order its sacred character. By exhuming Stalin, Khrushchev deprived the Party of its aura and

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conviction of righteousness, as also of its ability to serve as the monolithic pillar of the Soviet State. By liberating himself from the ideological rigidity of the Party, Khrushchev also deprived it of its ability to control him.

Hegel remarked that no person in the world is as unfree as the Emperor of China, then the acme of absolutism, who nevertheless was bound by the mandarins who ruled for him. The relationship of the dictator to his Party is similar; he rules it but it also rules him, and in order to win some freedom of maneuver he would rather communicate directly with "the people." Khrushchev who has robbed the Party of its theology and iconography, will not hesitate to loosen its organizational cohesion. A modern industrial state cannot be ruled by a military order; the iron cohort not only is useless, it is obnoxious from the point of view of the state and the man who heads it. Malenkov had the right instinct when he chose the post of Premier instead of Party secretary, but he was premature; and he also was mistaken about the dialectics of the process of liquidation: *the party can be liquidated only by its leader.*

If I am not mistaken, Khrushchev made the first move in that direction at the recent Moscow Party Conference. It is a typical Soviet zigzag, for only last year, at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev had tendered his hand to the Party. His Program promised the Party a life longer than the State, though it also threatened its functionaries with Lenin's rotation formula: no one is secure in his post, the program announced; "the people" always can "recall" him.

Now the Party is being told that the time may have come to recall some; it has failed in the most important task to which it had been assigned, the task closest to Khrushchev's heart, the improvement of farm output. A colossal failure and worse, a colossal loss of face. The Western press has rejoiced at the news that Soviet farming is backward and inefficient, that the harvest is bad and the virgin lands don't produce. Perhaps that is true, but next year's story may be different, and it is not this story which matters most. There must be a dozen other ways to draw the Soviet farmers' attention to their unfilled quotas and to the need for better results. But this was not a meeting of farm delegations, it was a Party Conference, where not the farm population but the Soviet people and all the world were told that the Party had failed. The Party has been told to perform or else, but maybe the signs are already pointing both ways: the Party must perform but perform or not, it will be taken down a peg.

Khrushchev is on his way to personal dictatorship, reaching out to the people across the barriers of Party ideology and organization. He lets it be known that he favors poets who are not in good standing with the Party, he calls on the people to watch the Party's performance. The old Caesarian formula is being revived for Khrushchev: *tribunus plebis,* the dictator and the people against the Soviet bourgeoisie, the Soviet State and Party. And obviously this formula also implies a tougher line on foreign policy.

It was never true that Khrushchev was "softer" than the Chinese, but the Chinese are aggressive in an area where the Soviet Union has nothing to gain and where success of a common enterprise only would put an end to possible Russian claims. On the other hand, Soviet diplomacy is con-

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cerned with undermining Western positions which a direct attack only would rigidify. The subtle tactics of rapprochement or detente was possible so long as the flexible instrument of obedient Communist parties followed every quirk of Kremlin policy *without* losing ideological coherence and doctrinal fanaticism. As that instrument is coming apart, externally by the emergence of multi-national Communism and internally by the erosion of the Party regime, Khrushchev's claim to international leadership comes to rest on the naked power of the Soviet state and on the continued dynamism of its policy. Inevitably he must be led toward policies which stress the basic conflict rather than the cooperation between the big powers. Though such a policy may defeat his strategic aim of dividing the main enemies, he already is giving signs (such as the hasty recognition of the Algerian government and the obstruction of the disarmament conference) that he would rather allow the tension to increase if in so doing he can reap cheap successes with the smaller nations. The pressure of the forces working in Russia, and in the Communist orbit on the policy maker, forces him to run after such small-time victories even where they lead away away from the major objectives of Soviet strategy.

INDIA'S GENERAL ELECTION

To judge by the American press, one would think the third general election of independent India began and ended with the story of Krishna Menon! The moment his victory became clear, the press lost further interest and to this day has not published the final or complete results or given any statistical breakdown of the popular voting.

If I find this concentration on Menon a narrow view of the election, it is not because I underestimate its importance, particularly in view of Nehru's involvement in the North Bombay campaign. It is one of the few disturbing factors—the other is the fraudulent elections held in the highly sensitive Kashmir area and described by our Bombay correspondent—in an election marked by its democratic procedure, its sense of responsibility, and the active participation of tens of millions. In what other newly independent great nation today have elections of such significance, and so democratic in character, been conducted?

Further, the fairly insubstantial reports received thus far indicate a growing sophistication and discernment among the voters in their choice of representatives. Even ministers in the present Congress government were rejected by the voters on grounds of inefficiency or ineptitude or unpopularity. Where the tendency of the first two general elections was simply to return Congress party-endorsed candidates, this time the voters apparently examined the choices before them in a deliberate way. The *Letter from Bombay* which follows gives many details

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of the campaign and the results. Here we shall only in a general way indicate some conclusions which may be drawn from the material already in, but far from complete:

1) In general, the election results indicated a slight, but not major polarization of votes drawn from the great mass Congress vote, and moving toward the Right and the Communist-controlled "Left." This is true nationally, in terms of elections to the Lok Sabha, or parliament; it is more true in the state-wide elections to the state legislative bodies, where the Congress lost a substantial number of places. This would indicate the electorate is far more critical of the Congress leadership *locally*, that is, on the immediate level of social and economic problems and their (unsatisfactory) solution. Nationally, the Indian people endorsed the over-all policies of Nehru and his government.

2) On the Right, a differentiated, but significant movement of conservatives, traditionalists, and reactionaries has stepped forward, particularly in the states. Its future, of course, depends on the country's economic growth. In fact, I would say that the principal mandate given Nehru and the Congress was clearly one of getting on with and continuing the country's economic progress. This right wing represents important semifeudal, communalist and disintegrative forces.

On the "Left," and of major importance, we have the considerable progress of the Communists. By holding on to their strength in the parliament, by increasing their representation in the states, by adding a few points to their percentage of the popular vote (over 10 per cent), the Indian Communists are in a much better position to pursue their major tactic of the moment: *a deep infiltration and penetration of the Congress party ranks on all levels.* Given the issue of Chinese aggression, how were such gains possible? I think the answer is that these gains accrued to the Khrushchev, pro-Russia (majority) faction of the Indian C. P.; in fact, the "hards," the pro-Chinese leaders went down to defeat, sabotaged by their own comrades in the elections! This linking up of "radical nationalists" of the Menon type with the Communists is a major source of worry for socialist and democratic India.

3) Most disappointing of all, of course, were the other meager results obtained by the Praja Socialists and other democratic-socialist groups in the country. Such movements at best held their own or slipped backwards; none registered important gains. Apparently, they did not project a clear or counter image to the Congress on a national scale, and were unable to profit from wide dissatisfactions which influenced local voting. As a result, the future of such movements is open to serious question and, headed by the Praja Socialists of Asoka Mehta, they are to reexamine their position and their role in Indian political life. Whether such movements shall continue to lead an independent existence or shall dissolve into the Congress is, of course, the uppermost question.

A great democratically held election has been concluded. It will be analyzed in closer detail for whatever indications such analysis will yield. In the meantime, India has resolved to go forward along the road of democracy and social and economic growth.

S. P.

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S. Natarajan

LETTER FROM BOMBAY

BOMBAY

We have just finished our third general elections, a bigger and better managed one than the first two had been. Some 210 million persons were entitled to record their vote, and over 130 million did. The arrangements owe much to the breaking down of the huge task by the Election Commission. Polling booths of a thousand voters each were set up and, barring movements of residents, most voters were within a stone's throw of their booths. In Indian elections candidates are identified by a symbol and the voter marks his left index finger with an indelible stain. The first is required because over 70 per cent of the electorate is illiterate; the second is a precaution against multiple voting by one individual.

On all sides, the efficiency, smoothness and impartiality of the election office are admitted. And there is admiration for the successful operation of the biggest election enterprise in the world; and pride at the ability to handle detail that, in other matters, is conspicuously absent among Indians. Incidents there are bound to be in an effort of such a magnitude. In the Punjab, for instance, the election of Chief Minister Kairon on a narrow majority of 34 dubious votes, and the declaration of the result without heeding his opponent's objections, have evoked wide comment; there have been two recounts ordered in Uttar Pradesh; and the sealed ballot boxes used in Kashmir have been found to be neither fool-proof nor knave-proof. But Kashmir has just this year come within the jurisdiction of the Indian Election Commission, and with its crop of 32 uncontested elections Kashmir cannot be considered seriously as measuring up to the standard of other State administrations. And the Punjab, it should be noted, has all the turbulence of a frontier state.

The results of the elections have been widely commented on and attempts to analyze continue. The Congress party has returned to power in the federal Center and in the states. In parliament, it commands a majority with over 350 of the 500 seats. The Communists, returning the same number of members as they had before the elections—30—take second place again. The Swatantra party, formed in 1959 to voice vested interests, holds third place with 25 seats. The Jan Sangh, a party devoted to Hindu interests, comes fourth with 14 seats. And the Praja Socialists who stand for democratic socialism, have dropped from third place to fifth with 11 members. A long tail of regional groupings, Marxist offshoots, Hindu extremism, and Muslim and Sikh parties make up the rest with 26 independent candidates. The most significant of these are the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham advocating the secession of the South Indian States and hailing from Madras (7), and the Punjab Sikhs (3) representing the militant Akali Sikhs whose leader, the aged Tara Singh, staged a fast for the achievement of a

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separate State for the Punjabi-speaking people.

To complete the parliamentary picture, one must mention that Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon inflicted a crushing defeat on his opponent J. B. Kripalani, surviving charges of being Communist-supported; that Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari whose finance ministership was signalized by heavy taxation and whose resignation followed an unsavory deal in the Life Insurance Corporation four years ago has been returned uncontested to parliament and is confident of returning to a prominent position in the new Nehru Cabinet; and that seasoned parliamentarians on the opposition side—the Praja Socialist chief Asoka Mehta, the Swatantra Party Chairman N. G. Ranga, the Communist S. Dange who may well prove more troublesome outside, the Chairmen of the Hindu Mahasabha and the old Jan Sangh—have toppled in the elections.

The anticipation is that the Congress at the Center will tend to emphasize more powerfully the objectives of the Third Plan, adopt more restrictive measures, and incline more Left in its international non-alignment. This would have been the natural trend in any case because the next elections are five years ahead, and the five years of the Third Plan, the middle span of the 25-year program of purposive industrialization, call for special effort—especially when the first year has been allowed to slip by. But the strengthening of the left wing in the Congress — organizationally too, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister's daughter, is widely spoken of as the next party president who will take over very soon from the colorless Sanjiva Reddy who resumes the Chief Ministership of Andhra—suggests that these policies will be put through more unpleasantly.

A further consideration is the loss by the Congress of its hitherto unassailable position as the secular Right party to the Swatantra party, and the emergence of a religious Right party as well. Mr. Nehru's fears, expressed six months before the elections, of religious and regional prejudices assuming serious proportions would seem to have been borne out by the rise of the Swatantra party to the second party place in three State Assemblies—Gujarat, Bihar, and Rajasthan; and its taking over this role from the regional Ganatantra party in Oriisa by negotiating its merger; by the rise of the religious Hindu Right, the Jan Sangh, in Madhya Pradesh and in Uttar Pradesh, to the same distinctions; by the threat of the Swatantra party and the Jan Sangh evolving a common program; and the similar success of the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham and the Punjab Akalis in Madras and the Punjab. All these have merely raised their heads in their regions but the event has caused more perturbation in Congress ranks than the successes of the Communists in West Bengal and Andhra, Red militancy in Kerala, and Communist infiltration into the Congress party throughout the country—specially in the Punjab and in Western India.

It is surprising that—with 30 Communists returned to parliament and 166 to all state assemblies when Communist China is pursuing aggression against India territorially and diplomatically, with Communist theoreticians openly urging that the "Congress wild elephant" needs a Red mahout to guide it, and Communists burrowing into the Congress—the Congress party should be more concerned with the threat to democracy from the

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Right than from the Left. But this is evidently the current thinking of the Congress leadership. Judging from the election results this would be a miscalculation more harmful to India and to democracy than to the Congress itself.

THE CASE OF JUNIUS SCALES

The infamous "membership clause" of the Smith Act makes it a criminal offense to be a "knowing" member of any organization which "advocates" the violent overthrow of the government. Evidence of specific *actions* aimed at revolution is not required for prosecution; *belief* is the crime. While other sections of the Smith Act have been freely used in the legal assault upon the Communist party, this clause has lain dormant for two decades. Last year it claimed its first victim.

In June, 1960, a bitterly divided Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Junius Scales, once a Communist functionary in North Carolina. On the same day, taking back with its left hand the permission it gave with its right, the Court ordered the release of John F. Noto, another one-time Communist at the bar for the same offense. The display of legalistic legerdemain with which the justices distinguished the two cases was bewildering. But the effect of the Noto decision, which spelled out exceedingly strict requirements concerning the type of evidence admissible in "membership clause" cases, was clear. The Department of Justice quickly abandoned its plans for further prosecutions, complaining that it was unable to furnish the kind of evidence demanded by the Court. For the time being, at least, the "membership clause" appears to be a dead letter.

Only its victim remains. Junius Scales is now in a Federal penitentiary, serving a six-year sentence. It is appropriately ironic that the only American to be imprisoned solely for being a "knowing member" of a revolutionary party is a man who denounced that party and resigned from it after Hungary, nearly *five years* before he entered the penitentiary. The exceptional severity of Scales's sentence—heavier than any meted out to top party bureaucrats convicted under the "leadership clause" of the Smith Act—cruelly compounds the irony.

A committee of distinguished Americans, led by Norman Thomas, Reinhold Niebuhr, Grenville Clark, and President Goheen of Princeton is petitioning the President to grant a pardon to Junius Scales. He should do so.

S. T.

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Edouard Roditi

THE HOMING PIGEONS OF ALGIERS

A Sociology of Rebellion in France

PARIS

When the cease-fire after eight years of war in Algeria was at last announced on March 17th, no sirens screamed in Paris, no anxious mothers fell down on their knees to pray in the streets, no crowds foregathered to burst into *Te Deums*. In fact, all through March 18th too, business went on more or less as usual, the announcement of Grace Kelly's return to the screen made the headlines too, and only in the courtyard of the Sorbonne did a relatively small and very orderly crowd of students meet briefly to hoist side by side the flags of the Fifth Republic and of the FLN. On the Boulevards and elsewhere, the mood of the public was about as indifferent as it had been some years ago when Mendes-France had announced the end of the equally disastrous war in Indochina.

The fact is that the Fourth and Fifth Republic's more or less "phoney" wars of colonial "disengagement," whether in Indochina, Madagascar, Algeria or elsewhere, have never been backed by the population of metropolitan France and have concerned mainly a peculiar élite of professional soldiers, colonialists, or rightist agitators. The average Frenchman had learned his bitter lesson of liberal anti-colonialism under the German occupation of his own country: if the Algerian Moslems or any other colonial people now wants its freedom under a government of its own, let them have it. But it also happens that this élite in the Army, the police, and the administration draws reserves from a fairly large class of supporters.

It would therefore be wrong to state sweepingly that there had never been in France any enthusiasm at all for the Algerian War. In every nation, there exists at all times a fringe of "Texans" ready to fight any war, no matter how difficult it may be to justify it to the world-at-large. In France a curious mystique of the Army, inherited from every conceivable military adventure since those of Louis XIV or Napoleon, and responsible, among other absurdities of French history, for the *affaire Dreyfus,* has long kept this lunatic fringe more numerous or virulent than in most other European nations.

The French Army's professional status-seekers had thus found, ever

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since the Algerian rebels first went into action in November 1954, considerable support in this margin of jingoists and other enemies of all democratic regimes which somehow seem to lack the dash and swagger that once characterized Empire-building. These enemies had indeed been active in every crisis of the Republic since France's defeat in 1871 in the Franco-Prussian War, but paradoxically responsible for France's defeat in 1940 too. For a while, the Third Republic had managed to keep them busy with colonial conquests in Indochina and Morocco, after 1918 in Syria and Lebanon too. But we now seem to lack vast expanses of tropical forest or desert in which to expend a nation's surplus energies, and conspiring against the Republic had thus become, in France, one of the main peace-time occupations of certain elements in the French Army that recruits so many of its officers from families that bear or claim titles from the monarchy or the Napoleonic régime.

Unlike other such wars, the Algerian War, however, was also a matter of life and death for a million North African Frenchmen who are anxious to preserve their privileges as a local *Herrenrasse*. They have friends, relatives and supporters in metropolitan France too, where a good quarter of a million other embittered Frenchmen have sought refuge in the past ten years as they drifted back from Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco when the white man no longer reigned supreme. Besides, great vested interests in agriculture, mining and industry were at stake, to say nothing of banking, insurance, commerce and real estate. Too many of France's leading enterprises, with plenty of funds available for political agitation and seditious activities, were now threatened with the loss of their North African investments and subsidiaries. After all, Algiers is just about as close to Paris as Chicago is to New York, and its new oil, natural gas and mining resources no further from the Paris Bourse than those of Oklahoma or Texas from Wall Street.

Successive French governments of the postwar period had eagerly encouraged French interests to invest heavily in all sorts of plans to develop the backward Algerian economy. Finally, as an example of the kind of special vested interest that was at stake, the proud Foreign Legion, with its French officers and its motley crowd of Germans, many of them former SS men, and other foreigners who no longer have any home, had in Algeria its last possible base, since the French law that originally established it provides that it should never be permanently stationed in metropolitan France.

Yet it would be wrong to attribute all the insubordination and sedition displayed by French extremists in the last stages of the Algerian War to such domestic phenomena, whether political, social or economic. The whole Algerian War had presented, from its very inception, strange characteristics of violence, brutality and illegality, especially in its treatment of prisoners and its torturing of political suspects. The victorious Allies of 1944 and, later, our international leaders in the Cold War must bear a heavy share of blame for the atrocities perpetrated in France or Algeria in the past eight years. True, the French had never been par-

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ticularly squeamish about the methods used by the military and the police in conquered North Africa: already in the reign of Napoleon III, there had been nasty rumors of practices that would now be called genocidal. But if France has shocked us again and again, since 1954, by its frequent recourse to Gestapo methods of torturing and SS practices of genocide, this is certainly because the French police and the French Army, after 1944, had never been properly purged of those fascist elements which had previously collaborated with the Nazis in occupied France or now studiously copied Nazi methods of retaliation, repression and "questioning."

General de Gaulle and his wartime supporters who came briefly to power in France after the Liberation might have found it difficult, if left to themselves, to agree to the apparently saintly policies of leniency that were applied to most former collaborationists. But pressures from abroad had been brought to bear on the Free French authorities which had never enjoyed, in exile, the full confidence of Washington and Whitehall, where curiously ambiguous contacts had been maintained to the very last with both Pétain and Laval. Whatever purges occurred in Algeria or France after the Liberation thus lacked the conviction or the legality of organized denazification. Some journalists and politicians were arrested, a few even tried and executed, often after shockingly long delays or in equally shocking haste.

The French Army and security forces thus escaped being systematically purged of those fascist or collaborationist elements which had been previously ready to fight the Allies or directly responsible in France for the implementation of Nazi policies. In the Army the sponge was liberally used to wipe out the memory of loyalty to the Vichy Government. Many former collaborationist officers were transferred to duties in Indochina or occupied Germany, if purges threatened them in France; even in prisoner-of-war camps, German SS-men were offered an escape from the Allied war crimes teams through enlistment in the Foreign Legion for immediate service in the Far East. In the police and especially in all French security agencies, most of those who might have been tried for their complicity in crimes committed under the Nazi occupation had either been double agents at the time, working also for Allied strategic services, or had been supplied with forged documents to prove that they had been active in the Resistance. Many of these particularly compromised agents were likewise transferred, after 1944, to Occupied Germany, North Africa or other colonial areas where serious man-power shortages were hampering administration and none of the former victims or foes would be likely to recognize them. Some of these men were even working in Allied War Crimes teams, where their duties consisted mainly in locating and suppressing, in the Allied Documents Centre in Berlin, everything that, in the seized Nazi archives, might possibly compromise their colleagues or superiors.

For a while, of course, such transferred officers or agents no longer enjoyed the benefit of routine promotions. As time went by, however,

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many managed to escape identification so well that they could again be promoted; some, especially after 1954, reached positions of real power and influence in their fields. The Algerian War, in particular, offered great opportunities of promotion to all officers and security agents who had the reputation of being tough, no matter how this reputation had been gained.

The willingness of French officers and security agents to cooperate at all times with extremist elements of the Right was moreover encouraged by the security policies adopted by the NATO powers in the Cold War. It has even been reported on several occasions that the Algerian War was being used as a testing-ground for new NATO weapons and guerrilla tactics. Be that as it may, in France and elsewhere, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) and other security agencies have concerned themselves for some years almost exclusively with the task of spying on the activities of liberals or leftists who might more or less reasonably be suspected of harboring sympathies for Communist causes. Had the French Communist party suddenly gone underground and started a campaign of bombings, an immediate wave of arrests would probably have made short shrift of all those responsible. When, however, the OAS went into action in metropolitan France just about a year ago, French security agencies proved for a long while to be completely incompetent. Their forces were indeed composed mainly of OAS sympathizers or of men who had honestly been barking up the wrong tree for so long that they now had no idea where they should strike.

French police and intelligence agencies have moreover a deeply rooted tradition of relying to a great extent on the cooperation of outsiders, underworld characters or foreign agents whom they can blackmail into serving their purposes, whether as informers or mere thugs. In the Cold War, many activist members of former fascist groups willingly served such purposes while waging their own guerrilla warfare against the French Communist party and later against the FLN. The files of French security agencies thus became veritable encyclopaedias of malicious gossip concerning all individuals who might at all be suspected, however unjustly, of sympathizing with these tabu causes. Any Moslem who could be suspected of being at all critical of French policies, however wavering or short-lived, would sooner or later be denounced as an FLN agent; but similar denunciations of indiscriminately anti-Communist conspiracy or of rabidly anti-Arab activity interested nobody, though these lunatic-fringe activities might actually threaten public order. When the rebellion began in Algeria late in 1954, all sorts of members of the Moslem élite who had no connection at all with the FLN had thus been listed for a long while as suspects and were henceforth treated, by the Army and the security agencies, as if they were active supporters or agents of the FLN.

In the Spring of 1954, I happened to spend an Easter vacation in Algeria. One week end, on the recommendation of Albert Camus, I visited the novelist Mouloud Feraoun in Fort National, an administrative center

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in the mountains of his native Kabylia, where he was President of the school for boys, in fact a French civil servant. On my return to Algiers, I was constantly shadowed, later on my return to Paris too. My phone wires were tapped intermittently, I was subjected to all sorts of other investigatory procedures and, in 1955, was suddenly summoned to the headquarters of the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) in the Rue des Saussaies and grilled there for a whole day. I was questioned mainly about my contacts with Algerian intellectuals whose names, in most cases, were unknown to me; it took me months to check their identities and many of them proved to be known only to have had brief contacts with Camus or Feraoun, none whatsoever with me. From a couple of wire-tapped calls I had received at home from Antonina Valentin, who was then writing a biography of Picasso and consulted me about American works published on her subject, I was also known to the DST as a foreign resident of Paris who was a potential source of information about such outstanding Communists as the great Spanish painter. Finally, at a gathering of younger poets who were planning the publication of a little magazine, the Algerian poet Kateb Yacine, subsequently an FLN supporter, was known to have spent an evening in my home. For all these reasons, I continued to be watched until 1958, when I was suddenly expelled from France by an order signed, oddly enough, when I happened not to be in France at all.

But I fought my case, won it close on two years later and was able to return to my Paris home late in 1959. In March 1962, Feraoun was murdered in Algiers by the OAS, together with five other Moslem or Christian colleagues who worked with him in a government-sponsored agency which campaigns against illiteracy and disease in the more backward parts of Algeria. Two members of the French cabinet were rushed from Paris to attend the funeral in Algiers, on the eve of the announcement of the cease-fire agreement. In official speeches of ministers and throughout the French press, Feraoun was posthumously proclaimed to have always been a man of peace and a loyal friend of France. Yet I had been assured by French security agents, in 1959, that he was a known FLN sympathizer and that my mere friendship with him sufficed to make me suspect too. Surely, Feraoun's murderers were men who, sharing this opinion of him, might now be suspected of belonging to some wild-cat group that had at one time cooperated with those Algiers representatives of the DST who had once listed me too as a suspect, or even of consisting to some extent of deserters from the DST who might have now joined the OAS.

Nor are these suppositions at all colored by personal bitterness. In *le Monde* of March 18th, Germaine Teillon published a moving article on her own associations with Feraoun and his murdered colleagues. An appended editorial note added that she had founded in October 1955 the agency for which they all worked together, recruiting its personnel not only among French educational experts but among native Algerians too, whether Moslems, Christians or Jews.

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> This peculiarity [explains *le Monde*] aroused the suspicions of the various security agencies, whether civilian or military; they pursued with their vexations this agency of the Ministry of Education, which was fighting illiteracy but refrained from participating in any campaign to *condition* the Moslem population politically. A first arrest occurred in 1956. . . . In July 1957, in the heat of the battle of Algiers, sixteen members of the agency's personnel were tried before an Algiers court-martial: two were condemned but paroled, one young Moslem was condemned to imprisonment for one year, thirteen were acquitted. During the first trial, one young Moslem, Said Ayadi, vanished in the Army premises where he was held and has never been seen again. Circles concerned with national education were so shocked by all this that a complaint was filed by a number of civil servants; a campaign of intimidation was started then among them, in the course of which a boy, kidnapped by men wearing paratrooper uniforms, also disappeared. In May and June 1959, about twenty people attached to the agency were again arrested, six of them imprisoned. On December 19, 1959, an Algiers court sentenced two monitors and two casual employees of the agency to sentences of three months or eight months of imprisonment.

From all this, it can indeed be seen that French authorities were quite schizophrenic in their attitudes toward this official agency, their left hand never really wanting to know, until it was too late, what their right was up to.

Nor is this an isolated example of contradictory attitudes or, as optimists might believe, of an "evolution" of the government's stand on the whole Algerian issue. On March 22nd, *le Monde* announced briefly that the officially ordered seizure of all copies of *La Gangrene,* a book reporting details of alleged cases of torturing, had been lifted, which suggests that the contested material of the book had meanwhile been proven to be true. Yet Premier Michel Debré, on June 25, 1959, had stated, in a speech to the Senate: "I insist on declaring to the Assembly that this book consists of a wholesale fabrication. . . . I would not like it to be said here that this infamous book, drafted by two infamous authors, represents in any detail even the shadow of truth. It is purely and simply a mendacious fabrication and has been compiled by two authors who are paid by the Communist party." The Premier has not found it necessary to withdraw these curious statements which, in most civilized countries, would now justify an action for slander before the courts.

It would not be absurd to believe that the OAS, which is led by General Salan with the help of a large staff of deserters from the armed forces and from security agencies, has done little else, in its more criminal actions of recent months, but continue to implement those extremist policies that had been practiced earlier by the army in Algeria and even in the police stations and prisons of metropolitan France.

We now know, for instance, of many proven cases of torture which involved the use of expensive equipment in carefully prepared hideouts. All this required funds that, especially in a nation of accountants like

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France, must have been drawn from some earmarked budgetary reserves, approved at some level of the administrative hierarchy. We know also of many individuals who have disappeared after having been arrested and questioned, of many proven murders that have occurred in premises of the Army or the police, of a great number of corpses of hideously manhandled Algerians that have been fished out of the Seine, where they had been thrown to drown, by the Paris police, when they were no longer in a condition to save themselves by swimming. We know of whole Algerian villages that have been wiped out by the Army in *ratissage* operations, men, women and children, because they had supplied food to FLN forces; and we know also of *ratonnades,* real pogroms carried out by French paratroopers even in the Algerian sections of such industrial centers of metropolitan France as Metz. Again and again, as OAS strong-arm men, thugs, conspirators and bandits are now being arrested, we are casually informed that they happen to be deserters from paratroop regiments, from the Foreign Legion or from other highly compromised elements of the Armed Forces or the Civil Service. Obviously, these men had once been specially recruited and trained for this kind of job. But those who recruited them seem to have ignored the known psychological fact that the kind of anti-social instability which guarantees a man the aptitudes required for successful adaptation to the life of a more or less legalized thug may also make him feel just as few qualms about turning against the authorities that recruited and trained him.

When the FLN in recent months began to acquire gradually the kind of official recognition that might enable it to demand retribution for crimes committed against its supporters, many members of the French Armed forces and of the special security units must have felt that they were out on a limb, committed to a way of life that might soon cease to enjoy any kind of legality or official encouragement. In desperation, they then joined the OAS which, in any case, seems to be even less squeamish about the moral character of its strong-arm men than the French Army and security forces: in recent months, it has thus been almost impossible for the ordinary police in metropolitan France to distinguish very clearly between routine underworld crimes and the kidnappings, blackmail ventures and armed robberies that are part of the fund-raising campaigns of the OAS. One wonders indeed how much of the money collected by supposed OAS agents has actually reached the OAS treasury.

The OAS is the bad conscience of France; of its present government, which was originally brought to power by a *putsch* in which those who later established the OAS had cooperated; of its whole rag, tag and bobtail of former Poujadists, jingoists and various near-fascist or former collaborationist elements of one kind or another. The lunatic fringe, *mirabile dictu,* even includes a certain number of families of the *haute juiverie* of Algiers who have long been personal friends and supporters of Jacques Soustelle, former Government Commissioner in Algeria, former Cabinet Minister, former *Nouvelle Revue Française* author, former putschist and, in recent months, a conspirator who lives in hiding in Italy or "somewhere in France." Men trained to torture and mur-

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der Moslems are now fighting General de Gaulle's government in a guerrilla war that goes on after the cease-fire in the barricaded streets of Algiers and Oran, cities from which, in March, it had for several weeks been impossible to escape to metropolitan France without an exit permit granted by some clandestine OAS agency. Former Minister Jacques Soustelle, once a friend of Minister André Malraux, may find himself soon in much the same position as, in 1944, such writers as Drieu La Rochelle or Robert Brasillach who, after flirting with Nazism, woke up one day from their Nietzschean dreams of power to see themselves condemned to death as traitors.

The cease-fire agreement, like the Liberation in 1944, officially closes an inglorious period in French history. But its very legality has already been impugned in the Assemblée Nationale, where extremist deputies such as Biaggi have ranted against the government and its supporters and demanded that they be summarily executed as traitors. At the grass-roots level, an important section of the European population of Algeria, mainly in Oran and Algiers, has long been planning a kind of Custer's Last Stand of its own, armed to the teeth with weapons, ammunition and supplies stolen, without much difficulty, from official stores. For a long time to come, we may thus expect sporadic acts of violence, even after the OAS strongholds in Oran and Algiers capitulate.

Two urgent tasks must be assumed immediately in Algeria. Firstly, the job of reconstruction, after eight years of warfare and hundreds of years of under-development, will prove to be far greater than anything that France alone can undertake. Spectacular financial and technical aid will be required from international sources too, as Geneviève Tabouis reported two days before the cease-fire, on her return from Geneva, where United Nations' experts were already estimating that aid to the Congo, in the past year, will prove to have been child's play compared with the aid required by Algeria. French official estimates list, for eight years of war, less than two hundred thousand casualties in the ranks of the FLN armed forces and among the Moslem victims of its various terrorist activities in Algeria and France. FLN forces, on the other hand, have estimated total Moslem casualties, including civilians killed in French Army reprisals carried out on individual villages and victims of starvation, at well over a million.

The second task to be undertaken concerns mainly the French Government. The cease-fire agreement includes a clause that guarantees a political amnesty and, on both sides, forbids reprisals for the political beliefs or activities of individuals during the war years. Before the French National Assembly, Minister Joxe stated, however, on March 21st, that this did not protect individuals whose criminal actions were unworthy of France. The FLN, on the other hand, is known to have collected scathing evidence of outrages committed by individual members of the French Army and security forces: torturings, murders, rape, etc. . . . The new Algerian Government can now be expected to demand that many of these individuals, as well as many OAS criminals who are continuing to

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murder Moslems at random in Oran and Algiers, be put on trial.

Will the French authorities have the courage and integrity to face all these consequences of their own folly? Can they at long last be expected to purge their own armed forces and civil service? Will the trial of General Salan, if it ever occurs with him actually standing in the dock, be any less lenient than that of Marshall Pétain after the Liberation? Or are we now destined to experience another moving scene of French national reconciliation, with the schizophrenic nation's divided political mind again achieving, for a while, a semblance of peace and equilibrium, like a patient who has just been subjected to shock-treatment but who may any day become violent again? Are we returning, as in 1944, to "business as usual," while a majority of those who committed crimes against humanity in North Africa are pushed temporarily into the background, but remain ready to emerge again as double-agents, torturers, murderers, thugs or rebels in France's next political crisis?

Again and again, in recent decades, thinkers have attributed the vagaries of French political behavior to a "crisis of the régime." But the régime has changed several times and the pattern of these vagaries, whatever their constitutional context, remains very much the same. Actually, we face in France a crisis of citizenship too. In every democracy, a certain amount of governmental schizophrenia is to be expected as normal: a judiciary which would never be called upon to defend the rights of the individual against the aberrations of the legislative or the encroachments of the executive would lose its most glorious function. But in France, as in several other modern nations, authority has gradually discredited itself in the eyes of many citizens as a result of some very strange phenomena of its own sociology. A couple of years ago, while reviewing in *Commentary* the published memoirs of Hoess, *Commandant in Auschwitz,* I drew attention to some of these phenomena: governments are tending more and more to recruit potential criminals as ideal material for special jobs in their armed forces and security agencies. Such potential criminals prove indeed to be remarkably docile when trained to perform unpleasant tasks that would revolt more normal citizens. But they generally prove to be great "security risks" too. In postwar Europe, we can observe the survival of certain patterns of behavior that once characterized the Resistance under the German occupation. Whole sections of the population, as now the extremist European elements in Algiers and Oran, refuse to comply with the imperatives of democratic authority if these fail to be in harmony with their own special interests. In a vicious circle, an increasingly ungovernable nation finds itself governed by increasingly unconstitutional or violent methods, with authority often represented by increasingly dubious or criminal elements. It now remains to be seen whether General de Gaulle, in the next twelve months, will have the courage and the vision to purge the ranks of his armed forces, his civil service and his own supporters, of all these unworthy representatives of authority. He must achieve this in so spectacular a manner that the French population at large will accept these purges and readapt itself to normal standards of democratic authority.

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THE YOUNG RADICALS:
A SYMPOSIUM

Michael Walzer

In the past year or two, there has been a great deal of talk about a new politics among the young: a new interest in radicalism and perhaps even in radical *ideas*. Often enough, however, it has not been young people who have done the talking; the new politics is activist but not very well articulated. Those of us who participate in it are most frequently the objects of interest, in a society which requires endless objects. And I can foresee a time when people will get bored with us. The sit-ins and the freedom rides, the occasionally riotous efforts to force the abolition of the House Un-American Activities Committee, the campaign against capital punishment, the peace strikes and marches—all these demonstrate only the temporary charm and limitations of the young. What is most engaging about the activities of the sixties, I think, is the keen sense of pleasure in our politics, the desire for personal encounter, the organizational naiveté. The false sophistication and largely vicarious weariness of the fifties is gone, while the surrender of self to history or party, which so often characterized the men of the thirties, has not reappeared.

On the other hand, our politics is almost purely negative: *against* segregation, HUAC, capital punishment, bomb testing, civil defense, intervention in Cuba, and so on—it would not be hard to extend the list. We lack political perspectives; we are zealous but by and large not committed; we are often anti-ideological. Among ourselves, there has been all too little communication (we exhort each other instead), too little boldness in presenting and defending a coherent viewpoint, too little intellectual self-exposure, too little hard work. There are those among us who become adepts at holding poses—they are eternally young, the first to become boring. Some of the best of us withdraw, after a brief experience of frenetic activism, into a radicalism so private and egocentric as to be incommunicable. But if all this is so, it is at least in part because we are disconnected from any firm sense of adult possibilities. If we become strident and dull, it is because we have not yet found answers to an extraordinary question: how is it possible in America 1962 to grow up political?

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This is the reason, then, for the symposium which follows. I asked a group of young radical intellectuals, some of them strangers, some of them associates in various political enterprises, to answer some questions about their personal commitment and ideological perspectives. Their answers suggest that there is little intellectual agreement among the "new radicals" and above all that there is little shared sense of what the future ought to hold. In a way, the cold war—the definitive political experience of my generation—has left us with narrowed political sympathies and narrowed minds. We are most alert to those possibilities which we oppose and dread. Surely there is now an enormous need for thought and argument which will break through the limits we have up until now endured. If radicals have ever believed that they could replace these two with spontaneous feelings and continuous activity, they were never more wrong.

THE QUESTIONS

1) *In what ways do you identify yourself as a radical? Many young people have expressed a sense of estrangement from the older radical (and socialist) traditions. Do you feel that your political views are different from those of an earlier generation of radicals? Do you have much to say to the socialists whose political education took place in the thirties?—much to learn from them?*

2) *What are the political issues in which you are most interested?*

3) *What forms of organization and activity do you feel are open to radicals today? What forms of "commitment"? In the past year the old question "what can we do?" has received some new answers. Do any of these seem to you to open the way to an effective left-wing politics in America today?*

4) *In what ways do you think Americans should respond to the nationalist and revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries? What sort of personal response do figures like Lumumba, Castro, Sekou-Touré, etc., evoke from you? To what extent would you withhold sympathy from movements which seem destined to establish authoritarian regimes?*

5) *What is your appraisal of the Kennedy Administration? In the aftermath of the Cuban intervention a marked pessimism seems to have descended upon many young people. Some of them have even suggested that they feel caught up in the futilities of the politics of an* ancien regime. *What is your sense of the American future? How far-reaching are the changes you think necessary in our society?*

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Our pessimism, negation and fearfulness are indeed spontaneous, but they are not enough!

I asked Lewis Coser to comment on the symposium responses not in order to conclude the discussion with an authoritative voice, but rather to begin it properly. Inevitably, that discussion must also be a dialogue between younger and older radicals—if only because the disagreements among the younger writers are not startlingly new. The Cuban revolution, for example, has divided opinion along familiar lines, despite our intense desire to be original. For myself, however, I do not believe that we should turn to the older radicalism only for some insight into the nature of these disagreements. We should indeed guard our politics from becoming merely a matter of stereotyped reactions to events which are not part of our own experience. There was something more in the older radicalism—and I know that it survives: a positive and public ardor and an intellectual excitement, neither of which has been adequately replaced by our own activist enthusiasm or our keen personal sense of all the things we dislike. And I think that, for all our disagreements, something of my own desire to find again a way to a creative public life motivates most of the contributors to this symposium.

Brief biographical notes on the contributors can be found at the end of the symposium.

Roger Hagan

What makes me identify as a radical is the conviction that something new must be added to the American calculus of goods and bads, rights and wrongs. I have an uneasy sense of a whole nation skating lightly over a cracking shell of rationalization and denial, even when there really is a firmer ground to stand on. To the extent that Americans have achieved a good society, they have done so in a curiously inarticulate fashion, celebrating what is trivial and even negative, and missing what really makes this country more livable than any other on earth. America is like the inarticulate, mumbling hero of its modern drama, tragically unable to discover its own saving qualities in time to avoid a meaningless and wasteful end. As a student of history I look for the sources of the hopeful developments, trying to figure out what became of them and why practically no one undertook to give them a place in the American self-image. As an actor in the present I try to cut through the fraud and locate the authentically life-giving dimensions of this society. In this I feel myself to be racing not only against hot war but against the Cold War as well, for the latter drives the country to a retrenchment which will close off all experimentation in humane liberalism.

The purpose of both activities—the purpose of any new radicalism with which I can identify—is to revive hope. A secondary purpose is

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to make genuine liberalism possible in American politics. I am critical of liberals, but there is no one else near power who can avert war in the next few years, so I should like to make more secure the position of such as Fulbright. Keeping in mind what *else* I should like to see begun, the best way to aid liberals seems to be the development of an audible and numerically significant Left which could place *them* closer to the revered center. The lesson of the 1904–1916 and 1930–1938 periods seems clear enough: genuine progressives and liberals achieved most when there was an active Left beyond them. If the few liberals in Washington can save us from holocaust by promising to save the country from the radicals, I shall be delighted to serve, even if it comes to dressing up like a woolly anarchist for a while. That is one reason why I have begun to march in demonstrations. Of course we move on many fronts at once, and need not give up our efforts to supplant or sophisticate the liberal world view even while being grateful to liberals.

1.) I have little to say to or learn from most socialists and fellow-travelers of the thirties. With a few exceptions, their recent function has been not to revive but to deny hope.

Some of them are still arguing for state ownership of all large economic functions, without asking whether gains in convenience of allocation and the aesthetic pleasure of extirpating profit considerations really compensate for the creation of a new and impermeable bureaucracy. The old formula has not been clearly proven wrong, but it does not seem subtle enough to affect positively the course of development.

Others of the old Left are now reacting in the opposite direction to identify economic goals as a total mistake and political freedoms as the sole criteria for judging social change and political activity. The questions that must be asked of this reactive stance are endless and I shall not enter into them.

Finally, some of the old Left seem to have become cold warriors. Obsessed with the phenomenon of Stalinism, the betrayals of which became the pivotal experience of their lives, they can think only of military revenge, a dream which they suppress just sufficiently to bring themselves into line with, of all people, SAC generals and Luce magazines. They urge the "acceptable" formulas of deterrence, intransigence, and quiet strangulation. They hold to a one-dimensional, non-dynamic view of The Enemy, judging all change in terms of a model fixed in the late thirties. They call any alteration or softening or liberalization, any hopeful but tenuous Soviet attempt to move away from rigid patterns and change the internal balance of "hards" and "softs," "merely a change of line." By aligning for their psychic tranquility with the "hards" at home they help strengthen the "hards" abroad, fulfilling all their darkest visions and discrediting liberal hopes. Both in their enthusiasm for military solutions, and in their arrogant conviction that they have seen into the dark heart of the radical and know as no one else can what is really valid and what is self-seeking among political goals, they seem just too involved in settling their own accounts for a

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new Left to bother about. I should add, however, that with those of them whose humanistic spirit and hopefulness still predominate, and who have the courage to keep expressing this—the war danger has brought some such men prominence once again—I feel great kinship, and I have learned much from them.

4.) I would support such a leader as Lumumba wholeheartedly unless I could learn that he was nothing but a self-seeking totalitarian. We have seen what hope parliamentary democracy *alone* is in the Congo, where positions change and contractual agreements are broken from hour to hour. It is naive to suppose that parliamentary democracy is the be-all and end-all, sufficient as a goal unto itself in a land lacking the traditions of contract and legality (and also lacking unwritten techniques like the rotten borough system and the party machine which have propped up British and American democracy where it otherwise would have broken down).

To begin with, I would still press for democracy, but on all fronts, not just the political, so that the organism could grow whole. I would expect deviations, just as our city bosses of a few decades ago were deviations, and I would judge each one on its merits. The city boss, after all, helped ease the unprepared immigrant into complex urban industrial civilization when nobody else gave a hoot for him. If in spite of my efforts it came to a question of whether I should favor a greedy self-serving local boss who was colored over a greedy self-serving white official of Union Minière, I would unquestionably choose the former. In all cases, however, I would try to keep riding the leftist tiger in hopes of heading him off rather than abandoning him and trying to starve him out. And I would expect to get bitten (expropriated, denounced, temporarily snubbed) now and then. The point which must be grasped is that few if any nationalist-revolutionary leaders come to power with the dream of totalitarianism. Not even Lenin did, and only in his last years did he see the perhaps irredeemable toll of corruption which the course of revolution and the problems of power had taken among the Bolsheviks. So much the more will it be true for the less ideological leaders of the new nations that authoritarian politics arises not from intent but from the dilemma of power in a hostile (non-nurturing) environment. One expects regimes which identify themselves with a national vision to try to maintain themselves; whether from power-lust or to safeguard the revolution is unimportant, for the actions will be the same. The question is whether we shall contribute to those dilemmas and that hostility or shall nurture such revolutions and help their leaders achieve their first vision before degeneration takes place and closes off the routes toward liberal freedoms and democratic socialism.

5.) The Kennedy Administration is good, better than we could have dared to hope from Kennedy himself or from the Democratic party, except perhaps during the Party's brief, opportunistic flirt with enlightened liberalism in its 1960 platform. This, of course, is not to say that

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the Administration is good enough, but it is not as bad as it appeared to be at the time of Cuba. If the President has lost his chance to lead Congress by trying to please everybody during his first year, he is at least now very much afraid of war and resentful of rightist attacks and pressures. He has begun to fight back, although, as usual, begging (via hints dropped by his staff) leaders of public opinion and placers of ads to prepare the way for him rather than taking the lead himself.

But if the last two months have increased my respect for a few people in the White House and State Department, they have not made me feel that many people in either the Administration or Congress have the vision and courage to break out of the patterns of establishment thought which hold us, as in a vise, in the path of war. It became clear in January, for example, that Castro is still the national obsession and that the Administration was prepared to make cynical use of the Alliance for Progress program in order to buy votes in the OAS to support its vendetta. Nor do I see evidence of any greater understanding of the potentiality for leadership in our democracy in a time of crisis —to expand the public understanding. I see nothing new being added to the American world-view, and in particular no understanding of or sympathy for social change. There seems to be little force behind the domestic liberal program, but even if this must be chalked up to politics, it is also true that the program for improving the quality of life is a shallow one, understandably the first to be abandoned since it rests on no deep concern for the alienation, impotence, and pent-up aggression of citizens of mass-industrial society.

Some of the President's stated goals are seductive, and at moments it is tempting to fall into his arms with dreams of ultimate union. There is a tendency among some members of the anti-war Left (indeed, those with whom I am most intimately associated) to play *solely* the internal pressure group, working through friends in Washington and spurred on by their tantalizing hints and requests to counteract the rightists. What is disturbing about all this is that a President with any genuine social-democratic views would not be so subject to the parallelogram of forces in the first place. We might reflect on what every young girl should know: that not all seductions lead to marriage, and some are for nothing more than momentary convenience. The inside-dopester game need not be abandoned, but it would be foolish to ignore the need to establish an independent Left position and strength, something that will weather the next "inexplicable" victory of the military-industrial-right viewpoint in the White House without being shattered and disillusioned, and that may find more significant means of altering policy.

2.) I am most concerned about foreign affairs: disengagement, disarmament, world government, world birth control. Yet, these are procedural matters rather than substantive political goals. That is, progress on them is necessary to enable the latter to be pursued. My political goals themselves are very long range and concern the alteration of social character and social structure in order to make possible for all

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people freedom in its broadest sense (i.e., both "negative" and "positive," in Isaiah Berlin's distinction; or in the fourfold definition of freedom in Erich Fromm's *May Man Prevail?*).

3.) My answer to question three is primarily a statement of faith in the life of ideas. More is needed than thought, but thought is needed too, and there is little of it even among intelligent Americans. The only clear waste, then, is to remain silent. But almost as clearly a waste would be to speak only inward to the Left, rather than outward to the liberal and uncommitted. Since much of the old Left and pacifist movement has what Robert P. Wolff calls the loser psychology anyway, they are a bottomless sink ready to receive and exhaust one's energies in endless theological disputation. Granted that the issue of Stalinism will never be dead as long as there is a Left, that it was "the good fight"; it is nonetheless so far from primary at this time as to be virtually an irrelevant trap for men of good will.

While there is no clear route to political significance at the moment, there are a number of organizations raising the intellectual temperature. Such are the Committee of Correspondence and several groups within professional organizations like the American Psychological Association, the American Anthropological Association, and the Federation of American Scientists. There are also tentative "movements" which will develop some political sophistication for those participating, even if, as movements, they last only a few months. Such things have begun to achieve nationwide scope and establish networks of communication reaching into sectors of the intelligentsia not previously tapped by SANE or the pacifist organizations. The war issue is, of course, the key to these sectors, but the war issue is educative. One cannot become involved in it without getting a sense of the interrelatedness of issues. Furthermore, activity connected with it can leave feelings of effectuality in its wake, reversing the trend toward political alienation. This, and the skew toward youth in the voting population since the warbaby generation has begun to reach voting age, have great political potential. I will not venture to say what activity or route will prove to be the crucial one, nor even to say whether the prime hope is to shore up genuine liberalism or to supplant it. In a situation as fluid as this, I prefer improvisation to programming.

At the moment, then, just two considerations stand out: the new Left is still utterly inept politically, its only effectiveness being to play the games of influence and of demonstration; and yet at some moment in the near future it will find that the Right has driven moderates toward it, along with a good segment of the young; and both of these will support something more courageously visionary, peace-oriented, and anti-crank-militant than the present Administration and Democratic party seem capable of bringing forth. This will not necessarily be a majority but it may in many places be a decisive minority in the balance of the two-party system. If the Left can then articulate its goals, find its spokesmen, and gain its political sophistication, it may find it-

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self with an opportunity unparalleled in our history. The crisis of the old order was only superficially encountered in 1929–32; it occurs in a far deeper sense in the early sixties, as spokesmen for militant free enterprise ideology veer toward a war whose finality and pointlessness are obvious to a growing minority of Americans. This is not a situation for optimism, but a hopeful resolution to work leftward on several fronts and with several tactics seems far from unrealistic.

Jeremy Larner

1.) I am a radical because as a child I found myself in a world of lies. The three lies which, put together, make the biggest lie, are the lies of sex, money and authority. We were taught by conscious threats and unconscious fear: *sex is evil, money brings happiness, authority equals moral superiority*. I was pressured to submit to these lies; time and time again it was demonstrated how easy it would be not to be hated. In fact, that lesson constituted almost the whole of my education, both at home and at school. But I found I could not submit. My recalcitrance was not a decision; it was only a circumstance. I simply knew that I could not be happy unless the world around me were drastically changed—specifically, I wished that others could yearn for truth as I yearned. When I said this, or showed it, I was bitterly attacked, punished, humiliated. By my continued stubbornness, I knew myself a radical.

As for old socialists, I feel strongly about them because they were the first grown-up respectables I met who shared some of my dissatisfaction. I learned from them to think hard, to pay attention to history, and to love and use irony. But their limitations as people seem disastrous, and frustrate me insofar as they are my own. They appear to be tedious, tired of themselves, full of self-hate, and chained to an idealism so abstract that it precludes all love of life. If you don't love life, why be alive? Not only do you miss the world's incredible luxuriance of textures, colors, personalities, but you are blind to the infinite visions of *possibility* which distinguish men from beasts. Man is the only animal who *becomes,* but when he insists too narrowly on the path of his becoming, his emotions get constipated and he makes life a drag.

Now I admire their idealism and many of their ideals. But they are so pathetically limited (one might even say *conservative*) when it comes to imagining new existential modes and relations and sequences which might make some of these ideals possible! For example, I assent with all my heart to the notion that economic democracy is a necessary part of man's becoming free and healthy and creative. But why insist on the Marxist order of things? Given such democracy as we already have, perhaps we must find some means to make ourselves more free and healthy and creative *first*. The history of our century does not fulfill the prophecy that the discontent of exploited masses leads them to establish democratic

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governments and creative modes of living—all they want is a share of the spoils. Political reform imposed from the top only leads to political regression and the need for new authority . . . and new scapegoats, new violence. So it is boorish and stupid and inhuman to insist that human problems can be solved solely through politics. That is why I don't find it much use to think of myself as a socialist, because it is my experience that a socialist politics does not get to the root of the matter—is *not radical enough!* The changes we need are so drastic that the human imagination cannot embrace them without casting aside a load of its oldest and dearest possessions.

"There is only one way to progress—the self-perfection of every human being."—LEO TOLSTOY.

2.) I am interested that men be the most and best they can. Perhaps this means that all men will be artists—capable of creating pleasure each on his own. Certainly it means that each man will desire to seek and face his own truth. To seek truth men must have peace and freedom; consequently I am interested in the dissolution of the arms race, and all other fictions that bind men into hostile groups. I have participated in strikes, picketing, and propagandizing to end bomb-testing and bomb-making. This politically complex issue is on a human level very simple: a small risk, prolonged over a long enough time, becomes a certainty. That's the way life began on this earth, with single cells eventually coalescing in paleozoic seas—and that's the way it will surely end, unless men can find less totally destructive toys to play with. Socialists who accept the accelerating-deterrent theory and rejoice in their *realpolitik* are victimized by the limitations of their abstract vocabularies.

Privilege and business also divide men into hostile groups, and therefore I am an advocate of political and economic democracy. Without true education, however, democracy degenerates into the kind of selfish scramble we have at present in Washington. The development of a true education would involve unprecedented concern with communication, the outlines of which are already implied in our modern usage of such words as "orientation," "assumption," and the fascinating psychoanalytic word "resistance." It's even possible that we need a whole new language —a more honest, more accurate language—a language of root perceptions. I am frightened but also thrilled to think that the Western intellectual vocabulary is washed up, and those who remain tied to it are spiritually dead.

Behind these issues stands the great existential issue—that men must somehow learn to enjoy themselves or else kill themselves from spite and frustration. This issue is eternal, I know, and perhaps not what is meant here by "issue," but we are living in the first years of history that man has had the power to destroy himself down to the last person. Among other things, the achievement of pleasure depends on our methods of child-rearing, about which almost nothing is known. Considering this alone, it makes me sick to see political people so smugly contemptuous of the study of psychology. Obviously, to achieve the pleasures men need

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we must do more, much more, than impose different political institutions on top of the same old system of unworkable assumptions and defenses by which humans have come to live. We must risk a complete reorientation of the psyche—turn our whole culture inside out if necessary—to find new patterns of thinking and feeling.

3.) The radical must campaign for truth, beginning in his most personal relations. If a radical can't come through for those around him, no contribution to humanity can compensate for the damage he will do. The next commitment is to one's immediate community. I agree with Michael Walzer (DISSENT, Fall 1960) that authoritarianism is most effectively thwarted when the small groups that it affects simply *resist*. On national and international levels, I admire the peace-walkers and sit-inners because they present the public with a fact, an undeniable portion of the truth. Look, says the new Negro, I am *not* content to remain inferior. I'll sit right here/not buy your products/make life difficult, until you give me my rights. Look, says the peace-marcher, I want to live. You lie when you say bombs are good for me. Somehow I'm going to make you see that people are all people, and not mere reds or blues.

There can be no meaningful left-wing politics in America until we demolish our ghastly lies.

4.) I dislike the phrasing of this question. To begin with I am nauseated by nationalism and all other forms of religion that preach superiority and hatred. But the Western merchants have preyed on the rest of the world like vultures—Lumumba, Castro, etc., are their natural children, and the parent is always responsible for the child-parent relationship. I totally sympathize with, say, Castro's desire to free and nourish and educate his people—would that Kennedy felt so strongly about the same things! The demagoguery and the Stalinism seem to me mainly infections caught from Western greed and pride. When the U. S. is ready to back a fascist rather than abandon United Fruit and Standard Oil, it is only logical that new nations will try to fight fire with fire. I reject the implication here that the American choice is simply to support or not support soon-to-become-authoritarian regimes. Perhaps that will be our choice only so long as we continue to export an exploitative capitalism. There is a chance that if our government were ready to haul in our merchant princes, and to tell Americans what it really means to be democratic, we might begin to have an influence in maintaining genuinely democratic regimes. Surely this—and not arms-racing and not embracing rightists—is the kind of chance the U. S. must take. With the others, we just can't win nohow. They say Kennedy is frustrated, but apparently he is too much the banker's son to consider dropping the hypocrisy and going all the way to enfranchise new democracies. As a radical, however, I will not limit myself to *his* sense of alternatives.

5.) When Kennedy won office, Murray Kempton commented that "A nation of quartermasters has elected a P-T boat commander." But because Kennedy has power, or seems to, there is a tendency among po-

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litical people to take him seriously. Yet how can you take seriously a man who goes along with the likes of Johnson, J. Edgar, Rusk, McCone, etc., etc., etc.? And that's only the beginning. I first saw Kennedy when he debated Nixon, and was appalled at his inarticulateness and lack of ideas. As he and Nixon traded memorized statistics, I was reminded of the run-of-the-mill half-bright campus politician: sober and eager to lead—he doesn't know *where* he wants to lead to, but that just leaves him flexible in times of crisis. Since then Kennedy has proved himself a hipster in the worst sense—the sense in which Paul Goodman calls Madison Avenue intellectuals hipsters: he feeds on the worship of people he despises. If only he would offend some group! To his disgrace, Kennedy has consistently avoided his tremendous opportunity to inform and influence the public. He has chosen instead to manipulate behind the scenes, toadying to congressmen and indeed accepting our necrotic Congress in its *status quo.*

Since the man will not tell the truth to the people, it is clear he has no faith in democracy—a shortcoming that could be fatal, for if democracy cannot be made to work, men will have small recourse from authoritarianism and authority-complexes. Benevolent temporizing does not alleviate, but merely postpones and intensifies the issue. For this reason Kennedy is a dangerous man.

Surely America cannot continue so torpid as she was in the fifties; history is moving too fast and already there are signs of unrest and change. But there isn't much time left—it's becoming increasingly clear that men will be either free and peaceful . . . or nothing. I understand that in the next ten years man's store of information about the world will double—a stunning conception! I am hoping for a longshot—that some of this knowledge may be about ourselves, and that it may be what's needed to turn the key to a different style of being. But history repeats itself, and all things come to an end, and were I a rational man I would cry in the street like a prophet and tear my hair.

Staughton Lynd

A few hundred years from now (if there are any human beings left), historians will look back on the time we live in and call it the Period of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. I believe this transition is the fundamental thing going on in the world today, and that everyone must define his politics in relation to it. I consider myself a radical in that I applaud the coming of socialism, and seek to assist rather than to resist it.

At the same time, I regard socialism as a mere apparatus rather than an apocalyptic consummation. Public ownership of the means of production, and public economic planning, are the necessary housekeeping devices for any modern society seeking to cope with its problems.

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Whether a given society which possesses this socialist apparatus will be a humane society is quite another question. It is, as I see it, a question which depends not on historical forces, but on human activity, on ourselves. The choice facing modern nations is not, capitalism or socialism?, but, a humane or an inhumane socialism? Just as De Tocqueville advised his fellow-aristocrats that democracy was inevitable and that they should seek, rather than resisting, to humanize it, so we should be telling the American public that socialism can be democratic and humane, if they will make it so.

We must not delude ourselves into the belief that America's permanent war economy can drift on endlessly in its present form, that the question of socialism is a real question only for other societies. Apart from the great economic depression which would ensue if America stopped spending on defense; apart from the ever-increasing danger that the arms race will tip over into nuclear holocaust; apart from the life-stifling and late-Roman-Empire atmosphere of our society, which twists and frustrates all simple constructive impulses—apart from these considerations, the spread of socialist economic planning throughout the world is going to produce more and more panic and hysteria in America. Like the South on the eve of the Civil War, although prosperous and threatened by no serious internal discontent our society is nonetheless a society in crisis. The immediate political possibility in America is not socialism but fascism, and socialism, if it comes, is likely to come by way of resistance to fascism.

The essence of fascism, I take it, is the destruction of the democratic part of "bourgeois democracy" in order to save the bourgeois: the attack on all decent, humane values associated with the rise of Western capitalism, in order to preserve the naked power of the capitalist class. In the South, where I now live, fascism is not an abstraction. Every reform directed toward a more liberal condition must take on the whole Southern Establishment; from the standpoint of the Establishment, academic freedom, white and Negro washing their hands in the same sink, trade unionism, and socialism, are all parts of one pervasive subversion. I predict that a similar coalescing of opposing groups will take place in the North also, as more countries are "lost" to the non-capitalist world, and the Birchite hysteria mounts.

It follows from the danger of fascism that the task of humanizing socialism, with which I began, becomes not at all a remote consideration postponable until "after the Revolution," but a matter of urgency. We must begin right now to defend those elemental human values, those commonly-agreed-on simple decencies, against fascism, just as elsewhere in the world they are being defended against socialist bureaucracies. In the process of transition from capitalism to socialism in America, there will never be a time when legality, freedom of inquiry, and mere kindness, will be irrelevant. Looking back, it is easy to see that Catholic Thomas More and Puritan John Lilburne, the "reactionary" and the "progressive," were in some sense fighting the same battle, unconsciously

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laboring together to keep open the possibility that English capitalist society would be a humane and liberal society. Wt must be prepared to seek out comrades who differ from us in many things, but share an intangible devotion to a social atmosphere worthy of human beings.

In my view, therefore, the Marxist and pacifist currents in present American radicalism must recognize their need for each other, and join hands. There is virtually no communication between the people working in these two traditions.

What, concretely, do the Marxist and pacifist (or "new radical") traditions have to give each other?

It seems to me that the morale of the Marxist tradition in America has suffered not merely because of the inadequacy of its leadership, but also because socialism as a goal to strive for no longer has much meaning to young dissidents. For one thing, it appears impossibly far off in our seemingly stable and prosperous society. More than that, however, socialism no longer calls to mind an array of concrete conditions obviously transcending what capitalism can offer. The welfare state provides minimum material standards for enough workers to blunt the cutting edge of the old economic grievances. Just how, one is asked, would socialism differ from what we have now?

In answering, one has to do better than to point to those communal enterprises, such as city-planning, education, and medical care, which are hopelessly and inevitably botched in a capitalist society. Socialism must and will also mean a new atmosphere in human relationships, a new creativity in daily life.

At this point the new radicalism makes its appeal. It has no long-term goals, no historical perspectives, no considered strategy for changing society: these are its fatal defects. But what the new radicalism offers is the infinitely precious possibility of each individual taking some definite step in the present moment toward worthwhile human ends. By joining in a peace march, by risking jail in an integration struggle, one acts, not as a counter in some abstract far-flung *Weltanschaung,* but as a human being affirming the value of human life right now. There is no inherent contradiction between this mood and socialism: on the contrary. Debs spoke in this tone in defying imprisonment during the First World War. But the quality has slipped away from latter-day American socialists.

Yet the new radicalism suffers from an intellectual shallowness which cripples its efforts. My friend Dave Dellinger has been a stubborn and courageous advocate of non-violence for over twenty years, but he (shaken, I think, by his encounter with revolution in Cuba) now writes of the pacifist movement: "We want to be against war without having to be against the things that cause war."* Martin King's young followers in the South are likewise failing to examine the disproportionate unemployment among Negroes, the structural economic obstacles to the Negro's advance toward real equality. Hence the Black Muslims cite government statistics, and the Gandhians squirm uncomfortably. A re-

* *Liberation,* January 1962, p. 21.

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cent letter in the *Atlanta Inquirer,* written by a poor Negro domestic worker and addressed to the city's middle-class Negro leadership, spoke of "your integration struggle." The price of the intellectual shallowness of the pacifist and integration movements is their failure to move off the campus and outside the middle class.

There is no magic formula for bringing together and fusing the insights of the Marxist and pacifist traditions. It will have to be done by the creative actions of human beings. But it has to be done.

I have also been asked to comment on "the left-nationalist and revolutionary regimes which seem to be building an inhumane socialism." I take this to mean Ghana and Indonesia as well as Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Surely one necessity is to be honest. Last winter, Richard Gibson in the *Times* and several imitators elsewhere asserted that the question of democracy in Cuba closely resembled the practice of the American Revolution, since no national election in America was held for thirteen years, i.e., from 1776 to 1789. Now, this is nonsense. There were no national elections until 1789 because there was no directly elected national government. But in the states, even the extra-legal state governments created between 1774 and 1776 were elected, and every state turned as quickly as possible (often in the midst of fighting) to drafting a new constitution. Almost without exception, the new state constitutions instituted annual elections as the cornerstone of democratic government, and most, of course, also included a Bill of Rights.

Yet I personally feel the strongest sort of kinship with the revolutionary upheavals of the non-Western world. How dare we as Americans sit in judgment on them? Our own early national history was built on the three cornerstones of a neutralist foreign policy, central economic planning, and the seizure of new territory by armed force. And who can deny today that America's role all over the world is to arm and finance the forces resisting basic social change? When I attempt to raise questions of morality with Soviet visitors, they shoot back the question, "Why are you arming West Germany?"—and I find it difficult to answer. I do not believe we should muffle criticism of overseas revolutions, but in some sense I feel we have to earn the right to criticize by working harder to check the international counter-revolutionary activities of our own government.

Basically, the revolutionary upsurge from Cuba to China seems to me wonderfully hopeful. As E. H. Carr observes in his new book on history, the pessimism and sense of doom of Western historians expresses the outlook of a social class being pushed off the historical stage. Surely a larger portion of the human race feels hope for the future today than at any time in history. All over the world mankind is rising from its knees.

In the new nations, moreover, a rich and varied experimentation is emerging in just that mingling of Marxist and ethical traditions so needed in America. Perhaps we can help them most precisely by the richness and passion we can bring to creating our own synthesis.

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Julian Mayfield

Since the Second World War the American radical has had the unenviable task of having to advocate socialism in the midst of capitalist plenty. So unrewarding have been his efforts that nowadays he hardly talks about socialism at all, but instead applies his efforts to separate issues, such as civil rights or capital punishment, which seem to contribute to the general progress.

We know that today most of the world's people are groping toward one form of socialism or the other. They take it for granted that a planned society is healthier and more viable than capitalist chaos and drift. The question that confounds them is how to move rapidly toward socialism without sacrificing humanitarian ideals.

The fact that in the U. S. today a socialist is a rare bird not only testifies to the decline of the American Left, but is further evidence of the growing insularity and almost incredible backwardness of this modern industrial nation. It is as if material wealth had dulled the sensibilities of an entire population. Consider, for example, how few of our fellow citizens manifest any concern that human civilization may be pulverized in a nuclear war at any hour. I do not mean to minimize the activities of any of the pacifist organizations or of individuals who have taken a forthright stand for peace and disarmament. The fact remains that they are over-shadowed by the massive anti-bomb demonstrations in Great Britain, a prosperous capitalist nation like our own.

Freedom rides, sit-ins, campaigns to abolish capital punishment and the House Un-American Activities Committee—all are reassuring signs that the entire nation has not yet been reduced to conformity. But even as we applaud we know that these fresh outbursts are only a pale reflection of the vigorous, militant Left that in the 1930s and during the war fought domestic and foreign fascism tooth and nail, the Left that drew its strength from the working class and helped create the Congress of Industrial Organizations. (I am always astonished when I listen to the reminiscences of the "retired" communists and socialists of the period. Many of them actually thought they were coming to power!)

The question persists: What happened to the militant Left after the war? Surely an important part of the explanation lies in the postwar economic prosperity of the country, but I should like to suggest another reason that may help to explain the seeming rootlessness and lack of tradition that characterizes the Young Radical today. It is that the non-communist Left threw in the sponge about fifteen years ago when the reactionaries launched an all-out attack on the Communist party and its closest allies. The non-communist radicals were faced with a dilemma: cooperate with the Communists by resisting the attack of the Right, and thereby risk being labelled themselves as willing or unwilling agents of the Soviet Union, or leave the extreme Left to fend for itself. For many reasons, not the least of which was that they had serious and long-stand-

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ing disagreements with the Communist party, the non-communist radicals chose not to fight. In this period principle yielded to expediency. Leftist and liberal organizations launched their own Red hunts to cleanse themselves before the professional Red hunters could get to them. The powerful labor movement expelled unions wholesale, proclaimed itself neutral politically and, much to the satisfaction of the corporate rulers, tied the wages of its members to the cost of living. "I'm not a Communist, but—" became standard conversational equipment for the radical.

The result was that for a decade American reactionaries had a field day chopping off the heads of their enemies, who were not only the bona-fide Communists, but anybody just a hair's-breadth to the left. During this hysterical period Senator Joseph McCarthy proved himself a great educator. He taught the now silent radicals that the meat grinder of reaction feeds just as well on Pink meat as on Red. And it is well to remember that it was neither liberals nor radicals who engineered McCarthy's downfall, but conservatives who had plans of their own in which the vulgarian senator did not figure.

It is against the political vacuum that was created in the middle fifties that we must consider the Young Radical of today. He has entered the political arena without a long tradition of struggle or a clear idea of what he wants. He is usually a student or an intellectual with no roots, and little interest, in the labor movement. He is as fastidious as his predecessor in avoiding any type of militant action that his enemies might call communistic. He looks upon the elimination of American racism as an end in itself and, until recently, he embraced the gospel of Passive Resistance as preached by Martin Luther King. The Young Radical seldom questions the capitalist system, only its most obvious defects. His objective is not to replace it, but to patch it up.

Now there are at least two groups of radicals (and probably more) who do not fit into this category. The first, with whom I may be identified, is the relatively small group of black radicals, mostly writers and artists, working in the large urban centers. We feel that we owe no loyalty to a society whose continuing racist practices seek to make of us half-men and half-women. We feel we have a stake in anti-colonial movements all over the world, and we do not ask State Department approval before voicing our support of Nkrumah, Touré, Nasser, and Castro. When Patrice Lumumba is murdered before the eyes of the world, we demonstrate in the U. N., and we condemn Dr. Ralph Bunche for presuming to apologize for us. We regard Passive Resistance techniques as an effective weapon for focusing attention on racial injustice by garnering headlines, and by engaging the energies of many fine youths, but we do not consider that these techniques seriously challenge the entrenched white ruling class. We raised money to send arms to Robert F. Williams, the former NAACP leader in Monroe, N. C., (now in exile in Cuba), and we are in implacable opposition to those leaders too timid to advise their black followers to defend themselves against all racist violence. Finally, most of us would not have been caught dead voting for John F.

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Kennedy, and after the hair-raising events of 1961, we feel entitled to say we told you so.

But for all the noise we make, we know that we also are largely ineffective and no real threat to the system. Although we are inaccurately termed "Black Nationalists," we belong to no party, have few followers, and as yet no comprehensive program with which to appeal to our people. If we serve any function at all it is to keep the fires of criticism lit under our recognized leaders who tend to grow complacent after they have had a chat with the President, and learned to call a few Congressmen by their Christian names. Frustration is our staple diet, for we must sit and watch these leaders neglect golden opportunities because of a lack of militancy, vision and commitment.

The second group that should not be ignored is the Black Muslims who, in the context of this discussion, may have the best credentials to claim the title "radical." This closely-knit, disciplined group is almost entirely working-class in membership and orientation. Their leaders seem dedicated and honest. A lot of nonsense has been written about them because they profess no love for American whites. They are not seeking to accommodate themselves to the system, or even to reform it, but to leave it altogether! They want land and indemnification for 250 years of American slavery. This is all quite fanciful, but before we laugh we should consider that the Muslims are the fastest growing organization among Afro-Americans. Within the next two years its membership will almost certainly surpass that of the NAACP, if it does not already.* They are determined to be taken seriously.

Conversations with Muslim leaders have convinced me that they properly appreciate the impregnability of the American power structure and the determination of the white ruling class, south and north, not to allow the black man any meaningful place in it. They know that it is farcical to regard the integration of a few schools and lunch counters as progress while the unemployment rate among Afro-Americans is from three to six times higher than that of whites in northern industrial centers. All this while the administration boasts of an economic upsurge!

It is too early to say how the Muslims will use the tremendous power they are acquiring, or even if they will be a force for progress. Few of us who admire their hard-headed militancy can subscribe to their entire program, some of which seems demagogic and shallow. Still they have succeeded in winning a large segment of the neglected and abused black working class, something no other organization has done, and to

* The Muslims claim nearly half a million members, and their enemies (the spokesmen for the black middle class) concede them a quarter of a million members. NAACP membership, under the leadership of aging Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins, declined by 15,000 members in 1961 to 375,000. Membership figures alone do not, of course, convey the full story of trends among Afro-Americans. It should be pointed out, though, that Black Muslim religious discipline controls the entire lives of its adherents (that is, choice of occupation, allocation of salary, type of dress, deportment toward fellow adherents, and non-adherents, etc.) while membership in the NAACP involves only the nominal payment of $2 a year.

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the extent that they shake the moderate black leaders out of their complacency and keep the Young Radicals on their toes, the Muslim challenge is welcome.

Barbara Probst Solomon

As there are at least twelve different questions raised by this symposium, all to be answered in four or five pages, I have decided to limit myself to a few ideas. Roughly, there are two separate themes posed—the individual's private mystique about politics, and his response to day-to-day issues. The rub, for intellectuals, is to correlate them.

I don't consider myself a radical. One reason is that I am not continually looking at all ideologies with true candor. I know what I feel about the Soviet Union; but how can I honestly say that I am examining all the implications of Communism when I know in advance that I won't accept it? Recently, while working on a novel in which one of the characters was a rather sympathetic Communist (not an ex), I paused. My mind drifted off the novel on to the Communist Registration Act, what I had done and not done. I feel no compunction about using four letter words, or describing freaks or aberrations, but because there was one moment when I hesitated to show a Communist as a human being, I know I am not free. Even in the privacy of my own mind, I'm not free.

This symposium on radical thought asks what I feel for an older socialist generation. Why not ask me what I feel toward an older Communist generation? Of course Communism—its essence, what it could have been—had an enormous impact, yet during my entire adulthood this whole area has remained in the realm of the unspeakable, it has been buried underground. It is hard for me to separate those liberals who became honestly disillusioned from those who became expediently disillusioned. What has influenced me is not so much what I thought of the radicals in the thirties—but what I thought of them in the early fifties when so many of them, at the first sign of true "hard times," reacted with such terrible silence. We demand of liberals in other countries that they storm the barricades and fight until death, but at home ... how many of us have ever served a prison sentence for our political beliefs? I remember those who acted with personal dignity, like Mary McCarthy, Arthur Miller, but I also remember the niggling article Murray Kempton, socialist, wrote on Remington's death, the countless demeaning confessions, and the smart-alecky Leslie Fiedlers, the whole mealy-mouthed crowd with their lofty anti-Communism. The issue behind the Communist Registration Act is the loss of constitutional liberty —free minds in a marketplace of ideas—and *not* the fact of Soviet crimes. Many liberals have begged the question. Until these laws are repealed, until treason again means treason in the real sense of the word, and until

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we have an above-ground Communist party, political thought left of center will continue to be muddied and evasive. In fighting against this intolerable law, radicals have been strangely unresponsive.

The silence McCarthy imposed on discussions of Communism is obvious, but it has obscured our own deeper, innate silence—the silence that comes of having been born American. I received my own political education backwards—discovering, as a young girl, first European politics during the postwar period, and then coming back to America and discovering what there was of political life in the fifties. In Europe I learned a lot about myself. For one thing, I was more deeply rooted in my pro-Americanism and a sense of national self-interest than I liked to admit. Though I was willing to conceive of all sorts of systems for *other* nations, when it was put to me that maybe America needed another system, my immediate reaction was no—without our government we'd be right back among the Indians.

America is the only country whose history is not much older than its system of government. "America" and "democracy" are words we use interchangeably, and more than anything else, it is our system of government that gives us our identity and binds us to one another. To imagine another system on our shores is like committing original sin. McCarthy was able to point the finger of shame so successfully at a generation because even those who thought they were Communists weren't really clear where they were going. In their blurred bitter love for America, they thought they had unwittingly killed the thing they loved. Our morbid fear of Communism is based not only on its threat to our future, but more profoundly, in feeling its capacity to destroy our whole emotional past. Radicals sense this perhaps even more acutely than others, and so we hesitate, going backwards and forwards like Alice's Queen.

In separating the emotional from the real, democracy is neither our mother nor our Catholic church. For me it is, however, as good a working form of government as any I know. American radicals are forever complaining that American politics, unlike the European, is not sufficiently theoretical. From what I have observed, quite the contrary, it is the European left wing, accustomed to think in terms of possible power, and thus forced to make decisions, that is practical, while the American left wing, in limbo, is reduced to abstraction. The most honest *theoretical* position I can take is to admit that the American *theory* of political government is, by and large, what I want, and therefore the invention of other theories is not my goal. What concerns me are our foreign policies, economic inequalities and deprivations of human rights. That this form of political life cannot be lumped under a specific party label makes it for me no less real, no less valid.

In symposiums I may ponder what it means to be a radical, but in real life, my concern lies with specific issues. Some are almost geographical. This symposium asks about Cuba, but that for me is not the real problem. The rub is what will I do, say, ten years from now if most of Latin America has undergone revolutions which may turn out to be

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morally right from their point of view and yet pose a real military threat from our point of view? In order not to be faced with this, our policy must be based on something more genuine than the hand-outs and quickie visits of today.

Yet not all foreign political crises are of our making. If De Gaullism loses, a right-wing political force will stretch from Algeria through Spain, France and into a God-knows-what kind of Germany. The whole balance of West European democracy would be upset and this could be our worst crisis. I am more concerned about this than the current necrophilia of civil defense, which will eventually die of its own absurdity.

In one breath this symposium hints at "new radicalism," in the other, "new futility." If we think in these terms we have no right to call ourselves political. Politics is a lifetime commitment and one should be prepared for losses and gains. We, of the independent left, often have a way of collapsing both after gain and after loss. As I have chosen to live after Hiroshima, after the gas ovens, I am not about to collapse over bad Administration policy concerning Cuba. I am not used to an Administration which shares my views and I don't expect it. Now, after having spent most of my life with disaster around the corner, I find I am more interested in preventing the apocalypse than dwelling on its imminence.

I didn't like Kennedy on Cuba *before* or *after* his election. However, now that he is in, it is too easy for intellectuals to merely throw up their hands despairing that he is all bad. Despite his mistakes, I feel he is receptive to pulls from the independent left. This pressure he cannot create himself—it must come from us. But we must be honest in what we demand. It is very easy for me to join SANE and the peace movements, and with my whole being I yearn for disarmament. Yet, when I think what would I do if I were President, I know I wouldn't want America to disarm unless adequately protected. The moral "should" the liberals have answered—the practical "how"—I'm not sure.

Stephan Thernstrom

1.) The radical tradition has left us three things worth preserving. First, a complex of *values* related to the ideal of a democratic community of free and equal individuals. These values are by no means the exclusive property of the radical tradition, obviously, but they have received a distinctive formulation at the hands of the prophets of democratic socialism—see, for example, Professor Tawney's *Equality*. Second, a *sociology* of power which provides the basis for a realistic critique of modern industrial society. The concepts of radical sociology—"class," the "state," "the means of production," "ideology,"—were first developed in order to attack nineteenth-century capitalist society, and were used to expose the contradiction between liberal capitalist rhetoric and the actuality of coercive, exploitative social relations. These conceptions,

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democratic radicals in our century have shown, are equally potent in giving the lie to the ideology of totalitarian regimes which have appropriated the language of the socialist tradition to support new and more terrible forms of exploitation and tyranny. Finally, our predecessors outlined a rough *program,* suggesting a variety of means by which to democratize the economy, abolish class distinctions, and humanize society.

I would surrender none of these. The precise weight I give to the competing values within this tradition is my own—I am somewhat more drawn to cultural pluralism, somewhat more doubtful about the implications of a "common culture" than William Morris, Tawney, and Raymond Williams, for instance—but this is a difference of emphasis, not of principle. The radical sociology, I believe, still provides the most useful point of departure for analyzing contemporary society, although we need to do more actual *departing* than our predecessors found necessary. "Hard" conceptions like "exploitation" and "ruling class" remain useful in appraising the Soviet system, but for the advanced capitalist countries we need to turn more to theories of "alienation" and "mass society." To shift the terms of analysis in this way, of course, raises questions about the ability of the classic socialist program to alleviate "alienation," but I doubt that these questions are as paralyzing as they have been made out to be. "Under socialism," man *won't* be ten feet tall.... The Demon Television will not necessarily vanish, nor will dope addiction, Billy Graham, or the *Reader's Digest.* But many of the ugliest and most frustrating features of American life today *are* demonstrably the product of our present social and economic arrangements, and I think that a change in these arrangements will significantly modify them. There have been exciting gains from recent socialist experiments in England, Norway, and Sweden; Israel's efforts to extend worker's control in Histadrut-owned factories should remind us of the range of unexplored possibilities for democratizing the work experience.

2). I could generate more enthusiasm about these matters if I felt that they were the chief political issues of our time. But they aren't. The great issue, of course, is whether there will continue to *be* issues and men to debate them in the future. A report with the title *Reaching 1975* was published not long ago; there is genuine doubt that we will.... The beneficent deity of some of our ancestors, History, now offers us an apocalypse without the consolations of religion. To find a way of rejecting the offer is infinitely more important than anything else we can do.

The radical intellectual tradition is almost entirely irrelevant to the problem of nuclear war. Social democrats have never had anything very interesting to say about the roots of international conflict; recall the breath-taking Germanic complacency of Bernstein's *Evolutionary Socialism* and the insularity of the Fabians. The theory of imperialism is at least directed at the great problem of the age, but I don't think that it's a very useful theory. To explain America's role in the world

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in terms of the contradictions of a capitalist economy is utterly fantastic, and the heroic reformulation of the theory which is required to extend it to the phenomenon of Soviet imperialism is so great that nothing of the theory remains.

3). This state of affairs is dismaying to the ideologue; it should be heartening to the radical who cares more about the fate of the world than he does about his analytical virility. What I am arguing is that nuclear war can be avoided *without radical changes* in the social structures of the major powers. This means that immediate political action is possible and necessary, that on this issue we can do more than merely wait and DISSENT. Nobody, after all, has a vested interest in nuclear war. About all that theorists of the power elite and the war economy have established is that there are important American institutions which have a vested interest in perpetuating a strategy and a level of armaments which make the *risk* of total war intolerably great. Somewhat similar pressures operate within the Communist world, of course. But in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. there are counterpressures as well. Even the leaders of "the military-industrial complex" shy away at the brink, and, at least in America it is possible publicly to attack the militarists and to campaign for a more sensible nuclear policy. The scales are very delicately poised, and even modest "pressure group" political activity may serve as a stabilizing influence.

SANE, Turn Towards Peace, and the recent series of more or less spontaneous marches and protests all deserve support, though they will have only marginal effect until they talk sense about specific *means* to the end they espouse. There has been marked progress in this direction in recent years; the student demonstration in Washington this February centered around a series of concrete, hard-headed proposals for stabilizing the arms race and reducing some of the obvious immediate risks of war, and I hope that this trend will continue. The simplest targets are things *not to do,* of course—resumption of testing, a crash program for civil defense, etc.—and I fear that the beguiling simplicity of these negatives has captivated too many well-meaning souls. SANE, for instance, began as an anti-testing organization, and it was hard-pressed to find something to recommend when the test ban seemed within grasp. The organization has a more far-reaching program now, but hardly one of overwhelming intellectual power and political appeal.

Unlike some of my contemporaries, apparently, I think that nuclear disarmament is a very tough issue. Even if we could dissolve the Pentagon and the AEC with the wave of a wand, the problem of negotiating an agreement with the Russians and working out an inspection scheme remains. If the nuclear powers had the *will* to disarm they could easily take the first steps now, but a lot of detailed research must be done before we will know *how* to approach a situation of total nuclear disarmament, and how to deal with the new problems such a situation will create. Might not nuclear disarmament require a drastic *increase* in America's conventional armaments? I'm inclined to think so. In any

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case, we won't progress very far so long as the only intellectuals who work full-time on the problems of disarmament are captive intellectuals. Young radicals should be marching and passing out leaflets, but their first duty is to acquire intellectual expertise in this field.

4). I think we must give our allegiance and support to any left nationalist revolutions in an underdeveloped country so long as there is any hope of the emergence of a non-totalitarian regime. America has no business at all in helping the French to murder in North Africa or the Portuguese in Angola. The first thing to do is to say to the native revolutionaries that we are *on their side* and to *prove* it. Are we still on their side when they seize newspapers, put their critics in jail, vote with the Communist bloc in the UN? The democratic radical should offer no self-righteous simplicities in answer. We believe in the basic values of the Western liberal and socialist traditions, which means that we cannot regard the freedom and dignity of the individual as merely part of the "superstructure," natural fruits of industrialization to be plucked after the "real" job of economic development has been accomplished. We know that "indigenous" Communist organizations are determined to extinguish national independence and extend the borders of the Communist empire. We are skeptical of those who speak blithely of "skipping a stage" as if it were a matter of merely expelling the foreigner, building a few factories, and watching the NNP climb.

But we do not have all the answers for the young revolutions, and the ritualistic invocation of India, Venezuela, and the Alliance for Progress will not suffice. The unpleasant fact is that the industrialization of the West involved coercion on a massive scale, even though much of it was masked by the seemingly impartial laws of the market. The individual freedoms enjoyed by the citizen of the modern democratic state are the product of painful, halting evolution. It is not impossible that Western individualism was the product of historically *unique* circumstances, and that the "freedom" which will emerge in the new societies will take very different forms. Perhaps, by our standards, we are entering a long age of barbarism.... The best we can hope for, I fear, is the economic and social development of the new societies will be carried on in ways that will only limit rather than extinguish Western democratic impulses.

The distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes is of the essence here. With the material assistance and moral support of the United States, it is possible that the development of the new societies can be accomplished without the total mobilization of the entire population under a totalitarian party and the obliteration of all sources of resistance to the regime. But surely "authoritarian" techniques of social control will be widely applied in these countries, and we will have to adjust our expectations to political realities unknown in twentieth century Western democracies. I'm not suggesting that we indulge in the vicious verbal mumbo-jumbo of those who call repression "freedom" when it appears to be "progressive," but I am saying that we must be

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prepared to stomach a lot before we declare our total opposition to a young revolution and consign it to the Communist bloc.

5). I doubt that America will have the wisdom and tolerance to pursue such a policy. I don't expect it from the Kennedy Administration, and I don't see much hope for anything better for a long time to come. The Cuban invasion indeed inspires "marked pessimism" in me, to put it mildly, and the recent antics of Rostow, Schlesinger and company at Punta del Este seem to indicate how little has been learned since then. On questions of this sort the President appears a dismal composite of the worst traits of Woodrow Wilson and T. R., and at a time when idealistic bravado and brash militarism were never more dangerous.

Ancien regime, however, is a bit strong. I retain a modicum of stubborn faith that we'll "muddle through" somehow... maybe.... The new Administration is a little better on disarmament than the last one, despite all the nonsense about civil defense. The President appears to lean toward the Army–Navy rather than the Air Force nuclear strategy, though he refuses to clarify the issue for the public. Our foreign policy is better in a lot of little ways, if not in any big ways. Nothing is being "done" domestically, but the social structure is at least still loose enough to allow things to "happen"—the progress achieved by the American Negro in the past two decades, for instance, is certainly nothing to sneer at. I think that a series of basic institutional changes are necessary to improve the quality of American life, but at least we are free to recommend changes and to say no to what is intolerable. We still have a stable constitutional system based on the freedom of the individual, and it will take more than McCarthy, HUAC and the Birchers to convince me there is anything like the serious "fascist" threat some of my acquaintances speak of. Democratic radicals have enough to worry about without conjuring up preposterous horribles.

Robert Paul Wolff

I view this undertaking with skepticism. Perhaps I am influenced by the grotesque product of the *Commentary* effort, but I think that my objections to a symposium on Young Radicals go deeper. Such a symposium presupposes that there is in existence a community of persons with a sufficiently coherent outlook to consider one another as a natural audience. It presupposes further that the term "radical" has enough content to withstand careful analysis. I find these suppositions very dubious indeed.

My doubts are only intensified by the evidences of "a significant upsurge in the interest of young people in politics," to quote the letter which accompanied the symposium questions. When one examines the

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examples cited, one discovers that they are without exception a-political or non-political in character. The first is the sit-ins and the response to them in the North. Now segregation is a totally non-political question, at least in any sense which is relevant to "radicalism." The Negroes desire to be admitted to existing American society. At best, this desire is neutral with respect to the value of that society, and at worst it implies an endorsement of it. The Negro problem is, in the language of the philosopher, accidental to left-wing politics, not essential to it. It is not even really the case that the Negroes provide a pool of cheap labor, and hence in that sense are involved in a conflict of economic interests. I am reminded here of Marx's brilliant (and much misunderstood) essay on the Jewish question. Marx argues that the only way to liberate the Jews from religious persecution is to liberate society from its capitalist form entirely. To expend one's energies opening up the ranks of the bourgeoisie (Ivy League schools, managerial levels of business, etc.) to the Negro is simply to ignore the radical problem, however much it may be in accord with the interests of justice. When the class distribution is identical for Negroes and whites, will we cease to be interested in the Negro workingman, as we have already lost interest in his white brother?

The same is true for the fight against capital punishment, which has no special connection with left-wing politics. Even the anti-HUAC campaign is a-political, for no question is ever raised about the function of congressional committees in general, or the sources of right-wing strength. The fight is solely against abuses of the existing system, and hence quite conservative persons can join the campaign. Finally, as I shall point out below, the peace movement is utterly a-political.

I find this country exceedingly non-political, and I am convinced that the "upsurge" of activity among young people will not, and cannot, be transformed into a genuine left-wing movement. The reason, in part, is that the steam has gone out of the issues which first gave rise to radical thought and action. Read Marx's description of the working classes in industrial England! There was no question of arousing their interest in Shakespeare or Bach, in "enriching" their lives by inculcating them with a middle class academic ethos. They were starving and oppressed —by miserable working and living conditions and impossibly long hours. To apply to a well-paid auto worker of today the categories appropriate to his predecessor in the mills of 1830 is absurd. Of course, there are many workers today who do not share the benefits of the well-unionized industrial workers. (And radicals might expend some energy looking after their needs.) But it is no longer possible to claim that their plight is structural to the system. The same techniques which have raised the auto worker or steel worker to his present affluence can be employed to aid the migrant worker or chain-store clerk. These are ills which call for "more of the same," not a "going to the roots." Our society may be rotten in many important respects, but I would not want to bet money that its *economic* efforts will fail.

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One might answer that there *is* an economic problem—viz., the political power of the great corporations in controlling foreign affairs. This is true, but again it is not the problem which radical thought originally set itself to solve. The central insight of Marx's analysis of political power was that economic power was transformed into political power *which was then used in the service of that economic interest.* In America today, economic power has certainly been transformed into political power, but a look at the relation of export-import levels to the economy as a whole will reveal how silly it is to suppose that our foreign policy is a reflection merely of the economic interests of the powers who control its formulation.

With this very extended introduction, let me turn to the questions of the symposium. I have already said as much as I wish about the first. The answer to the second is simple and again reveals the irrelevance of radical politics. The only issue, so far as I am concerned, is whether there will be a nuclear war. Nothing else is even remotely as important. I could even face with philosophic resignation a conservative reaction for several centuries in the West. Mankind has survived such periods before. But a nuclear war would mean the death of those traditions and principles which I consider worth fighting for: democracy, a concern for the individual, the inviolability of truth, the ideal of the socialist society, the rule of law. Now the problem of preventing a nuclear war is simply not a peculiarly left-wing issue. The tradition of political thought which give birth to "left-right" distinctions was and is wholly concerned with national problems. Neither conservative, nor liberal, nor socialist political theory has anything much to say about international affairs. Yet today the problems of class struggle and economic justice are secondary to, and relatively distinct from, the issue of war or peace. Despite the touching faith of some of my friends, I see no reason to suppose that a democratic socialist United States would be any less belligerent than it is today, or any less involved in a cold war. Indeed, judging from the virulent anti-communism of much of the Left, I would almost expect such a United States to be *more* intent upon an anti-Red crusade!

I take it that the concealed purpose of the third question is to ask whether the techniques of non-violence can be applied to left-wing political activity in America today. The answer is obviously no.

The fourth question reveals one of the greatest weaknesses of left-wing thinking today. It asks what sort of "personal response" is evoked in me by Lumumba, Castro, et al., and whether I "withhold my sympathy" from movements with an authoritarian bent. This is just the sort of pointless, subjective question that reveals the death of genuine left-wing thinking. It is, in a way, like the growth of interest in cultural criticism, which on solid radical grounds should be the subject of least interest (as it is directed to the very highest reaches of the superstructure), rather than the focus of radical discussion. What earthly differ-

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ence does it make how I "respond" to Lumumba or Castro? I would be uncomfortable in their presence and would rather not be governed by them, but so what? As for authoritarian government, I "withhold my sympathy" from every government which commits a single act of oppression or injustice or cruelty, which is to say that I have no sympathy for any past or present government. But if you mean to ask whether I would withhold my *support* from such governments, then I answer that my decision would depend entirely on the viable alternatives. If I were in a position to do so, I would support Khrushchev against the old Stalinists with every means at my disposal, because he appears to be the best Soviet alternative from the point of view of world peace. As soon as a better alternative arose, I would shift my support. I am revolted by the reports of injustice and repression in Cuba, but I supported Castro last year and the year before, and I support him now, because the alternatives seem worse. Sympathy has nothing to do with the matter.

The last question raises an issue of fundamental importance. It has seemed to me that the Administration, in common with virtually the entire spectrum of effective American political opinion, is in the grip of a world view which is dangerous and distorted. The Cuban venture illustrated it, and so in general has the President's response to the Berlin crisis. I think this world-view is, in the classic sense, a case of ideological false consciousness, and I have found it almost impossible ever to crack through it in discussions with liberals or others. But I confess that I do not see the economic or institutional roots of this ideology, and therefore I cannot see any way to combat it (the voice of reason is unfortunately an inadequate weapon). I am unconvinced by explanations of our foreign policy which rely upon economic interest. I am equally unimpressed by psychoanalytic explanations. I do not know why America has become dedicated to an anti-Communist crusade, nor why even very intelligent and independent men persist in misreading the recent history of Soviet-American relations, imputing to Russia an expansionist aggressiveness which belies the facts, and to America a role of wronged innocent which is simply grotesque. European liberals do not exhibit this blindness and conservatism, despite their community of interest and culture with those of the United States. If there is any problem deserving of study by radicals, it is the analysis of the nature and sources of this American ideology.

One last word about the rationale of this symposium. *Commentary* can perhaps be excused for its symposium on young Jews. After all, Jewishness is not a matter of *doing* something, but merely of *being* something. It is therefore understandable that one might wonder just what it was to *be* a Jew. But radical is something to do, not to be. As Aristotle said about happiness, one becomes radical by directing one's attention to problems and dealing with them in a radical fashion. To seek directly to *be* a radical is almost certainly to fail. So this narcissistic mirror-gazing can only waste energy which ought to be devoted

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to hard work on issues of substantive importance. How about a symposium on the American ideology, or the problems of arms limitation and reduction, or the sources of political power in our society, or the fate of the non-unionized worker? Don't worry so much about who's radical, and why. Rest assured that every true and honest sentence which you print in DISSENT will, in contemporary America, mark a radical departure from existing patterns of thought.

James T. Burnett

1) The term "radical" as most of today's young radicals apply it to themselves is adequately defined by any standard dictionary—going to the roots of social problems, demanding a change in the very nature of existing society. However, in the last generation, the word has been a subject of confusion on two counts—first, its application to the phenomenon of the so-called "beats," and second, on account of that tendency which the editors of DISSENT once called "authoritarians of the 'left.'" The "beats," while projecting a "radical" image to the public-at-large, and providing a *tone* of revolt that was a major source of their appeal to young people, were not radical in any *social* sense. In fact, they represented a retreat from politics. The fact that the first widely noted movement of the "Silent Generation" was anti-political is indicative of the '50s in America. And I believe that the decline of beatnikism says something important about what has changed since then.

How do I, and how does the present generation of young radicals view earlier radical generations? It can't be denied that there is a considerable amount of "estrangement," if not hostility toward movements and traditions of the past. This sentiment, insofar as it exists, has two roots. One is the traumatic experiences of some of the older of the present student radicals with the Communist movement; second is a certain degree of realization that the non-Communist radical left in the past has been isolated—and to a large extent has isolated itself—from the main stream of U. S. society and politics. But more and more, many who share this estrangement find it impossible mechanically to separate their present radical commitment from a relationship to specific tendencies and organizations existing from the past. In my own experience, many of the "anti-organizational" young radicals find themselves engaged in an increasingly tense balancing act between various organizations. And I should not conclude without emphasizing the fact that *ideologically* even the most "anti-organizational" of the young radicals in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred are dependent upon people and theories produced in the organized radical movements of the past.

2) Undoubtedly, the two issues which have evoked the greatest response from the present student community are racial equality and peace.

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The sit-in movement beginning in February 1960, and the response it evoked in students all over the country was the first significant example of action on a *social* issue by the present generation of students. And although the Civil Rights movement in any institutional form on the Northern campuses is presently in a state of relative eclipse, the issue is one which American society itself guarantees will be a cause for student action for a very long time to come. On the issue of peace, certainly one of the most remarkable events of the past few years has been the organization and overnight growth of the Student Peace Union into *the* organizational form of student anti-war activity in the U. S., on a basis of opposition to both of the Cold War blocs. The appeal of the student peace movement can be gauged from the more than 6,000 people drawn to Washington for the recent Student Action for a Turn Toward Peace. One of the sponsors of the TTP action was the Young Peoples Socialist League. The YPSL, the Socialist party's youth section, is one of the traditional faces of radicalism on the American campus. Although the YPSL has increased its size more than ten-fold during the past four years, the organized Socialist movement in the U. S. still has a long way to go before it is reconstructed as a significant political and intellectual force. But the recent emergence of YPSL chapters in areas untouched by Socialist organization in years—if not in decades—from the Ivy League to the Southwest—is one of the surest signs that the '60s are not merely a re-run of the '50s.

3) Although the name and tradition of the YPSL are the same as that of the '30s, the nature of the organization and the position in which it finds itself are strikingly different. Leaving aside the fact that organized Socialism is much less popular in the '60s than it was in the '30s, the YPSL finds itself in the position of being the *only* significant organization attempting to propagate Socialism in the student and youth community. This is, of course, a radically different situation than existed in the '30s—or even in the '40s or '50s. And the YPSL today has a different conception of its nature and role than the traditional one of organized American Socialism. In the first place, it is explicitly broad and multi-tendencied. Secondly, it regards itself not as an organizational rival or replacement for the movements and organizations of the existing American "Left" (i.e., liberalism) but as a left wing in the liberal student community. This might be formulated best by saying that although YPSLs do not consider themselves liberals, they do act as part of the liberal community. The role of Socialists and radicals generally must be *in* the existing peace, civil-rights, etc., movements which have a generally liberal orientation. If American radicals have a significant part to play today it is in struggling for the broadening and democratization of these movements, and in bringing out the *political* implications of their struggles.

4) The Colonial Revolution has been the most dynamic movement of the post-World War II world. It is not surprising that the events and

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personalities of this revolution have evoked the passions and enthusiasms of students throughout the world—and even in the relatively apathetic United States. And neither is it surprising that even authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies in the colonial countries find a response in the student community. Particularly in the United States, the radical-tending student has been saturated with polemics for "freedom" and against "Communism" and "totalitarianism" originating from the most reactionary forces. Under these circumstances some young people tend to look with rose-colored lenses at figures such as Fidel Castro, or even Mao Tse-tung. This is a response to the political atmosphere of the United States and is largely independent of any consciously Communist or pro-Communist movements, which have all but disappeared.

One of the most important roles that the younger radicals can play in the U. S. student community is in establishing the radical bona fides of the *democratic* Left and the libertarian essence of a radical program directed against all power blocs and ruling classes.

5) Without a doubt, Kennedy began his Presidential career as the most popular figure among what passes for the "left-wing" of American politics since the days of F. D. R. His popularity is still not dissipated among large sections of the labor, civil rights and liberal movements, nor even among liberal and radical students. But it is undeniable that the realities of life, particularly the Cuban invasion, have caused serious misgivings about the desirability, not to say the sanity, of the "new" American Establishment. But the feeling of *"ancien regime,"* I believe, stems not so much from an estrangement from the J. F. K. personality as from an awakening realization of the realities of the American—and the world—situation. After the political night of the '50s, we have entered not only a nominally new, but a qualitatively *different kind* of decade. No one can feel this more than one, like myself, who came to radicalism in the '50s. The reviving movements for equality and peace, the increasing concern from all quarters about the "purpose" of our nation and our society, the concern and realization about what is going on out there beyond the three-mile limit, and the domestic "reappearance" of such "old-fashioned" problems as poverty and unemployment, are changing the consciousness of American young people. This is the most promising thing about our decade.

Lewis Coser

When I was asked to summarize in a few pages my general reaction to this symposium I assumed that this would be an easy task. In fact I have been trying for several hours to discern common themes to which I might address myself. But what *is* there in common

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between, say, Robert Wolff, for whom the struggle for integration, against HUAC or against capital punishment, has nothing to do with radicalism, and Jeremy Larner who says he is a radical because as a child he found himself in a world of lies?

Perhaps, however, this wide variety of response is one of the very characteristics of the new radicalism. Perhaps it derives not from a theory, as did the old, but from a wide arc of individual responses to a common mood. But one cannot discuss a mood in the same manner as a theory; one is either with it or one isn't. Being imprecise by definition, a mood lends itself with difficulty to analysis. Let me try nevertheless to set down a few reactions.

Some years ago, I pleaded in these pages ("What Is to Be Done?" now in the book *Voices of Dissent)* for a new radicalism which would do away with the profound divorce of the political and the personal from which the old radicalism had suffered. I argued the need to relate concern for personal autonomy with concern for political autonomy. The dehumanizing of politics in our age, I said then, needed to be countered by insistence upon the fact that politics did indeed involve something "out there," but that it also involved *me.* (Michael Walzer expressed this recently when he wrote: "No Utopia Without Me.") But now the chickens have come home to roost. Certain of these responses, though by no means all, seem to me so self-centered that they almost blanket out the sense that politics also concerns something "out there." This is perhaps most blatantly so in Mr. Larner's piece. The self-absorption and vanity with which he displays his ego would perhaps not worry me much were it not for the fact that I sense it echoed, in more modulated and muted ways, in a number of other responses.

Among the most obnoxious characteristics of the old radicalism was certainly its infatuation with History, the presumption to know its course, and the fallacious sense of power that came from this "knowledge." But now radicals seem to be heading toward an opposite fallacy. In a number of these contributions there is an extreme curtailment of time perspective, an immersion in the here and now of immediate experience. This is a wholly understandable reaction. When the world seems to make as little sense as it does today it is only to be expected that man try to hang on to that immediate core of existence which seems directly apprehensible and controllable. Yet, such an attitude may also lead to an extreme limitation of the sense of the politically possible and to an almost willful insulation from the varieties of historical experience. I can directly experience only a tiny fragment of the wide arc of human possibilities. Concentration on self thus leads to a kind of self-denying ordinance which bars access to wide areas that can be reached only through mediated experience. Let me try to be more specific.

I was quite struck by the short memory of the contributors. There is a lot of talk about Castro, of course, but not even one mention of the Hungarian, let alone the Spanish Revolution. Is one really to sup-

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pose that these major events in radical history should not be allowed to help shape the political and moral sensitivities of young radicals today? In the thirties most radicals were riding the bus of history. In the forties and fifties the non-Communist radicals felt that they had missed the bus. The new radicals now say that there is no bus. Good. But they speak as if there were no history either, and that is no good at all.

Mr. Wolff argues in a historical vacuum about what is or is not political. The struggle for the integration of Negroes is precisely as political as was the struggle for a measure of integration of the working class into society, and this latter struggle was—Marx's theory to the contrary notwithstanding—what radicalism was mainly about throughout the 19th century. In England and, to some extent, in this country, the struggle for women's suffrage was once among the central preoccupations of radicals. Such mundane affairs as the fight for the eight-hour day engaged the energy of the best radical minds in Marx's generation. But to Mr. Wolff all this is neither radicalism nor politics. I feel the crying need to enlarge the sphere of political radicalism so as to include many areas of human experience which a previous generation of radicals had left untouched. Mr. Wolff wishes to restrict further the sense of politics and hence of radicalism. To Marx the root was man, to Wolff, "the only issue . . . is whether there will be a nuclear war." What a disastrous restriction! The threat of nuclear annihilation is, of course, that wholly novel event which overshadows our age, but to brush aside all the other problems which grate upon the sensibilities of decent man, the avoidable tragedies and avoidable horrors which stunt the lives of millions, with the remark that these are not political questions and hence do not concern radicals *qua* radicals seems to me unfortunate. Not only integration or economic exploitation but even mental health become political problems today. In this age of total crisis a radicalism which refuses engagement condemns itself.

Staughton Lynd may be exempt from my strictures about the lack of a sense of history. The trouble with him, however, is that he has read the wrong history books. He still believes that fascism came into power in order "to preserve the naked power of the capitalist class." That's where I came in. He seems wholly unaffected by the spate of first-rate anatomies of fascism which have been written over the last two decades. Perhaps, one wonders, he considers all this "bourgeois science." He believes that we live in the Period of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (the caps are his). While one may be touched by his faith, one may yet doubt whether such a curdled radical stance has any hold on present realities.

Lynd fortunately goes on to argue that we must guard against the possibility of an "inhuman socialism" and he shows by this very formulation that he is ambiguous about the old Marxian certainties, that he no longer accepts the naiveté of the formula: feudalism leads to capitalism, capitalism leads to socialism, i.e., the good society. This is fine, but why then not throw out the old muck altogether? And how does he

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reconcile his recognition of the dangers of an inhuman socialism with his statement that "the revolutionary upsurge from Cuba to China seems to me wonderfully hopeful?" A man who can refer to the terror, thought control, the simple denial of elementary human dignity in China—an assault against man for which I can find hardly any parallel in "capitalist" history—as "wonderfully hopeful," and yet, can talk about the need for humanizing socialism has, I submit, got his values seriously mixed up.

This leads me to Castro about whom a number of writers seem to share a common attitude. None of them is disposed to join Castro's acclamation brigade, and most of them would probably be disposed to consider C. Wright Mills's and Waldo Frank's love affair with the Cuban dictator a bit silly. But several of them, nevertheless, seem to be disposed toward a kind of benevolent neutrality. This I find rather distasteful. At the root of it I often sense a feeling of guilt. America is responsible, the argument seems to run, for the conditions which made the rise of Castroism inevitable. Hence we as American radicals have no right to a critical stance. But this does not make sense. Even if America were wholly responsible, which it is not, for the rise of Castro, why does this exempt him from radical criticism? We are radicals because, among other things, we reject absorption into the establishment which bears the responsibility. Furthermore, genesis, so runs an axiom of scientific method, can never explain persistence. Maybe Hitler's character was fatally warped by childhood influences; but does this exempt him from moral and political judgment for his actions?

Some of these writers simply don't seem to *care enough* for democracy; and, focusing on crimes of Batista or the United Fruit Company, they don't seem to *visualize* the trade-union leaders, the libertarian socialists, the members of Castro's original liberation movement now rotting in his prisons. They seem, in addition, to be given to undifferentiated, almost visceral responses; they argue that if one opposes the criminal, stupid and disastrous invasion of the Bay of Pigs one need therefore defend Castro. But this is not so at all. One of the enduring characteristics of radicalism has precisely been that it refused to choose between equally distasteful alternatives, that it refused to choose between the cholera and the pest. I find it parochial to argue that because we are Americans we must restrict ourselves to the clearing up of the mess on our own doorsteps. The glory of the radical tradition is precisely that it has taught men to transcend such narrow definitions of the situation, that it has led to a widening of our sympathies as well as of our sense of involvement. Yes, we have a right to cry out that the fish stink in Washington and in Havana, in Conakry as well as in Cairo.

Julian Mayfield is moved to a similarly undifferentiated response. He voices his "support of Nkrumah, Touré, Nasser, and Castro." He can put all these men into the same category presumably because all of them came to power *against* something which he hates, colonialism. But such a global response is precisely the wrong attitude for a radical to take. In Cuba Communist agents have permeated political life on all

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levels so that it gradually comes to resemble that of the "People's Democracies," while in Egypt, by contrast, the most prominent domestic Communists have been in prison for years, others have mysteriously "disappeared." Castro's men fraternize with Khrushchev and Mao; Nasser with Tito. Is all this unimportant? And is the new radicalism viable if it operates on the level of visceral response rather than in terms of considered and informed judgment? One may sympathize with Mayfield's deploring "a lack of militancy, vision and commitment." But some of his remarks, I fear, seem almost to plead for a kind of mindless activism, a know-nothing militancy the consequences of which I for one find somewhat frightening to contemplate.

It is almost self-evident that the "new nations" will not suddenly blossom out in the near future with full-blown parliamentary democracies; they will undoubtedly reveal pronounced authoritarian features. And democratic self-righteousness in regard to them may, as Stephan Thernstrom argues, be wholly misplaced. But it is essential, and here, as in much of his piece I am in full agreement with Thernstrom's distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes. We fail of our obligations as radicals if we refrain from attacking with all the vigor we can muster any tendencies toward totalitarianism which may appear in these new nations. Authoritarian regimes come and go; but once a totalitarian regime is in power there will be a long night. . . .

Let me end on a somewhat more personal note. Roger Hagan says, and Jeremy Larner echoes him in his characteristic tone, that he has "little to say to or to learn from most socialists and fellow travellers of the thirties." I am not sufficiently acquainted with Hagan, but I am willing to bet that much of the present thinking was indeed shaped by precisely those writers of the thirties he so summarily rejects. Wasn't his attitude toward Marxism partly shaped by Sidney Hook? His attitude toward social psychology by Erich Fromm? Was he wholly uninfluenced by Norman Thomas' moral appeal? Did the "left" novelists and poets of the thirties have no influence in sharpening his moral sensibilities?

T. S. Eliot once wrote somewhere: "Someone said, 'the dead writers are remote from us because we *know* so much more than they do.' Precisely, and they are that which we know." The socialists of the thirties are by no means dead, and it would be presumptuous to contend that the radicals of Hagan's generation know *only* what they have learned from them; still, one cannot but feel that Hagan and his cothinkers are a bit rash in their wholesale slaying of ancestors. Naturally, they are inclined to be contemptuous of the older radicals, and people in politics don't expect gratitude. But a little bit of history would help here too; no one can be more glad than I am that a number of major intellectuals have in the recent past become active in such organizations as the Committee on Correspondence, SANE and the like. But where were many of them in the McCarthy era when we of DISSENT, mainly, though not wholly, older radicals, were fighting the whole pack of right-turning intellectuals, when we attacked the American Celebration and the literary trumpeters

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of the Cold War? This may sound self-serving; maybe it is; but it needs to be said.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE SYMPOSIUM:

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Michael Harrington

THE AMERICAN CAMPUS: 1962

I am writing this from New Haven. Last night I debated a retired general on the House Un-American Activities Committee before about two hundred students. The meeting was sponsored by "Challenge," an organization at Yale which brings controversial speakers to the campus. A contingent from the local Young Americans for Freedom showed up, though they were not in costume (sometimes they come to peace meetings in ROTC uniform; on their last outing everyone wore dark glasses). I would guess that the audience was at least two thirds on my side and rather demonstratively so.

Ten years ago when I first came here to speak, the meeting was held in a student's apartment off campus. Our mood was that of catechumens. This contrast in New Haven could be extended all over the country, for during the past decade the campus has opened up. There is a spirit of debate and concern working among the students.

I have been traveling the country throughout this period (for several years, I thought I should have been billed as the "oldest young socialist" alive; now, alas, students sometimes call me "Sir"). In that time, I have been privy to an endless number of bull sessions about the nature of the "student movement." For that matter, one of the characteristics of the reawakening on campus is a sort of frenzy of introspection and self-consciousness, with groups spending almost as much time in front of a mirror as on the picket line.

This experience has convinced me that it is next to useless to propose some general theory of the campus. The generations succeed one another with a rapidity almost like that of the tsetse fly; the departure of a few key students can change the look of a college within the span of a summer vacation.

So let me set down a few impressions. The change on the campus began around 1956 or 1957, it was enormously accelerated by the sit-ins and the sympathy demonstrations they evoked, and it is still moving forward. Its mood has been more radical than liberal, oriented toward single "issues" rather than finished ideologies (but conscious politicals have often played a decisive organization role). Its tone is moral, focusing on questions like peace, capital punishment and human equality, ignoring economic conflict and social planning.

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If the year 1960–61 was under the sign of the Civil Rights movement on campus, 1961–62 was dominated by the reaction to the Bomb.

Indeed, the most striking recent development has been the growth of the Student Peace Union. The Washington peace demonstrations were probably the most spontaneous expression of student feeling since the thirties. At Earlham College in Indiana not too long ago, students told me that some of those who went from small, mid-Western schools were under heavy administration pressure to stay home. The very fact that these schools, so long out of the student mainstream, were involved at all is a sign of how powerful is the emotion produced by the Bomb and the issue of testing.

Throughout the darkest days of McCarthy there were always the predictable colleges of the New York underground where a few sophisticates held the line. Now student politics is becoming more indigenous, less of a New York graft.

The SPU is particularly important in view of the vague, almost moody character of the peace sentiment. Its leadership contains a fair number of politically astute young people. Thus, the Washington project had a clarity often lacking in student actions today. Yet, it is precisely the political diffuseness of the rank and file which gives the organization a broader appeal than any student group of recent memory.

So it is that one finds students motivated by religious considerations, students from small schools, students who have never belonged to any group, working together. In Berkeley last November, I went down to the "Veterans' Day" demonstration. Several hundred pickets demonstrated silently as the legionnaires marched past (the dignitaries in open automobiles didn't know what to do when they saw us: some waved; some froze; and one beauty queen took an SPU button). The young people there were not the seasoned pickets of the "Berkeley Zengakuren," that informal group which had developed out of the Chessman walks, the House Committee demonstrations and Civil Rights projects. They were younger, less sophisticated, new to political life.

If peace has come to the fore during the last year, the question of Cuba has receded. This reflects in part a disillusionment brought about by the obvious growth of the Communist apparatus in that island. The improvised, irreverent mood of the barbudos having been replaced by the hard maneuvers of the aparatchik, there is little basis for student sympathy. Yet the Cuba sentiment is still worth a comment or two.

To veterans of the radical movement, student attitudes on Cuba, or Russia, seem to have a familiar fuzziness. But it would be a mistake to think that one is confronting a finished ideology of support to totalitarian capital accumulation, a resurrection of that discredited sociology which sees the breaking of eggs to make an omelette as a guiding political analogy. These attitudes have a different basis and once again they are more mood than program.

Students today distrust adult leaders and organizations (and particularly the Liberal Establishment). They are radical, bent on working

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out their own ideas. The initial sympathy for Castro came more from Sartre's version of him as a revolutionary existentialist than from the apologetics of Huberman and Sweezy. And often, the break with the hypocrisy of American society generates a suspicion of anyone who comes down hard on Communist totalitarianism. In the first radical flush, these students fail to distinguish between the official Anti-Communist slogans of the status quo and the critique of a democratic Left.

The point is, these attitudes must be faced and changed. But they cannot be done by regaling the newly radical students with the facts of the past. It cannot be done from a lecture platform, from a distance. Rather, the persuasion must come from someone who is actually involved in changing the status quo here, and from someone who has a sympathy for the genuine and good emotions which are just behind the bad theories. I do not want to give the impression that there is a wave of pro-Communism in the student movement. Not at all. I simply want to emphasize that there is a complex feeling here and that it cannot be dealt with through a recital of the old categories or by a magisterial act.

One of the main impulses for the present student surge came from the sit-ins in the winter of 1960. That event set off sympathy pickets, conferences and Freedom Rides. Since then, the Southern Negro students have made tremendous advances; the Northern students have, in many cases, gone back to the books or to other causes.

It is very difficult to convey the flavor of the student movement in the South. When I went to the meeting of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee in Atlanta in the fall of 1960, I was convinced that the initial force had been spent. It all seemed to be marked by a sort of amiable, parliamentary chaos, and there seemed to be no basis for the emergence of a concerted, organized drive. I was mistaken. In the ensuing year and a half the Southern students have produced a full-time, dedicated cadre, and all the old theories about "professional revolutionists" seem to have found a somewhat curious practical incarnation.

Yet the tremendous gains of the Southern students poses a problem. These youth share the distrust of adult leadership with their counterparts in the North. Experience has taught them that the older, established spokesmen are prone to conciliation and compromise. As a result, there is a mood of the youth "vanguard" which has serious consequences (youth alone cannot transform society or even a region of it) but which also corresponds to the immediate reality (youth, in fact, *is* the vanguard in the South).

In any case, one now meets the full time activist from the South. As one student at Howard told me, "Sitting in has become like going out and getting a pack of cigarettes." At times there are glimpses of a new status order based on how long one has been in jail. (I thank God for my one comfortable night as a guest of the New York City police. That is a bare minimum. Otherwise, one would be as declasse as a virgin in a street gang.)

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Perhaps the most hopeful sign in the South is the way in which the students have committed themselves to voter registration. That inevitably means the development of a broader movement, of bringing adults together with the youth. Still, the accomplishment of these students is already the greatest achievement of the youth movement in decades.

From reading the journals one might think that there is a wave of campus conservatism. As far as I can tell, that is simply not true.

I have been North, South, East and West, and I have yet to find a chapter of Young Americans for Freedom which is playing a really vital role on campus. Here at Yale (the YAF National Chairman is a student in New Haven), the group might have fifty dues payers and far fewer activists. Generally speaking, YAF is less of a force on the big campuses than the Young Peoples Socialist League—and no one has been writing about a socialist sweep among the young.

The young conservative publications are slickly edited and expensive. One gets the impression that some adults, probably the Goldwater people, have decided to build a sort of Stevenson movement on the Right. However, they are certainly not leaving the direction of it to the young. Events like the Madison Square Garden rally are created by professionals like Marvin Liebman, the defender of Tshombe and Chiang, and have all the spontaneity of the Komsomols marching in Red Square.

Sometimes I get the feeling that part of the conservative student reaction, limited as it is, involves an emotion quite similar to that of the democratic radicals. There are, of course, the prematurely old YAFniks with vests and a measured arrogance. But there is also a kind of student who has a genuine hatred of the rottenness of the Establishment. At Harvard, several YAF students helped raise money for the Southern students (they were, it seemed, opposed to the state in Mississippi as well as in Washington—and even though their own organization has smeared groups like CORE). At Chicago, the center of a conservative radical wing, at least one leader has joined SANE (how else get the state out of the military sector?) and their theoretical journal has attacked the House Un-American Activities Committee in the name of libertarian values.

In general, though, the young conservatives are the product of some good copy writers, not of the campus scene. There are student bodies with a fair amount of right-wing opinion—Nixon did fairly well in the polls in 1960—but most of the young fogies are too busy with pan-Hellenic affairs to worry about "I Like Nike" picket signs.

Yet there is one source of conservative politics that is important: the Catholic college. In the course of the past few months I have had a fair amount of encounters with Catholic college students (at Albertus Magnus, Manhattan, Notre Dame, Fairfield and before a regional meeting of the National Federation of Catholic College Students). The impression which comes from this experience has been curiously contradictory.

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On the one hand, the bulk of the Catholic students are much more conservative on civil liberties than the youth of the secular colleges. The normal reception to a debate over Operation Abolition at a big school has one third of the audience in favor of the House Committee and at least two thirds vociferously opposed (I might add that the Committee's film fantasy on San Francisco has done more to promote campus discussion of the issue, and to create sentiment for the abolition of the Committee, than anything in years). At the Catholic colleges I found the proportions reversed.

Yet the Catholic liberals and radicals I met were, as a group, much better than their secular counterparts. Precisely because they were living in a generally conservative milieu and come from a tradition historically hostile to the left, their views seem to have more intellectual substance than those of their non-Catholic similars. They come to their conclusions, not as a matter of accepting dominant values as the New York liberals do, nor even by sharing in a widespread mood. They work through to their convictions and they must be prepared to defend them.

The campus has awakened in recent years and is continuing to do so. The revolt is not, as in the thirties, a product of sympathy with mass union struggles. It is quite often uninterested in the problems of the economy. There is, rather, a radical mood in the midst of a semi-affluent society, and the key terms are the Bomb, the racist, the executioner. As a result, there is a freshness and elan and more than a little ignorance born of innocence. Yet it would be a terrible mistake if the adult radical concentrated on what seems to be the classic repetition of old errors. The dominant emotion is good, it is a witness to the idealism and courage of the young. If the adult reaction is one of preaching, it will simply reinforce all of the hostilities to the Establishment, and no one will listen.

What the adult radical must do is attempt to bridge the gap between the generations, to understand that the students need political advice, that they must become part of a larger, post-college community —and to understand that, with all their problems, they bring to us a gift of freshness, enthusiasm and elan.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON'S new book, The Other America *(Macmillan, $4) will be reviewed in our next issue. As will HARVEY SWADOS' new book,* A Radical America *(Little–Brown, $5).*

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NOTEBOOK

THE ISSUE OF GOA

TELEGRAM:

Asoka Mehta
Praja-Socialist Party, India December 19, 1961

DISMAYED GOA ACTION PLEASE ADVISE POSITION YOUR PARTY ON THESE EVENTS.

DISSENT

Camp: Calcutta
December 22, 1961

Dear Plastrik:

Thank you for your cable of 19th inst. I find it difficult to understand what the dismay is about.

Goa, Diu and Daman were three Portuguese possessions in India. After the British and the French left from India, we naturally wanted peaceful transfer of power by the Portuguese also. We cannot acquiesce in colonial possessions anywhere, least of all on our own soil. The people of these three possessions—600,000 of them—are part of our own people and they do not want and cannot be allowed to be outside our Republic.

For fourteen years we sought to achieve amicable settlement. There were frequent unrests in the possessions and the people were brutally suppressed. In 1956 there was a mass movement in which many *satyagrahis* were killed. A number of my colleagues carry the scars of those days on their bodies today.

Portugal began aligning with Pakistan and made Goa a hostile base against us. All reasonable pleas for settlement were ignored. Trouble was brewing afresh in Goa. The Portuguese authorities considerably fortified their positions to suppress popular upsurge. They also started intimidating our people on the border areas.

India, in our opinion, after having shown patience for fourteen years was fully justified in taking military action against the Portuguese authorities in India. The core of the campaign and the warmth of welcome from the people show that the Portuguese had no supporters among the Goans.

Even the former French possessions are today administered democratically but as a distinct administrative unit. So will be the Portuguese enclaves. We have a cultural agreement with France, we would welcome a similar agreement with Portugal. We do not want to snap the cultural ties. We would like them to be regularized. Political control, however, we cannot accept.

DISSENT, at least should recognize that non-violence and peace cannot be allowed to become synonyms for status quo. If the civilized world will not help to change our iniquitous status quo, iniquitous not in subjective terms but in terms of commonly accepted canons: the evolving of international order of decolonialization—even after

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fourteen years, we cannot remain supinely indifferent.

We have no quarrel with the Portuguese people or their Government. We desire the same friendship with them now that we have established with Britain and France. Our action was not an expression of power politics or of our armed might, but the assertion of the freedom of our people which has to be respected.

Yours sincerely,
ASOKA MEHTA

Dear friend and comrade
Asoka Mehta:

Your letter saddens me not because I doubt your country's right to repossess Goa, nor the perfidy of Portuguese colonialism, but because it indicates how difficult you and your associates find it to look beyond India's just grievances. As a socialist I have always felt that we must rely on our friends to keep the larger issues in mind. Colonialism and its remnants in the world are indeed very large issues and none of us doubts that no nation can feel itself secure as long as foreign domination alienates part of its people from the rest. This is particularly true in the case of India, struggling to preserve its national unity against so many disintegrative forces within and hostile forces without.

But this is not how you pose the question in your letter. You say that India felt threatened because Portugal began to align itself with Pakistan, posing the danger of Goa's use as a hostile base. The ease with which Goa was overrun at least throws some doubts on the contention that a real and immediate threat existed. But this also is not the issue. In my opinion, the real issue is whether any nation, feeling itself threatened, should be entitled to preemptive warfare and unilateral action before any action has been suggested to the United Nations or the Security Council. In the October 29, 1961 issue of *Janata,* a publication of your party, I read the following as part of an editorial on "Liberation of Goa":

> Before this step was taken, however [i.e., military action as an extreme measure — SP], world public opinion has to be prepared for it.

The editorial then goes on to suggest certain ways of preparing world opinion. I believe you will agree that no steps, such as summoning Portugal before the Security Council of the UN, were taken. I am saddened because you appear to place a question of national defense before the question of peace or of collective security. I fear that you fail to see that the Americans, among others,—I refer not to Americans of the reactionary right looking for any chance to slander India and its supporters, but to those of democratic and socialist persuasion—were utterly unprepared for the unilateral liquidation of the Goan enclaves. Sensitive to abrupt shifts in world conditions, fearful of anything smacking of violence and yet another danger of war, doubtful about any course of action that further tends to undermine the shaky remnants of UN prestige, their reaction was predictable. You have expressed elsewhere your view that their reaction to India's seizure of Goa is "disturbing, disheartening and irritating." You were surprised by this. But why? These are not "false friends" of India, but people who have always placed your nation's welfare among the highest of personal and political priorities. These are people who, like myself, asked the ques-

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tion: what was gained, what was lost?

When I first heard of India's attack upon Goa, my immediate thought was: why now? Why, indeed, hadn't they done it sooner? For instance, in 1947 at the time independence came and was accompanied by a strong, popular nationalist upheaval. It may have been painful then, but the world would have understood that this is just, that this is revolutionary nationalism. Then was the time to complete the national revolution by mopping up Goa, along with French Pondicherry, with the approval and participation of the people.

Meanwhile, India became a responsible member of the United Nations, and one of the foremost to insist upon the indivisibility of peace—correctly so. She could no longer take Goa by force, but had to wait—ought to have waited — for either of two developments. Either a popular revolution inside Goa or an authorization by the Security Council to march unless Portugal agreed to negotiate. The first did not happen; the second India did not try to secure. Why? Apparently, India did not place Goa high on its list of national problems demanding resolution. Then how did it get there? The explanation must lie in the realm of national politics, particularly the February general elections.

India could wait no longer, not because of some specific or new Portuguese repression or action—this would again have been a matter for the Security Council to explore—but because something inside India had changed. I submit that this is the wrong reason for removing peace from the highest place on the list of priorities, even temporarily. Not only for India's sake, but for the world's sake, India could not afford to take matters into her own hands. If India takes Goa today, Khrushchev can use that as a pretext for taking Berlin tomorrow, with consequences all too familiar.

It would be wrong for the critics of India's Goa action to blow this up beyond all proportion. Certainly I shall not join those who, imputing to India a doctrine of non-violence and absolute morality which she could never realistically hold, have been so quick and loud to condemn. Further, your country has just completed a gigantic electoral experience which, from all that I know of it, has been conducted with complete democracy amidst the freest exchange of opinions and views; literally tens of millions of your people have gone through another precious experience of democratic life. Given what we know of the world today, what socialist and democrat can have anything but the highest praise for Indian democracy? The balance ought to be kept straight.

But the Goan action still is a disturbing one. We accept your assurances that the former Portuguese enclaves will be administered in a spirit of local rule with particular care to special problems. But it is the future that is troubling. I read, for example, in your party's election program of the need to "vacate" the occupation of parts of Kashmir by forces considered hostile to India. What does this signify? What means shall be employed to bring this to an end? Relations between India and Pakistan are delicate and easily disturbed; why should the socialists take the lead in such matters? It would seem to me that there is nothing to be obtained in reawakening the problem of Kashmir; nothing, indeed, to be obtained in Kashmir itself, which would warrant the possibility of war between India and Pak-

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istan. Ought not the *status quo* to prevail in those areas of the world which, under present circumstances, do not lend themselves to any satisfactory solution except by the use of force and violence which, in turn, may bring us to the brink we all dread? Has not India the far greater problem of China —there we have naked and open aggression, as your party has been saying for years now—to face over the next years? This, it seems to me, is one of the larger issues we shall have to keep in mind: how shall we assure the success of democratic India in the long struggle with China?

I have stated candidly some of my immediate responses to your letter. There is, of course, much more that can and will be said on both sides. Goa itself has already faded away as an immediate concern, but there will be a multitude of new and larger "Goas." If we continue to examine them both in the light of their immediate and concrete political implications and in the light of our common democratic beliefs, we shall keep open the lines of communication between democratic socialists everywhere in spite of our disagreements. Thus we shall be able to cooperate in finding the solutions we all search for.

Cordially yours,
STANLEY PASTRIK

Charles Michaelson

The Whitest Collars Turn to Unions

The victory of the United Federation of Teachers in the collective bargaining election among 33,000 classroom teachers in New York last December, probably the largest white-collar election ever held in this country, has had some important effects. It will certainly result in individual and professional improvements for the city's teachers. It has spurred organizing by locals of the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO. And it has reminded the unions of their obligation to organize the white-collar worker, or at least to try a lot harder than in the past.

The AFL-CIO needs to do this if only to protect its 12 million production and service members. Changes in technology are weakening their bargaining power, especially in the more highly automated industries. For example, 3,700 members of an Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers local struck a Texas refinery recently and stayed on strike for 10 weeks. While they were out, 600 supervisors and technicians brought production up to 65 per cent of the prestrike capacity and would have raised it higher if the strike hadn't ended.

Organized labor is also obligated to represent the entire work force. At present the AFL-CIO's membership is 85 per cent blue-collar although these workers are less than half of the non-

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agricultural work force in the nation as a whole. The imbalance is growing. Automation has already displaced hundreds of thousands of production union members, the core of the federation, and replaced them with unorganized white-collar workers. (From 1955 to 1960, production worker employment in manufacturing dropped 800,000 while non-production employment increased by 600,000.) And new white-collar jobs are being created. Today there are 20 million non-supervisory, salaried white-collar workers. By 1970 their number is expected to reach 29 million.

The unions now have about 35 per cent of the production and service workers in their ranks. Of the 20 million white-collar workers, by contrast, only two million are organized. But with this group expected to increase by 8½ million by 1970, labor will have to enroll nearly a million new white-collar workers during the sixties merely to hold its present low level of representation.

Recent white-collar organizing has been at a standstill. From 1958 to 1960 the federation gained a mere 4,000 new white-collar members yearly. Since the teachers' votes were counted in mid-December, the UFT (which then had 9,000 members) alone has organized 4,000 new members and all are employed professionals, the most status-conscious white-collar group.

The three white-collar groups—the nine million clericals, the four million salespeople and the seven million professional and technical workers—have all resisted unionism, the resistance generally rising as the skills do. If ten per cent of all white-collar workers are organized, only about two per cent of the top group, the employed professionals, are.

The UFT overcame this prejudice by convincing 20,000 teachers of their need for a union; it formulated a series of reasonable appeals directed to educated people who are ordinarily suspicious of unionism. It ran its election campaign more like a political primary in a middle-class neighborhood than a plant organizing campaign. Most of the campaigning was done by several hundred spirited rank-and-filers, not by staff members. The rank-and-file teachers organized the system themselves: they saw the union as an opportunity to improve themselves and to heighten their professional standards.

They showed that a professional union can also be a militant union. The UFT's 5,000 members struck on Nov. 7, 1960, persuaded 4,000 other teachers not to cross their picket lines and forced Mayor Wagner to fulfill his earlier promise for a collective bargaining election.

In the balloting, the UFT got 20,045 votes, more than 60 per cent of the total. The Teachers Bargaining Organization, a coalition of "professional" associations hastily thrown together by the National Education Association, got 9,770; the independent Teachers Union got 2,575. Seven hundred teachers missed the point altogether and voted for no agent.

The UFT began negotiating a contract with the Board of Education late in December, the first time in America that any organization of teachers, union or association, has entered collective bargaining with a board of education. The first sign of improvement was the Superintendent of Schools' preliminary budget, submitted to the city budget director early in February. It asked the city to provide $27 million next school year for 6,000 new teachers, both in the

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classroom and for the corrective reading program. On salary the negotiators have reached an impasse. The Board has offered about $30 million for salary increases while the UFT is seeking $53 million. It's asking for $500–850 raises above the current, $1,800–8,650 scale for teachers with a bachelor's degree. Eventually the UFT hopes to reach a $6,000–12,000 scale for teachers with a bachelor's degree and two $1,000 increments for holders of advanced degrees.

But the most important change that the election has brought is the improvement of teacher morale throughout the system. The negotiations have ended some of the authoritarianism and favoritism (who gets the "good" classes?) that has existed in the schools.

Spurred by the election, the AFT local in Chicago, which represents more than half of the 18,000 teachers there, has asked to be named collective bargaining agent for Chicago's teachers. The Detroit local expects to ask for collective bargaining rights within a year. And the AFT, which now has 60,000 members, hopes that the collective bargaining urge will mushroom across the country.

Labor people are watching to see if the New York election will prove to be a breakthrough that opens the white-collar drive the federation must conduct sooner or later. As Sol Barkin has noted, labor's power has not yet deteriorated seriously, and the Kennedy administration has created a more favorable climate for organizing.

Although automation is growing in the store and office, the clerical and sales workers still present a formidable problem. They have imagined themselves as part of management, tied to its goals. Management has fostered this feeling, even by the use of collective bargaining with its production workers. Daniel Bell pointed out that in 1957 steel management negotiated a wage increase averaging 19½ cents an hour for its production workers; it then granted to non-union employees, mostly white collar workers, an average hourly increase of 26½ cents.

Another factor that makes retail and clerical organizing difficult is the number of part-time workers, many of them women. "The saleswomen at the shopping center are working for luxuries, for a refrigerator or to pay off the mortgage on the house," one union staff man said to me. "Sometimes they're working for the 20 per cent discount on clothing."

Many of the white-collar workers organized in the past were in fields like transportation, communications and entertainment, industries where operating unions could effectively shut off service in support of the white-collar workers. But in today's "mass" white-collar industries such as finance, trade and government, organized production and service workers can do little to advance organizing.

The employed professional and technician—the accountant, engineer, publicly employed doctor, nurse and medical technician, teacher, staff lawyer—present a more hopeful picture than the clerical worker and salesperson. He has the same basic problem dealing with his single employer that a clerk or secretary has, but he also has personal characteristics that unions can capitalize on.

The professional has a high degree of education directed toward a specific vocational goal, so generally he likes his work better than the non-professional. The union can appeal to the professional as an agency that will help him increase his satisfaction on

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the job and his value to society. ("We like teaching, we want to make sure the kids learn," one UFT member said.)

Because the professional is the best educated white-collar worker, he should be the first to recognize the unpleasant changes in his working conditions: increased specialization, greater interchangeability and subsequent loss of individual bargaining power and status. He should be the first white-collar worker to realize that he must join a union—not just a "professional" association—if he intends to regain any control over deteriorating conditions. And this is what happened among the New York City teachers.

"There was the feeling that you, as a professional, didn't count," one UFT member said, describing the atmosphere in his school before the union organized a chapter there. "You were in a menial status, your professional training didn't count for a thing. You followed policy handed down through a corporate set-up. When the teachers realized this, resented being only employees and felt the desire to affirm what they'd been trained for, they had to have the union."

Very few of the seven million employed professionals have seen this, but it is the basic white-collar organizing challenge, for if the professional employee and the technical employee can be organized, the other white-collar workers should be brought into the labor movement without great difficulty.

"We hope to develop an organizing approach to the engineers and professionals *first* in new campaigns," said George Collins of District 4 of the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE). "The clerical first—then professional approach is the long way. Company paternalism slows the campaign down easier."

District 4 has 80,000 members, a fifth being white-collar workers who range from clerical to professional engineer. The union's experience is that white-collar bargaining demands may be different in particulars (engineers want tuition refunds for advanced study written into the contract), but there is little basic difference in organizing or bargaining.

"I hope," Collins said, "that our union will follow the pattern of industrial change and become a modern industrial union. We want to complete the union, make it a total blue-collar-white-collar union."

If organized labor – the industrial union, the white-collar craft union (such the the Office Workers and the Insurance Workers) and the professional union—can attract the professionals, it can recreate a dynamic American trade unionism. When the professionals finally do organize, they generally make first-rate trade unionists: loud, democratic, educated and militant.

"We have the most democratic union in the city," UFT member Eugene Blum said flatly. "We've got a high degree of membership participation and our members are jealous of their rights. And part of the ideology of the leadership is the desire to build a democratic organization of teachers."

The employed professional has long been blind to the fact that his self-interest and morality both lead to unionism. Only one question remains. Can the lame lead the blind?

The above was written before the recent teachers' strike. We hope to have an analysis of the strike's effects in our next issue.—ED.

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AN ASSIST TO THE UNION REFORMER

A little imagination can go a long way. Just when it seemed that the issue of trade union democracy was to be smothered by the fatuity of the CIO-AFL Ethical Practices Committee, and general indifference, Herman Benson came along with a creative idea that has done much to regenerate an interest in democracy in the labor movement. More precisely, what he has done is give heart to those rank and filers and local leaders—the "Jimmy Higgins's" on whom the vitality of the unions must ultimately rest—who are committed union men, and who as committed union men believe that freedom cannot be sacrificed without sacrificing the union as well.

Assisted by a few friends like Jim Peck, one of CORE's leaders, and an occasional dollar bill from others, Benson got the idea—so simple that its bigness is only now becoming apparent to more than a few—that local reformers could hang on and fight better if they were assured of moral, financial, and legal support. It started a couple of years ago when A. J. Hayes, president of the International Association of Machinists, and *head of the AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Committee,* ousted Marion Cieply and Irwin Rappoport who were opposing a corrupt local leadership in Lodge 113. Benson, who has for many years been an active socialist, wrote about the case, reprinted his article, and mailed it to two hundred people. He secured the intercession of Norman Thomas, Professor Clyde Summers, and the American Civil Liberties Union, and generally made unionists and friends of labor aware of the case. Hayes, chief Ethical Practicer, has spent huge sums (not his, the union's) to defeat Cieply and Rappoport. But they continue to fight; that they do is tribute to their own convictions, and the quiet work of Benson's labor "reprints."

I don't know whether Benson and his few associates sought out other union reformers battling corruption, or whether they found him. In any case, the "reprints" became a regular publication, *Union Democracy in Action,* reporting on many situations, and encouraging support for union reformers everywhere. Essentially, it is *of* the labor movement, and this is very important. It rests on the premise that "the union movement is an important force for social progress and for democracy in sociey," that the unions must reach out to all of labor, that democracy cannot be imperiled without injury to the highest interests of the union. In reporting specific cases, it has also stated the broader terms and relevance of democracy, speaking as well of those unions where democracy is more than a constitutional piety.

In the current issue,* there are reports on situations in the house painters' union, the garment workers' union, the United Papermakers and Paperworkers' union, and several maritime unions. It also records the creation of the United Federation of Teachers on a democratic structure, as well as the latest facts in the Cieply-Rappoport case cited above.

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* "Union Reformers in Action," edited by Herman Benson. *Union Democracy in Action,* No. 4, January 1962. Box 62, Knickerbocker Station, New York 2, N.Y. ($3 for 10 issues.)

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Now, the problems before the labor movement clearly do not begin and end with democracy. Democratic institutions can also decay if they lose purpose, or if they fail to measure up to their responsibilities. Democracy will not solve the problem created by automation. Nor will democratic procedures by themselves ensure democracy. After all, there is still the matter of getting union members to take an interest in the internal affairs of the union, attend its meetings, or otherwise participate in policy-making. Complacency, lack of self-confidence as a union member, hence thinker, are involuntary enemies of democracy as bureaucracy is an organized enemy. Working-class suburbias with their distance from plant and union hall, shopping centers and, paradoxically, increased leisure—all these are factors too. Who wants to intrude on leisure for a crummy old meeting? That is, who wants to, or can be made to, unless there is the excitement of participation, of cause, of men like Cieply and Rappoport who are willing to give it that little bit extra that inspires others to give some of their own? "Union Reformers in Action" shows that there are such people, and that there can be more.

One of the saddest phenomena of the union movement today is that it seems to have lost its appeal for young radicals. Appeal? Awareness may be more accurate. There are young sociologists working in the field, and there are dedicated students who want to work on labor's side of "labor-management." (And I suppose there are some to whom expertise is a matter of training for a pie-card career.) But the sense of mission and attraction, the understanding that the labor movement must be enriched in common with sit-ins, freedom rides, and broader community issues—these are missing. And yet the labor movement possibly needs the young radical as much as it needs an answer to the weightier problems of its erosion. This may not be of the same order of importance as organizing the unorganized, but it is nevertheless a challenge to the conscientious labor leader. In fact, it could reasonably be argued that the one would measurably benefit the other.

There's something in *Union Democracy in Action* for the young radical —as for the middle-aged and older radical, liberal, civil libertarian. All of these would be well advised to send in their small contribution, get on the mailing list—and take it from there.

E. G.

A HALL FULL OF LOSERS

We met by chance on the subway platform. My friend was on her way to the Cherry Lane "Theatre of the Absurd": Ionesco's "The Killer," if I recall. Would I go along? I declined with thanks; I was on the way to my own "Theater of the Absurd": The Young Americans for Freedom rally in Madison Square Garden. Its theme: *World Liberation from Communism.*

I had sent for a ticket three weeks

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in advance, without result. A series of phone calls still gave no result; finally, I had been instructed over the phone to report to a mysterious booth in a remote part of the hall. There I found my ticket in an envelope, labeled "Mr. Dissent"!

I wandered about before the meeting. First and most striking, not a single Negro; perhaps Moise Tshombe's presence, announced but not delivered might have attracted a few. Second, a petty sprinkling of those we usually think of as New Yorkers: city folk, Village types, workers, Jews, etc. But mostly family groups from the suburbs of Long Island and New Jersey; a large collection (in groups) of biddies with permanently angry faces; the "jock strap" crowd from the High School Phys. Ed. departments, Madison Square gambling and wrestling touts, the Y's, etc.; enclaves of clean-cut "American" college boys with their college banners. Altogether, a motley crew that never jelled or adhered during the 4½-hour evening.

Why were they here? The banners failed to provide an answer. Nor did the slogans. "Liberate the Liberals"? "Repeal the Income Tax"? "Up Victory, Down Coexistence"? These empty phrases offered no clues to my search for understanding.

Once the meeting got underway, my sense of it was that the later the hour, the sillier it became! It reached its peak in the only direct programmatic speech of the evening offered by a stern-faced young conservative, Brent Bozell, a friend of William F. Buckley, Jr., who had flown to the meeting from his "hideout" in Franco's Spain. The melodramatic oratorical effort of this young theologian was—astonishingly enough—followed by a few choruses of the Yale football song, "Boola Boola," played by a hired band. Calling upon the "Christian West," Bozell raised the biggest storm of the evening with a set of proposals we transcribed literally:

> "To the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Prepare for an immediate landing in Havana.
>
> "To the Commander in Berlin: Tear down the Wall.
>
> "To our chief of mission in the Congo: change sides.
>
> "To the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission: Schedule testing of every nuclear weapon that could conceivably be of service to the military purposes of the West.
>
> "To the Chief of the CIA: You are to encourage liberation movements in every nation of the world under Communist domination including the Soviet Union itself." Etc., etc.

Before this, the tone of the meeting could best be described as querulous, whining, self-pitying. One was struck by the mordant attudinizing of these people. They took on the stance of a small, isolated and persecuted sect cut off from American political life and hounded by shadowy enemies: "liberals," "bureaucrats and beatniks," the New York *Post*, the Washington *Post* and particularly the New York *Times*. Whatever historic continuity there is in this "movement" dates back to negative middle-class feelings about F. D. R. and the New Deal, seen as the source of all that has been wrong in America for a quarter of a century.

The speakers were college kids of the YAF's National Council, each making a grand entry by introducing and presenting an award to one of the pillars of conservatism. The opening YAF ritual, a reading of the so-called Sharon, Conn. statement of principles, reminded one of Fourth of July piety, but without the egalitarian spirit of the Declaration of Independence.

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(". . . when it [government] takes from one man to bestow on another, it diminishes the incentive of the first, the integrity of the second, and the moral autonomy of both.") A series of young men, exhibiting various degrees of college oratorical skills, presented awards to molding isolationists and other figures of the political past; Herbert Hoover ("positive conservatism"); Ludwig von Mises ("pillar of free enterprise"); John Wayne ("tall in the saddle of morality"); Senator Thurmond ("like Calhoun")—your reporter heroically refused to stand for "Dixie"; John Dos Passos ("back to free enterprise"). House Resolution 444 which "demands a policy of victory in the Cold War," also received its reward.

It was past eleven when Barry Goldwater began to speak; the audience had waited many hours to hear him. But Goldwater must have sensed that this hall full of losers could elect no one, that its adulation and applause are kisses of death. Before moving into a dull speech about "conservative values," Goldwater doused his audience with the coldest of showers. He pointedly reminded it, referring to American Nazi pickets outside the hall, of his benighted state of "half Jewishness"!

Given the state of affairs we have described, this was the wisest move he could have made. For there was no Minnesota Fats to redeem this conclave of sore losers. S. P.

Michael Walzer

Students in Washington: A New Peace Movement

The size of the recent student peace demonstration in Washington only inadequately suggests its importance. Both in organization and ideology the demonstration differed from all that had gone before in the student movement. It is even possible that Turn Toward Peace, the recently formed coalition of peace groups which provided an umbrella for the students, will really come to represent a new turn—if not toward peace than at least toward a vastly more sophisticated and intelligent agitation on such issues as testing and civil defense. The following notes are an attempt to weigh the possibilities and difficulties of the new turn. I am writing them under the impact of a wonderful day in Washington.

1. Over 5000 students were in the capital for the February 17 demonstration. Student leaders expected far fewer, though 5000 was the goal they had set themselves last November. They came from some 150 colleges, mostly in the Eastern half of the country. There were a surprisingly large number of high school students; arriving in busloads, largely from New York, all Saturday morning, and they undoubtedly added to the élan of the picket lines. The line in front of the

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White House was the largest and liveliest in many years. On the march to Arlington Cemetery, Saturday afternoon, the line stretched for almost two miles—and the student leaders, amateurs all, marched their followers three and four abreast. All this was impressive and exciting.

2. Who organized the demonstration? It is not easy to tell. In a sense, it was spontaneous, an unexpected response to a call issued from Cambridge. The ginger group, which first proposed the project and maintained a rough sort of ideological initiative and control throughout, was Harvard's TOCSIN, an undergraduate club which broke away from Student SANE last year. But TOCSIN hardly had the resources to win a nationwide response. Instead, its members somehow managed in tortuous meetings last November and December to bring together the two largest (rival) campus peace organizations, the Student Peace Union and Student SANE. SPU provided the Midwestern support and manpower and SANE brought the New Yorkers to Washington. The Turn Toward Peace Student Council now includes all these groups, and independent or local organizations as well.

All of them seem to have worked hard on the demonstration, despite a considerable amount of local feuding. The ideological sources of the feuding can be summed up briefly, though the summary will not be equally accurate for all campuses. The SPU has been influenced by both the pacifists and the socialists—the rhetoric of its leaders often manages to combine the worst elements of the two jargons—and tends to adopt the stance of a political movement whose long-range goal is not merely disarmament, but a totally non-violent world. Student SANE (a group not very effectively controlled by its adult organization) is a more narrowly conceived peace movement, whose style often shows the lingering effects of the Popular Front or Progressive Party, but which is also more oriented toward practical politics than the SPU. Its leaders profess a great aversion to pacifism. These two groups have inherited, so to speak, the wars of their fathers. And because neither of them has produced any significant intellectual effort, the reasons for these wars are often obscure and impenetrable to most of the students involved. This is especially (and dangerously) true of the recent efforts of National SANE to purge the Communists from its youth organization. Students, responding in terms of their own limited experience, have fought the SANE leadership as if it were McCarthyite.

3. It was TOCSIN which brought a new element to the student movement: a highly sophisticated awareness of the realities of the cold war. Perhaps it derives from the continuous debate the TOCSIN leaders are engaged in at Harvard with friends of the Kennedy administration. They have defined their own position in the terms of that debate and they went to Washington very much prepared to argue with the people already there. The policy statement was largely their effort and it represented a sharp break with the statements of previous peace demonstrations. First, it treated the cold war as a real conflict of interests and values and not merely as an invention of evil or insane men, and it proposed non-military ways of carrying on that struggle. (The arguments of Seymour Melman's *The Peace Race* [reviewed in DISSENT, Winter, 1962]

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have apparently had some effect on the campus.) Secondly, the policy statement did not naively declare the various defenses of deterrent strategy to be examples of wickedness and immorality, but *argued* the inadequacy of deterrence and produced a list of "initiatives" which the U. S. might take in the cold war without weakening its own second-strike capacity. It was in this spirit that the students set up interviews with congressmen, members of the administration and officials of the Russian Embassy, but rejected the idea of a vigil in front of the Pentagon or the White House.

The sophistication of the TOCSIN students (they had allies, of course, in the SPU and other of the independent groups) may be illustrated by a single example. One of their "initiatives" was a proposal that the U. S. close down military bases overseas which could be used *only* for a first strike against the Soviet Union. Such bases as those in Turkey, the statement argued, would never survive a Soviet first strike and therefore added nothing to our retaliatory capacity. They represented political commitments which might better be upheld by other means. The policy statement carefully distinguished between yielding the bases and throwing over the commitments—for the latter would leave the Turks as exposed to Soviet coercion as are the Finns.

I find this sort of thing very much preferable to the wilfully naive (often deliberately irrational) and self-righteous peace claque which has often substituted for argument in the past. And undoubtedly the claque can be resumed at any time, unless TOCSIN's initiative is followed up, for many of the students in Washington probably preferred the style of political action represented by the "Ban the Bomb" and "Peace or Pieces" posters which they carried. Something of this attitude will, of course, always be found in the peace movement; there is no reason to repress it. But students need to be convinced that serious political involvement necessarily will carry them beyond such obvious sentiments—and that if they don't get beyond them, they are something short of being involved or serious. Curiously enough, it is the kind of student who diligently reads the *National Guardian* who is likely to prefer the vague rhetoric of peace! peace!, perhaps because it does not compel him to take a stand in regard to the cold war.

4. The easy and unearned aura of righteousness which has marked the peace movement in the immediate past has undoubtedly put off many of the brighter students. They have confronted the dull highmindedness of the committed minority with a weary sophistication about politics which was at least equally unearned. But in the newer peace groups, like TOCSIN, one meets the bright and idealistic student, bringing enormous intellectual energy to his own encounter with radical politics. These were the students who visited Bundy and Wiesner and the others, and made up the delegation to the Russian Embassy: those talks would have been worth hearing.

The students on the lines looked very good, not so carefully dressed up as the YAF counter-pickets, nor so beat as the photographers hoped for —who ran about after beards (there were very few beards). They were high spirited enough to come to Washington and sober enough once there to accept the discipline which the demonstration leaders outlined in a mimeographed paper. But it should be said

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that that was almost the only paper the marchers carried. There was unfortunately little effort to distribute literature and so to begin to educate the students who were already, in a minor way, activists. One of the most serious problems of the new student movement is likely to be a growing gap between leaders and followers, between the sophistication of the leaders and the simplistic Ban the Bomb fervor of their followers.

5. There was an even greater gap, of course, between the official policy of the demonstration and what was reported in the press. And the press does not only inform the nation; it also helps shape the self-image of the marchers. In both cases, it encourages simplemindedness. It serves to convince the students that rational argument is not possible and that it is necessary to adopt a stance of absolute opposition and denial in the face of the cold war. President Kennedy set the tone for the liberal press (the press of the vital center!—and that now includes the New York *Times)* when he sent out coffee to the students who picketed in the snow on Friday. Indulgent, even a little permissive, unwilling (of course) to argue, but eager to urge responsibility and congratulate the students for not being apathetic—this was the line also of the *Times'* editorial on Sunday, which did not even mention the policy proposals of the students. Some of the marchers, reading this sort of thing, might have been convinced that they had come to Washington with no program at all. On the other hand, the columnists of the Hearst papers asserted flatly that the demonstration was a Communist plot. And the marchers, reacting, might decide that *that* charge was never anything but redbaiting.

6. After the long march, there was a meeting on the grass behind Washington Memorial. The talks were mostly passionless and dull, except for the brief excitement of Emil Mazey's promise to bring the unions into the peace movement. The students drifted away, fleeing the wetness and the earnest, antique rhetoric of a young SPU leader. And then Norman Thomas brought the mass of students to their feet. The standing ovation given to Thomas was one of the high points of the day. In a sense, it represented the unity experienced on the lines and the march, and it overwhelmed the memory of bitter feuds—in which Thomas, on the national board of SANE, has been very much involved. The students have made the socialist leader a hero of their own, perhaps knowing only vaguely that he represents a continuity with the past they would do well to explore.

UPWARD AND UPWARD WITH THE ARTS

"Hollywood, Calif., March 5—James Joyce's 'Ulysses' will be more optimistic as a movie than as a book. But, according to Jack Cardiff, the director, the film will adhere to the basic literary and philosophical values of the novel

" 'Daedalus worries the life out of me,' said the British director. 'Daedalus is Hamlet, but Shakespeare handled the ending better than Joyce did. Daedalus is a baffled intellectual, a lonely man who rejects everything and everybody. He must not reject Bloom in the movie as he did in the book. His portrayal must not be too downbeat. We want the movie audience to believe in tomorrow." From the N. Y. *Times,* March 7, 1962.

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Giorgio Galli

TURMOIL AMONG THE ITALIAN COMMUNISTS

MILAN

Among all the Communist parties outside the Soviet bloc, the Italian one (PCI) is probably the most skillful and adaptable. Its characteristic flexibility has been brought into full play during the past half year, when it has had to face two major problems:

a) the rifts in the Soviet bloc and the international Communist movement after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU;
b) the new political situation in Italy.

Let's begin with the second of these problems. At the January 1962 congress of the Christian Democratic (Catholic) party, a left-center faction prevailed and the consequence has been a possible major shift in Italian political life. The Catholics have joined the Social Democrats and Republicans in forming a new government which proclaims its intention to introduce economic and social reforms—and which, for the first time, gains the support of the Nenni Socialists (PSI).

This obviously creates serious difficulties for the Communists. They have enjoyed a pact of common action with the PSI since the popular front days in the mid-thirties. It has not been an untroubled union since, for one thing, the Communist leadership of this alliance coincided with severe defeats for the Italian workers in the years between 1948 and 1955. What shook the relationship between PCI and PSI to the very roots however, was the Khrushchev revelations at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. After that, and still more so, after the Hungarian revolution, the PSI renounced the pact of common action and agreed merely to regular consultations between the parties. In 1961 the pro-Communist wing of the PSI gained a temporary victory, but now that the Nenni Socialists have been courted by the left Christian Democrats, the "alliance on the left" is to all effects and purposes ruptured.

When in full force, this alliance enabled the Communists to influence nearly 40 per cent of the Italian electorate and to gain partial control over local town administrations, trade unions and cooperatives. In certain cities, especially in central Italy, and sections of the Italian federation of labor there is still close cooperation between branches of the PCI and PSI; but on a national scale the PCI has suffered a notable defeat as regards its policy of making the Nenni party a kind of semi-autonomous appendage. The ties between the two parties have further been weakened as the Catholics, who have lately begun to take root among the workers and peasants, have consciously and with some success pursued a policy of wooing the PSI.

Meanwhile, an internal crisis has developed in the Communist party. On the "right" there has appeared a faction headed by Giorgio Amendola, a veteran party leader who was head of

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the organizational apparatus until 1960, when he was replaced by Berlinguer, a Togliatti disciple. Amendola is still a member of the CP leadership. Since the 22nd Congress of the CPSU he has been the outspoken critic of party policy and has campaigned persistently for "polycentrism," a thesis first advanced by Togliatti but given a much more deep-going interpretation by Amendola, who argues that majority and minority factions—banned in the Communist movement since the triumph of Stalinism—should now be permitted. He also proposed a somewhat conciliatory attitude toward the recently formed left-center government.

At the opposite extreme is a wing of the PCI still linked in sentiment to Stalin and led by Mauro Scoccimarro, a party veteran who spent many years in jail during the fascist period. Scoccimarro wants to limit the criticism of Stalin to the barest minimum and looks upon the new government with open hostility, describing it as a maneuver of Italian capitalism to weaken the labor movement. This last view of his brings the party "old guard" close —at least on domestic policy—to a "new left" which has its center in the youth federation of the PCI and its journal *Nuova Generazione*. Where the "new left" diverges sharply from the Scoccimarro group is that concerning the Russian developments it offers the most far-reaching criticisms that any tendency has yet ventured within the PCI.

Meanwhile the aging party leader Togliatti, an extremely skillful politician, tries to play a role as the grey eminence above the various factions. At the PCI Central Committee meeting of November 1961, the most agitated meeting since the end of the war, Togliatti supported Scoccimarro simply in order to cut off discussion, and harshly attacked the two critical factions, the Amendola "right" and the youth federation "left." Amendola had said that "polycentrism imposes itself" in the present political situation, and *Nuova Generazione* has gone so far as to describe Trotsky as "one of the most original personalities of the October Revolution about whose ideas debate has reopened." It has even published an article entitled "The Bureaucratic Degeneration of the Socialist State."

These heresies have brought an intervention from Maurice Thorez, the Stalinist leader of the French CP, who has written that "the thesis of polycentrism [in the Italian party] surprises and disturbs. . . . On the level of party organization, the creation of a majority and a minority becomes a possibility, which means in practice a return to sects and factions and an abandonment of the Leninist conception of the party." Similar criticisms have appeared in Ulbricht's organ *Neues Deutschland,* and when Luigi Longo, vice-secretary of the PCI, recently went on a tour of eastern Europe he returned with the statement that the Communist world disapproves the kind of discussion going on within the Italian party.

At the December meeting of the Central Committee Togliatti did succeed in blocking Amendola's plan for convoking a party congress while simultaneously attacking *Nuovo Generazione* for "interferences" in party life which are "mistaken, confused, unacceptable." And by a unanimous vote —Togliatti can still manage them— Amendola's views concerning the permissibility of factions was rejected.

Nevertheless, the discussion continues and the differences remain.

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With his characteristic skill at political balancing, Togliatti, after attacking Amendola's general view on the nature of Communist organization, put forward a position on domestic politics that are rather close to the "right." Togliatti, in effect, proposed that the PCI abandon its previous negative criticism of the left-center coalition and even claim that the very establishment of such a government is the result of pressure from the left. In February, reporting again to the Central Committee, Togliatti said:

> The credit is mainly ours, because it is we who have led the working class of Italy. . . . This leadership of the PCI has helped stimulate all movements of a democratic nature among the popular masses. . . . It is in this context that the results of the recent Christian Democratic party congress must be seen. . . . We can only congratulate those Christian Democrats who have come to understand that the old expedients will no longer do for solving today's problems. . . .

The PCI, then, will continue to vote against the government in parliament but in its propaganda will claim that whatever reforms it undertakes are the fruit of Communist pressure. Similarly it will denounce the limitations of the new government as the result of ties to the conservative tendencies within the Christian Democratic party. In that way the PCI hopes to profit in the 1963 general election.

Within the PCI, however, the adoption of this line has not brought peace. In mid-January Scoccimarro attacked the left-center government as a capitalist maneuver, while Amendola urged a pragmatic approach. An appearance of unanimity is preserved, largely through the authority Togliatti still commands in the party; but how long this will continue remains to be seen. To a large extent, it depends on how effective the new government proves in carrying out its proclaimed intentions.

Within the ranks of the PCI there is considerable confusion and uncertainty. Berlinguer's report at the December meeting of the Central Committee offers frank evidence:

> There have been unfortunate experiences. . . . It has partly been a matter of confusion, disorder, sometimes excitement. . . . At one point there was a lack of understanding, conservative and sectarian in nature, of the 22nd Congress. Discussion has enabled us to overcome, though not entirely, this kind of misunderstanding. . . . On the other hand, there are to be found, here and there, misunderstandings of an opposite kind: tendencies to stray far, not just from our political line, but from the very base of our ideology. . . .

Clearly the attitudes of a "conservative and sectarian" kind are those of the Stalinists, while the "tendencies to stray" are those usually called "revisionist."

This political uncertainty troubles the party militants—those who lead the local branches in the day-to-day work—more than the prominent leaders. The party as a whole, and most of the Communist voters, do not seem to be very worried, however, and so far as one can tell, are still prepared to accept orders from above. It is upon this tradition of discipline that Togliatti counts for suppressing the critical ferment within the party and for carrying out his new domestic policies, likely to be popular among the workers. Flexible though he is, Togliatti does not propose to tolerate deviations from either the party line or its rigid structure. And at the moment he remains in command.

Translated by MARY DAVISON

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COMMUNICATIONS

Lincoln Fairley
Research Director, International Longshoreman's & Warehousemen's Union

THE WEST COAST LONGSHORE CONTRACT

Deliver us from our friends! They claim to know better what is good for the longshoremen than the Union does. Nothing is more infuriating, particularly when the friend is as generally knowledgeable as Harvey Swados. In this instance, however, it is clear he is looking at the West Coast longshore situation with a jaundiced eye and without benefit of all the facts.

What one misses most in his critique is any summary of the benefits which the longshoremen derive from the Mechanization and Modernization Plan. We do not object to anyone's finding fault with the Plan, but we do object to stressing the faults without mentioning the virtues, particularly when they are important and unique.

No one would know from reading the Swados article that a registered longshoreman, a member of the Union, now has the most complete job protection of any worker in America, particularly against the displacing effects of "automation": He cannot be laid off, and practically no one is ever fired; he is guaranteed approximately $100 a week even if work opportunity falls; he can retire as early as 62 with a monthly income of $220; if he does not retire until age 65 he receives $7,920 from the Fund; and he gets the same full medical coverage for himself and his family after retirement as before. When workers everywhere are being laid off because of automation, it seems a substantial victory that no longshoremen are unemployed and none will be, short of the bottom dropping out of shipping.

Swados' view stems in large measure, as I read his article, from nostalgia over the passing of those conditions on the West Coast waterfront which made the work so attractive that, as he points out, nearly 10,000 men (not 14,000 as he says) recently applied for some 600 jobs on the San Francisco docks. Attractiveness depended not only on the wage level, but on working conditions, many of them won by the Union in militant on-the-job struggles in the thirties. These Union-imposed conditions, which gave respite to the back-breaking labor, established an unusual amount of Union control over the place and content of the work and permitted a unique degree of social contact among the men.

That many of these conditions are disappearing is incontrovertible. That the disappearance is related to the new Mechanization and Modernization

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Agreement is also true to a significant degree. But to characterize the Agreement as "a $29,000,000 bribe (on the part of the employers) to buy back certain working conditions . . . " is a gross distortion of intent and result. It not only overlooks crucial elements in the plan's origin, it frankly ignores the impact of changing methods in the maritime industry.

Swados says that the Agreement is not in any important degree a "mechanization" agreement. This is an important key to his misinterpretations. He overlooks the fact that the working rules whose modification (they have not been given up; they have been changed) he deplores have for years been steadily losing their protective value because new equipment and new methods have been making them largely obsolescent. They no longer provided the security they once had because the work situation to which they had been tailored had disappeared.

The slingload limit, for example, which he discusses, was designed as a protection against speedup; it has become of decreasing value as unit loads originating with the shipper have replaced the traditional loads built on the dock. Unit loads have for years been exceptions to the load limit. Now the exception is becoming the rule. It was precisely because such rules were losing their protective value that the Union made the policy decision to modify the rules in return for new forms of protection and security for the men.

A similar exchange was made two years ago when the Union won an 8-hour guarantee in return for substantial rules changes designed to increase flexibility of operation. It was recognized that in order to get the employers to pay a man 8 hours' pay each day he turned to, whether they could find work for him or not, it was necessary to permit men to be shifted from one ship to another, and from ship to dock, and to make other rules changes which, with careful management, would reduce "dead time" to a minimum.

This contract change was adopted in referendum vote by the narrowest possible margin. Yet today, were another vote held, it would be practically unanimous. The men have learned by two years' experience that the certainty of a full day's pay is worth far more than the old rules which, when adopted, were intended to prevent discrimination and to protect the job, but which now, with the guarantee, no longer serve any useful purpose. We anticipate that the type of criticism of the Mechanization Agreement which Swados ran into on the waterfront will similarly evaporate as the benefits become felt and understood. Actually, benefits are just beginning to be paid because the Internal Revenue Service held up tax approval for almost a year.

Apart from the fact that the modification of the work rules cannot be disassociated from mechanization, there is another point Swados overlooks. As understood by the parties to the Agreement, only $2 million per year (of the $5 million per year total) is in return for the rules modifications. The other $3 million represents what the Union calls the men's "share of the machine."

Quite apart from the modifications in the rules, we have thus won a tangible portion of the benefits of increased productivity due to mechanization. This share the Union intends to make a continuing part of the contract, not only for the next five years but indefinitely. What other union has won a "share of the machine" or has been successful in persuading their employers

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that the men have a right to a direct share in the benefits of rising productivity?

In his nostalgia for the good old days ("When you climb aboard the *Hawaiian Citizen* you are no longer entering the swaying world of the seafaring man" and no one will be "getting a personal kick out of the cargo that he pats after he stows it properly in the hold"), Swados overlooks the fact that the men find the new machines to be labor-saving in a sense that is meaningful to them. There is less physical exertion in handling the cargo. In one lumber port where men had steadfastly opposed the "Aberdeen dolly," after some experience with its use they were loath to accept a job where all the stowing was by hand.

Actually, mechanization and maybe even automation eventually are coming to the waterfront. To oppose it is as useless as it was to fight to preserve the glorious days of sail against the inroads of the dirty rusty tramps, though the nostalgia is just as real and just as futile. Instead, we have tried to accept the inevitable and to benefit by it. Much of the backbreaking labor is disappearing, no matter what the Union does about work rules.

Another strand in Swados' concern involves the men on the "B" list whose opportunity to become full-fledged Union longshoremen has at least been postponed because of reduced work opportunity. Among them, and these are the ones he feels for most strongly, are "dedicated militants" from other unions who thought the ILWU offered a haven but who have suffered a "terrible disillusionment."

One may wonder, perhaps somewhat cynically, whether so many men would have applied for the "B" jobs if longshoring were not universally looked upon as the best job for a workingman on the West Coast. The "B" men, as they become "A" men, and this applies to the "dedicated" but now "disillusioned" militants as well as to others, will find the protections afforded through the Mechanization Fund to be of great personal value. We are inclined to believe that their disillusionment will melt away as soon as they become "A" men.

But this is not the basic answer to Swados' genuine concern. The only real answer is that no one, including the "dissident" leftists whom Swados writes about, had any satisfactory alternative to offer. The choice was between fighting a rear-guard action to preserve as many jobs as possible by all the devices of featherbedding and making-work on the one hand, and accepting the new order on the other, and trying to derive some positive gain from it.

The former method would have preserved some jobs for "B" men, but at the cost of serious risk to the Union if it forced a showdown with the employers. The path we followed, adopted only after three years of discussion within the Union and by referendum vote, has hurt the "B" men. But it protects the vast majority of longshoremen. I am not saying that the minority, and particularly the scattered "militants" within it, are not deserving of concern; I am saying that if the choice is between their interests and those of the great majority of men, the decision has to be made as it was, even though it is a hard one to make.

It is a misreading of the Agreement to say it is an old man's agreement and that Harry Bridges is paying off his debt to the old-timers. What it does for the old-timers is to retire them early, even by compulsion if necessary, in

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order to maintain work opportunity for the younger men. What it does for the younger men is to increase their work opportunity and to open up skilled jobs vacated by the older men. It could more appropriately be called a young man's agreement. If some of the young men haven't seen it that way, they will now that retirements are beginning and their prospects for becoming regular longshoremen are becoming more immediate.

Another area of Swados' concern is with the "dissidents" among the Union longshoremen, men "who because they are Socialists or Trotskyists or ex-Wobblies or ex-Stalinists, persist in operating as though the principles of solidarity and brotherhood were antecedent to self-aggrandizement, the accumulation of power, or the captivating glare of publicity . . . [whose] prospects in ILWU are dim indeed."

It is difficult to overlook the apparent intent to accuse the Union's leadership of self-aggrandizement and the other vices mentioned. But assuming that this was not intended, what can be said about the role of "these idealists"? Almost to a man they opposed the 8-hour guarantee in 1959 and the Mechanization Agreement in 1960, primarily because they saw these proposals as reducing their work opportunities. Was such opposition based on the "principles of solidarity and brotherhood" or was it based on a clinging to the old ways of doing things—the "militant" approach which is not the approach the majority of the membership wants? The majority appears to want security and a larger income. Whether Swados or anyone else likes it, their needs—as they see them—can't be kissed off.

Should Bridges lead a "militant" and "dedicated" minority in a hopeless battle, or should he stay in the leadership of a majority which, like workers in other industries, is no longer easily moved to participate in job actions and other "militant" forms of union activity? He chose the latter, and this perhaps helps to explain why the ILWU has persisted as a strong and remarkably united union when other progressive unions have disappeared or are sadly weakened. Bridges has known how to adopt tactics to changing situations which, met with rigidity, would have meant the end of the Union as a progressive force.

In conclusion, I must object to the invidious and gratuitous personal attacks on Bridges. At one point Swados chooses to interpret Bridges' adoption of the new program as an attempt to challenge the "Meanys and Reuthers" on their chosen ground of "respectability." This is absolute nonsense.

The decision to push for the new agreements in 1960 rather than in 1962 was for precisely the reasons given; it was not to out-do the Meanys and Reuthers in respectability. Actually, it was the conviction of both the Union leadership and of the employer spokesmen that 1960 was the correct time to move on this issue. It must be a courageous labor man who would challenge Bridges' conclusion on timing. Anyone familiar with the West Coast longshore bargaining could tell Swados that when it comes to knowing the best time to move, Bridges is second to none.

The allegation that Harry Bridges "has more in common, intellectually and temperamentally with Paul St. Sure than he does with his own rank and file" scarcely deserves comment. It is a subjective conclusion, supported by no

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evidence and denied by a life-time of successful union leadership. He could not have remained head of a united and democratic organization without the ability to keep in close touch with the wishes and needs of the rank and file.

Speaking before the American Association of Port Authorities at Long Beach, California, on September 28, 1961, Bridges discussed the philosophy back of the Mechanization and Modernization Agreement. He said:

"Probably the points of view of the parties differ as to the 'whys and wherefores' of these facts but they still remain the common framework within which an agreement was reached. Here they are as I and the union see them:

"(1) The companies with whom we bargain own and operate the ships, docks, terminals and equipment to make money, in short for profits.

"(2) Shippers of goods and cargoes move and distribute goods for the same purpose.

"(3) The various kinds of new equipment appearing in the industry—machinery, containers, etc.—are a capital investment for the purpose of reducing labor costs and speeding up the loading and discharge of ships thereby increasing profits.

"(4) Although the new methods are labor-saving, they do not eliminate labor completely. And to the extent labor takes a share of the savings or benefits resulting from new methods the profits of the owners are reduced.

"Thus behind every part of the collective bargaining agreement is the persistent problem of where you draw the line, how you determine the balance between the work force and the owners. There's nothing new in this of course, but it is more sharply presented to the parties when they negotiate over the issues of technological change.

"In stating that we in the ILWU recognize these as facts, I don't want any of you here to draw the conclusion that we are among the great cheer leaders for the free enterprise, profit system. I, for one, am not. But facts are facts. We try to operate from them. We think the other side does also. The solutions embodied in the new agreement are based on the facts of life of the profit system without any comments or endorsements on our part."

Harvey Swados replies

It is distressing that Lincoln Fairley, who is universally respected as one of the best labor research men in the field, should feel compelled to read gross distortion, nostalgia, malice, invidiousness, etc., into an account which, given my explicit biases, was as objective as I could possibly make it.

Far from romanticizing the past or opposing progress, the article indicated that mechanization and automation were coming to the waterfront, *but* that—unlike such industries as coal and chemicals—their complete adoption would probably take another generation. What would best protect the longshoreman in the interim? To find out, I spoke not only to Mr. Fairley and his colleagues, but also to the men on the docks.

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In the event that he has not, I can assure him that it is as difficult to find a longshoreman who admits to having voted for the "mechanization" contract as it is to find a German who voted for Hitler. To the best of my information, men *are* working harder now than they did before, despite the ILWU leadership's previous assurances to the rank and file and Mr. Fairley's assurances to the readers of DISSENT.

Why? One would not know from Mr. Fairley that standard canned goods loads which before the contract used to be 2100 pounds are now over 4000 pounds in the Port of San Francisco. The magic wand of automation has not yet lifted these from ship to shore or vice versa without men straining and pushing. On an uneven deck, or one which has been dunnaged off, or one which lists the wrong way, the job of pushing it on an eight foot high, four foot square four-wheeler is exhausting. The sweat which Harry Bridges promised would be eliminated by the new contract has come back—with interest.

More. As you increase the load size, you decrease the number of loads. Since it is this "hook cycle" which gives longshoremen their periodic rest (long recognized by all parties), intervals of rest are cut down as loads are increased. This used to be known as speed-up. To be sure, the leadership tells the men in such circumstances to call for machines or for "pushers"; but in the nature of the situation—with A men only temporarily taking on hold work, B men afraid of "black marks," and casual workers unaware of the problem—the workers tend more and more to tackle these larger loads unaided.

More. Coffee time and relief periods have been cut.

More. Injuries in this hazardous industry have mushroomed since the new contract. Here is Local 10's *Longshore Bulletin,* February 8, 1962:

> BIG INCREASE IN INJURIES. The West Coast longshoremen had a 16% increase in injuries in 1961, compared to 1960. The increase for the San Francisco Bay Area is 20%. Everybody is in a tizzy trying to figure out how this all came about. In view of the fact that there was a decrease in injuries on the East Coast and the Gulf maybe the new program of big loads and "hurry up" has something to do with it. . . .

More. The Pacific Maritime Association has circularized the gang bosses to remind them that under the new contract they are responsible for enforcing discipline and must discharge men for violation of any of half a dozen listed rules. Thus far the walking bosses have refused to cooperate, asserting that they are not finks. How long, however, will they continue to resist fearing that their jobs, too (essentially they are "witnesses"), will be eliminated? After all, it is only the B men (once again!) who will suffer, since it is they who are now doing more than 50% of all the hold work.

Small wonder that local after local of the ILWU has reached a point of desperation . . . only to realize that under the terms of the new contract they are as much at the mercy of the powerful International as have been the rebellious San Pedro members.

Small wonder too that demoralization has spread through the ranks since the new contract, and that the worst elements have been encouraged to move in on the membership: job selling, mentioned in passing in my article as a

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"minor sore," grew to the point where the International caught men selling B men's jobs for from three to five dollars a day.

Mr. Fairley's defense of the new contract is based on such laudable objectives as its helping men to retire early, creating job security with no layoffs, and providing a guaranteed weekly wage. The rank and file members with whom I have been in touch do not see it quite that way. In one aspect the pension plan has been improved since the contract, it is true: the scale has gone up from $100 to $115 a month. But other maritime unions have succeeded in getting their pension plans liberalized during this period, as Mr. Fairley knows in more detail than I. And in order to get this contract, ILWU members gave up both a wage increase and pension liberalization. The older men cannot be described as ecstatic over the fact that when they leave the industry early, they do so on money that could be theirs in addition to pension money, if they waited until age 65.

As for job security, it will be applicable for an ever-shrinking group—and at the expense, as Mr. Fairley concedes, of the B men. For Mr. Fairley this is a "substantial victory"; more disinterested observers would be more inclined to view it as a semantic victory. (John L. Lewis gained his own kind of job security for UMW members by defining the unemployed miners out of the ranks of the union.) The guaranteed weekly wage, supposedly a concomitant of job security, is an object of derision for many, who never expect to collect it. I am afraid that Mr. Fairley slurs over, as I did not, the fact that it is computed on an annual rather than a weekly basis: the longshoreman who earns but $50 a week, say, for three months, and then earns enough in the rest of the year to bring his income up to $5200 minimum, will collect nothing. The B men, of course, are "included out" in any case . . .

Mr. Fairley's comment would appear to proceed from the odd assumption that automation in his industry is already an established fact. One must insist on the simple truth instead that most waterfront jobs are still man-handle jobs. It would seem, therefore, that despite Mr. Fairley's insistence that there was no "satisfactory alternative" to the new contract, there was indeed such an alternative: the principle embodied in the old 1959 contract, of taxing the employer only in those instances where new machinery was introduced. (However, it is hardly the function of the reporter to propose, from his privileged sanctuary, alternative solutions to vexing problems. Surely it is enough if he describes a going situation to the best of his ability, including its history and implications.)

What Mr. Fairley is saying, if I interpret correctly his remarks that longshoremen are "no longer easily moved to participate in job actions and other 'militant' forms of union activity," is that the membership of the ILWU is more tired and more middle-class than the leadership, which made the brilliant best of a bad situation and brought forth a contract that is a "substantial victory," if only the membership can be persuaded to see it that way. But then to speak, as Mr. Fairley does, of the ILWU persisting as a "strong and remarkably united union" would seem a contradiction that can serve the ends of mythmaking but not of a clear understanding of current reality.

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Mr. Fairley's indignation at my characterization of Harry Bridges is of a similar order. It is understandable, if regrettable, that he should feel he "must object" to a judgment that was balanced and temperate; but since I am under no such compulsion I shall hold to my view. It is not enough for Mr. Fairley that I describe Harry Bridges as one who has "in the past given great leadership" to workers (a description one could in justice apply to but a tiny handful of American labor leaders); I am asked as well to participate in the propagation of fairy tales. Harry Bridges is still honored by a substantial proportion of the membership of his own union; he is also honored by the San Francisco press as a grand old man in the making, and by the affiliates of the Pacific Maritime Association for reasons of their own. Of late he has been, as he himself described to me with characteristic gusto, an active participant, along with the young ad men and junior execs of Montgomery Street, in a Great Books Club, which meets at the members' homes for purposes of mutual intellectual improvement. There is nothing of the sinister or sell-out about such activity; neither however is it unjust to characterize it as being closer to the propensities of a Paul St. Sure than to those of a working longshoreman. Such are the realities of labor leadership today; would it not be irresponsible for the conscientious chronicler to blink them?

AMONG OURSELVES (continued from page 106)

always hard to come by, of course, but we invite readers and writers to consider DISSENT as a place of publication.

• Finances remain very tight, indeed, downright troublesome, partly because the various efforts at expansion we've engaged in lately have eaten up a good part of what little money we had. There is a problem of getting through until the next fund drive in the fall—we earnestly ask those readers who still have unpaid pledges from the last one to send their money in.

On the whole, the general atmosphere is good. DISSENT is slowly, steadily growing. We keep trying to improve it, and its influence spreads.

New Dissent Activities & Offerings

Speakers' Bureau: We agreed at our last editorial board meeting that we would cooperate with local discussion groups of all kinds to furnish them with speakers and discussion leaders from among the members of the editorial board, our Contributing Editors and writers. Expenses must be paid by the discussion group, and we cannot, of course, guarantee that the speaker most desired will always be available. Write our office, giving alternative speakers and dates; we shall do our best.

Reprints: Experimentally, and for articles of our choice only, we shall be offering cheap reprints of certain material published in DISSENT. However, there must be a fairly large order placed to make this possible. The first reprint of this kind we are offering to organizations is Stephan Thernstrom's article on the "Politics of Civil Defense," in the last issue, still available at 10¢ each.

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BOOKS

What Can We Do With the City?

THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, by Jane Jacobs. Random House. $5.95.

The Death and Life of Great American Cities is the kind of book which suggests a two-column discussion; one labeled right, one wrong. The author attacks city planners, architects, administrators, private enterprise, public works, reformers, utopians, bankers. She finds all city planning theory of modern times in error, whether it favors garden cities, cities beautiful, skyscrapers or detached single-story houses. She italicizes "The city cannot be a work of art." The end result, in spite of excellent observations, reasonable recommendations, and a good heart is that Jane Jacobs' book suggests we leave everything pretty much as it is except we paint the walls.

The author is no mere theorist—it was she that led the fight to "save" the West Village and when the New York *Times* reported her as saying that "in addition to a well-knit neighborhood organization the Committee had been successful because it had refused to discuss any planning whatsoever with the Planning Commission" she stated her position. I would maintain, it was not because the single goal of the Committee was to remove the "blighted" designation from the neighborhood that no planning was discussed, but rather that the existing plan, such as it is, is all the plan Mrs. Jacobs wants.

Her ideal city consists of small blocks so there will be plenty of corners to turn, for long blocks are boring. If you chopped all the 800′ long Manhattan blocks in half there would be twice as many corners to turn and things would be more interesting. Unlike LeCorbusier, who is simple minded and finds seven different kinds of streets from path to superhighway, the author sees all streets alike, only more of them. What a pleasure to have more curbs so that more cars can be parked, shining or grimy, forming the ideal foreground to the background of her street activity and architecture.

She finds the superblock an abomination. So it is when the architect designs buildings as if he were using a cooky cutter but the author does not question the reason why this is current practice. That a superblock can be designed so it has life and variety in the buildings and in the spaces around them, that the plan can foster community is, to her, obviously sheer fantasy. Equally fantastic, as she sees it, is to think of breaking the gridiron pattern by creating visual barriers (bridge building, for example) to close vistas, keep others open and in general plastically model space. Such handling of space might make a beautiful city but the city beautiful is not for us—probably unsafe, and probably immoral and decadent.

In Mrs. Jacobs' city there are small stores, in each of which is found a

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jovial but watchful shopkeeper; jovial for the neighborhood needs someone who is a friend, and watchful, because a concierge is required. It is not only the grocer chained to his counter that watches, everybody is hanging out of the windows watching and there are sidewalk characters who also watch—these are the "eyes of the street"—keeping the streets safe. It is not their intention to spy on their neighbors as happens in small towns, the Soviet Union and used to happen in Mussolini's Italy and Nazi Germany. These are kindly people who keep the streets safe, for unfortunately much as we love the Puerto Rican and Negro people they tend to be, shall we say, and especially when not watched, er—antisocial? The city must consist of mixed uses and it doesn't seem to matter whether these are pleasant or disgusting.

There is an idyllic passage dealing with the foot of Christopher Street: "You could not find a happier place on a hot summer day or a lazy summer Sunday. From time to time, a great slushing and clanking fills the air as a sanitation truck dumps its load into a waiting scow." This the author explains is not "pretty-pretty." I agree it is not pretty but at least it has meaning. In a society where schools become gigantic baby-sitting operations rather than educational institutions, where the man is fitted to the work rather than the work to the man, where watching a baseball game on TV makes a man an athlete, such a spectacle has reality and so by contrast is entrancing. When you live in a world of deodorants, after a while even a bad odor has the advantage of proving you haven't lost your sense of smell.

The sidewalks are filled with children playing. Parks and playgrounds are unnecessary, according to the author, for children don't want them, they are boring. Indeed the dullness of the Park Department's prefabricated swings and slides suit the toddlers but once a child has reached 5 or 6 the straitjacket of school arouses an opposite reaction and there being no reasonable occupations in the city for a child to engage in, suggests unreasonable occupations. If the children play on the street then they can be easily watched. For safety, according to Mrs. Jacobs; to prevent unreasonable occupations, is my interpretation. In addition, teenagers and adults in the same predicament can't molest the little tykes. She finds parks dangerous and the book describes horrendous episodes which show Boris Karloff lurking in shadows amid the forsythia. "A miraculous rescue of a 9-year-old boy who was pushed down a sewer by an unidentified assailant—in a park of course"—the New York *Times* reported, "The mother had told the boys earlier in the day not to play in Highbridge Park.... Finally she said all right. The boy's frightened companions intelligently raced out of the park and back to the evil streets where they enlisted help quickly."

Old buildings are needed—not for beauty or tradition but "plain ordinary, low-value old buildings, including some run-down old buildings." Naturally, in an affluent society such as ours, we can afford to demolish good buildings and put up bad buildings since it makes a profit for the entrepreneur both in demolition and reconstruction and further, guarantees that in 20 years the son of the entrepreneur can repeat the process. The naive question of Sir Hugh Casson comes to mind. "Why," he asked, "do you tear down permanent buildings and build

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temporary ones?" So, when the author says, "fix the buildings up but leave the people" she is on safe ground for obviously the best our architectural talents can do is to create new housing that look like penal institutions (only not so solid!) especially when fees paid to architects by housing authorities are too low to profitably study a job (especially for the big offices that get the jobs), and especially when the regulations of the housing authority in essence forbid any original thinking, for such thinking is experimental—impractical and will not be approved by the State or Federal agencies.

"No relocation outside the neighborhood" is a good slogan when you have no idea of better community, no idea of city plan, but a very good idea of how entrepreneurs make an honest dollar by converting a neighborhood from low rent to high rent.

In the author's ideal city there will be a high concentration of people and not only the buildings' uses are mixed but ethnic and income groups as well. Everything is active and noisy, radios blare, and the fusillade of trucks backfiring, the shattering starts and halts of buses, grindings of garbage trucks, orchestrate the scene, keeping the teeth on edge and the nerves tensed. Ah! dolce vita, all side by side, nuisance factory, fancy office building, the corner candy store, wino, matron in her mink, bar and grille, baby in his shiny pram, artist in his beret, parking lot, pizza parlor, mauvais garcon, minister, black and white, hot dogs and caviar and God in his heaven. It's all very integrated and not at all utopian for isn't this to be found in the West Village—pattern for the ideal city?

Traffic problems are solved by "attrition of the automobile by the city." This is a nibbling away process. For example, at Washington Square a great victory was won. You don't have to remove a street from the city map, all you do is put up a chain barring its use. No need for planning, "strategy and tactics" are the words. Make streets narrower, impassable to thru traffic: Barricades not planning is the slogan. Naturally, part of the activity will result from this — instead of whooshing down thru streets you can have the pleasure of a roller coaster, sounding the horn as you whirl around corners on two wheels. It is obvious that a law banning the private automobile in Manhattan is also fantasy, so let's keep our streets as parking lots.

Slums in the ideal city "unslum" themselves. Successful unslumming means that enough people must have an attachment to the slum so they wish to stay and it also means that it must be practical for them to stay.

Here the author finds Puerto Ricans and Negroes from the South long-time dwellers (at least 10 to 15 years) who chose their dwellings as the most desirable, are delighted with their ghettos and enjoy living many in a room paying (according to Charles Abrams) more than anyone else for these pleasures. Here you find as typical, the statement of a north-end young butcher who "pointed out a three-story brick house, told me that the family that lived there just spent $20,000 modernizing it (out of saved earnings!) and added, that man could live anywhere . . . he wants to stay here. People who stay don't have to, you know, they like it."

And in this ideal city, the landlord will "unslum" and not raise the rent.

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The author is no theorist, no believer in prognostication or forecast. She

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is practical, she believes only what is in front of her nose. So, no planning is required, just the strategy and tactics involved in immediate situations. The problem is to win the battle not the war. In rough and tumble politics such a method applies and in fact is the statesmanship of our time. Thus this book is bound to be popular. It is also bound to be popular for inherent in it is a disbelief in new forms and new ideas, a lack of understanding of the function and relation of art to life and not least a tacit defense of the status quo circa 1920.

This was surely not the intention. The intention was to attack the absurdities of academic city planners, the venal interests of real estate speculators and their cohorts in government.

It is unfortunate when a warm-hearted and well-meaning woman plays into the hands of her avowed enemies because she does not see long-range objectives. Much of what she says is common sense and many of us have long attacked, as she does, the anti-urban, pro-automobile teaching and practice of city planning, legislation that establishes low-income ghettos, segregation and the like. All this is good, the shrewd and accurate personal observations of the facts of city life are first rate, the bother is the limited viewpoint.

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Mrs. Jacobs' essential weakness is in her anti-utopianism. She should (as a beginning) ponder Oscar Wilde's, "A map of the world which does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the country in which humanity is always landing, and when humanity lands there, it looks out, and seeing a better country sets sail. Progress is the realization of Utopias."

Secondly, she should consider the combination of the doubling of in-city populations in the next 40 years with the more than halving of work hours. Massive urbanization and mass freed time (leisure?) needs a basic rethinking of the physical patterns of the city for these will have (are having) a colossal impact on its structure.

Thirdly, she should consider whether her assumption that it is reasonable to accept the technology as it is, the work and leisure as it is, the education of child and adult as it is, the mores as

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Politics of the Far Right

THE AMERICAN ULTRAS, by Irwin Suall. New America (303 Park Avenue So.). 1962. 65 pp. 75¢.

This pamphlet, written by the national secretary of the Socialist party, is a useful survey of the right-wing groups now springing up in the United States. It is mainly a factual presentation, bringing together material about the Birch Society, the "Christian Anti-Communist Crusade," etc. The writing is economical and restrained, only occasionally falling into the agitational mannerisms that have traditionally been a curse of left-wing pamphleteering. Perhaps the most noteworthy section of the pamphlet deals with the political activities of military men who have openly aligned themselves with the Birchers and used their authority to pump reactionary propaganda into the ranks beneath them. Suall suggests, with some plausibility, that we have here an incipient group of military Ultras, somewhat like the Salan gang in France, who would become an important power center for a mass movement on the right. I. H.

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they are, and for that matter, the political institutions such as they are, as ultimate, byzantine, unchangeable.

Having said all of this, allow me to hope that this book will fall into hands that can appreciate its merits. Among these I find: a well formulated indictment of present bureaucratic thinking; the chapter on the erosion of cities by the automobile including the 1890 English *Architectural Review* description of London in the horse and buggy days; much about what she says on the failure of the present subsidized dwelling legislation and its results; a good part of the chapter on the "need for primary mixed uses" in the city; and finally, and best of all, Jane loves the great city and this love shines through.

PERCIVAL GOODMAN, F.A.I.A.

Fidelism as Faith

THE CUBAN STORY by Herbert L. Matthews. George Braziller, 1961. $4.50

Herbert L. Matthews, the New York *Times* correspondent whose 1957 interview with Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra Mountains was a key step in the rise of the Cuban leader, has written a sympathetic study of the Cuban Revolution.

The pages of this book must have been written in mid-1961 and, as Matthews himself states, the rhythm of the Cuban Revolution is so contorted, events are almost obsolete before they can be interpreted. But the deliberate choice of Communism (or "Marxist-Leninism," the preferred expression today) was already foreshadowed, and Mr. Matthews judged events presuming the strong possibility that the Fidelists might opt for a Communist state.

The Cuban Story is more than a history of post-1957 Cuba. It is also an apologetics, which word in its old form is a branch of theology through which Christians logically defended their faith. The faith is different but the reasoning the same. For Mr. Matthews was struck with an extreme case of hero worship as a result of meeting Fidel Castro (by now confused with his ego satisfaction at making a great journalistic scoop) and has never been able to see the world the same.

In brief, Matthews' thesis is that Fidel Castro was never a Communist but the United States forced him to choose the Russian system in order to continue the Cuban Revolution. As an editor of the New York *Times* he is careful to punctuate his remarks with disclaimers of historic inevitability, but underlying most of his attitudes is the feeling that the situation in Latin America has gone too far to be corrected by anything other than radical revolutions. Since in light of this same reasoning the United States will oppose such revolutions, the new Latin American leaders must look to Russia or China for guidance and assistance. This is not a position Mr. Matthews favors, it must be emphasized, but one which he conceives as the movement of history so long as America stubbornly

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condemns what he calls totalitarian democracy.

Matthews may be right. One believes and thereafter finds or recreates both facts and the logical relation among these facts to support conclusions which then seem inevitable. Every great faith is based on this psychologic process and if enough people from the intellectual elite will it strongly enough, the great 20th-century redemptive faith in revolution shall indeed create a world-wide religion of Communism. For, despite all sophisticated asides, the kind of reasoning employed by Mr. Matthews does not lead to neutralist socialism but rather complete economic and political subservience to Russia or China. The people of Puerto Rico may vote independence from the United States but Cuba, the Puerto Rico of Russia, no longer has that option.

Examples of the ability of Mr. Matthews to accept Fidel Castro's thinking abound throughout the book. Some may be quoted:

—"Fidel could not have held elections without putting a halt to his revolution."

—"Even if the agrarian reform creates a Communist-type State system the peasant did not have freedom and democracy before, does not know what they mean and cannot be expected to care."

—"In theory, Fidel could have developed the 26th of July Movement into a one-party system such as Mexico has with her Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) but, as I pointed out before, Fidel knew—or thought—that middle- and upper-class elements in the 26th of July Movement would not go for the radical social revolution he had in mind. This left the field clear for the Communist party."

—"The case of Huber Matos was even more revealing, and is considered by some students of the Cuban Revolution as a watershed. In my own opinion it was a logical, although reprehensible, development, and perhaps even inevitable.

"Matos, like many other officers and members of the former civic resistance, had watched the growing strength of communism in the Army with alarm. He tried to argue the matter out with Fidel, but Fidel would not listen or even see him. So, on October 19 Huber Matos presented his resignation. The next day he was arrested, charged with 'treason,' and in December was tried, convicted and sentenced to thirty years in prison, with Fidel Castro himself as the bitterest accuser.

"Put thus baldly, it was an utterly shocking business—but a revolution is not a tea party, and a great deal happens in revolutions that is shocking . . . By the logic of the Revolution, Huber Matos was a traitor. Those who condemned the outrageous way he was treated, had to condemn the Revolution."

—"he [Fidel], alone, holds the fabric of Cuban society together and without him it would break down into chaos, anarchy and a blood bath fearful to contemplate."

—"Perhaps there is no middle way—peaceful, democratic, evolutionary—such as we want to see. Perhaps we will be faced with the choice of one of the two evils—the Left-wing, socialistic, Fidelista way, or the Right wing, reactionary, military dictatorship way."

The point of these quotations is not to agree or disagree with what Matthews states. It is simply to indicate

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the trend. Elections are excreta to a revolution; since peasants neither know nor care for freedom and democracy, these aims become without substance; radical social revolution must leave the field clear to Communists; any man who disagrees with the Leader is a traitor by definition; the Leader alone holds together society; and no alternative is given between the "Marxist-Leninist way" and reactionary military dictatorships. It follows that all revolutions must turn Communistic. Oddly, the final implications of Mr. Matthews' reasoning are closely similar to the reactionaries he despises.

The Cuban Story of Herbert Matthews and *Listen, Yankee* by C. Wright Mills clearly portray a dominant attitude among the Latin American student and professorial body. Stridently anti-American for reasons excellent and less than excellent, the Wave of the Future is now riding hobby-horse with Moscow and Peking. And no Alliance for Progress can change this feeling since the world view of the Latin American intellectuals is so bound up with anti-Yankeeism, the emotional security of these individuals would be shattered if their redemptive faith were put to question.

Only time may disprove the presuppositions of *The Cuban Story*. Nothing has been so salutary for Africa as the experience of Guinea. Fidel Castro, who has gone much further than Sekou Touré, is the only agent who can destroy the charisma of the Cuban saga. For the very logic of his experiment, the actuality of the dream, will show the true face of the totalitarian police state. Juan José Arévalo, author of *The Shark and the Sardines*, the most violent anti-American book ever published and a sacred text in Cuba, recently criticized Fidel Castro as "materialist" and "thoroughly impractical." This can be a straw in the wind. If the Cuban story continues to unfold at the same momentum for the next year, Fidelists both inside and outside Cuba will start to ask themselves questions which cannot be resolved by the pat slogans Herbert L. Matthews has so lightly mouthed.

DANIEL M. FRIEDENBERG

A Marx One Can Love

MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN, by Erich Fromm (with a translation from Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* by T. B. Bottomore). Frederick Ungar, New York, 1961. 260 pp. $1.75.

Hearing the old Lutheran chorals in a Bach oratorio, one is astonished to have quite a new experience as the richness of different contrapuntal textures unfolds. So one is pleased to find the familiar ideas of Marx exposed by the author of *Man for Himself, The Sane Society,* and *The Art of Loving,* in the light of twentieth-century insights. Fromm uses the very

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words of the young Marx (and adds 100 pages of a long-forgotten manuscript which has not been accessible to English readers for a long time), but he relates them to the experience of a modern psychologist and philosopher on the one hand and to the tradition of non-conformist thought of the past and of non-Western cultures on the other hand. He sees Marx as one in the long series of mystics and existentialists from "prophetic messianism, Christian chiliastic sectarians, thirteenth-century Thomism, Renaissance utopianism and eighteenth-century Enlightenment," to Kierkegaard and Zen Buddhism.

Were it merely for the pleasurable experience of relating these cross-currents of the world's thought with the Marxian anthropology, this exploration would be rewarding in itself. For the English-speaking public (Fromm acknowledges his indebtedness to the German and French Marxicologists of the last thirty years) this is quite new. Marxian and socialist thought has rarely been recognized as part of, and indeed deeply embedded in, the strands of a sempiternal human yearning for fulfillment of the human personality.

With Fromm we are far away from the old-school textbook of Dial-Mat with its dry derivations from Hegel's triad, Feuerbachian or Darwinian materialism and classical economics. He pits quotations, information, insight and wit against the superficial, nineteenth-century and Soviet interpretations which have made of Marx a mere follower of Holbach turned economist and social thinker. His refutation of the vulgarizers (both adversaries who built up the strawman of Marx the materialist, and disciples who canonized the collectivist economist Marx) is definitive and devastating.

Fromm's is a labor of love, an act of piety, and a show of courage in these days when every hack writer takes his digs at Marx. The Victorian gentleman who diligently excerpted classical economics in the British Museum appears as a human being of that sentimental age. Like all great men in history Marx loved children, we learn. He abhorred the "crude communists," the collectivizers and "bourgeois materialists," and with great effort only could he conceal his concern for justice, his humanism and idealism. As tribute to the spirit of his age he used the language of the materialists and positivists who dominated it.

Today Fromm writes in the language of the existentialist psychoanalyst which is understood in our age. Nothing need disconcert us in such a change of front. Engels himself admitted that in the earlier days he and Marx had overemphasized the deterministic aspects of their philosophy; idealistic philosophies then were mostly apologetics, and the churches still were the prime target for every free thinker. Marx never dreamed that Christian or other religious ideologies might one day turn up on his side of the barricade. He credited Lamennais with nothing but confusionism. Historical research meanwhile has discovered saintly heroes of liberty, and Fromm now conjures up the Church Fathers, Lao Tsu and other holy men who said in theistic language what Marx said in sociological language. Fromm thus enriches socialism's orchestration. Marx had no inkling of the beautiful chord to which he was supplying the descant. He rather thought he was providing a needed dissonance which urged the chord toward resolution.

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Now without torturing my metaphor, the chord would sound different without Marx's melody. It is one thing to say that we might not understand what Lao Tsu meant if Marx had not made it clear. It is quite another thing to say that Marx and Lao Tsu meant the same thing. In seeming to say this, Fromm does less than justice to Marx, whose major contribution to the sociology of knowledge is precisely his charge that theological language, while it may "reflect" social discord, also obscures its cause and, instead of revealing the alienated state of mind, fixates it.

In this sense Marx never meant the same thing as Kierkegaard. Marx, who always was so meticulous in giving credit to the most obscure writer who had supplied him with a small fact or had first, however obscurely and fumblingly, suggested an idea, never mentions the Danish metaphysician who died thirty years before him. He admired Jacob Boehme, but he had no use for Meister Eckhart or the Church Fathers. Their concern was different from his, and only in the perspective of a century later do we appreciate that, rightly understood, their thinking might be related to ours in the same way Marx's is. Historical contemplation of past heroes changes their image and significance. We now are looking for the structure of the non-conformist mind rather than for specific ideas in which it manifested itself at various moments in the evolution of human society. In this respect we do find resemblances which were not suspected before and which certainly the persons concerned never supposed to exist. The nearest thing to Meister Eckhart in modern socialism certainly was Weitling, the tailor woefully berated, humiliated and purged from the Communist League by Marx. The two definitely no longer understood each other, as Marx no longer understood the ideas they had in common some years earlier. In his early twenties Marx still was able to admire the human protest and was a friend of all rebels. After 1846 he was impatient with anyone who continued to hold these abstract, alienated or ideological conceptions of the revolution.

Here I come to the point where, with all admiration for Fromm's intention and achievement, I feel that he has overstated his case. With a few famous quotations (which in themselves are appropriate enough but failed to convince this writer and other scholars who earlier had gone over this area), Fromm tries to show that there was no difference between the "young Marx" who wrote the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" constituting 100 pages of this book, and the "old Marx" of *Das Kapital*. These manuscripts, dating from 1844 when Marx was 26 years old and had not yet been converted to communism are an aphoristic, groping, polemical, and on the whole still very unsure and confused exposé of a philosophy which then passed by the name of "German socialism." Its principal representatives were Weitling, Lorenz von Stein, Moses Hess and Engels, and it showed more than verbal signs of its Young-Hegelian heritage, baptized in Feuerbach. The manuscript itself is an unfinished first draft, rather hastily written, and moreover, what we have of it is incomplete. Neither Marx nor Engels, executor of his will, nor Bernstein who was executor of Engels' will, ever thought of publishing it. Bernstein did publish another, more developed but also more polemical and

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tedious manuscript entitled "German Ideology" and dated 1845, which contains much of the same material in the form of a savage attack on Stirner and other radical disciples of Hegel. Hegel's school then was rapidly disintegrating into individualists and socialists; but Marx then had not gone all the way yet.

The manuscript of 1844, "Marx's main philosophical work," was not published until 1932, a consequence rather than a cause of the Marxists' failure to understand the true meaning of Marx. It is omitted in the East German—though not in the Moscow—edition of Marx-Engels' "Works," probably because of its attacks on "crude communism." Fromm feels that "Marx could be regarded as an enemy of freedom . . . only by the fantastic fraud of Stalin." This contention is manifestly erroneous. Lenin had drawn the dictatorial and totalitarian conclusions which Lukacs underpinned philosophically in 1921, drawing inspiration precisely from the study of Marx's early works.

Yet the real blame for misunderstanding Marx must be laid at the door of the great teachers of Marxism in the beginning of this century, Kautsky, Plekhanov, and earlier even Engels himself. When he wrote the canonical book against the much-maligned Eugen Duehring, he remembered the old manuscripts, looked them up and discarded them as unhelpful in explaining "scientific" socialism. In his funeral oration for Marx, which Fromm reprints, he did not breathe a word of the philosophical socialism which was Marx's concern in 1844, but attributed to him "two great discoveries . . . that the production of the immediate material means of subsistence . . . forms the foundation upon which the state . . . art and even ideas have evolved . . . (and) the surplus value."

Then there are other things, even more embarrassing. Marx's ruthless purge of Weitling from the Kommunistenbund; his treacherous intrigue against Bakunin in the International; his unfair attack on precisely the humanist "faults" of Proudhon and his vile admission, in a letter to Engels on the day of Sédan: A Prussian victory over Napoleon also will bring us the victory of our theory over Proudhon's! The man who befriended the children on Hampstead Heath was a dictator. He also was personally responsible for the degeneration of his critical method into a canon of economic dogma, and of his humanist, revolutionary philosophy into the justification of material progress for the working class. He spent a lifetime trying to elucidate the laws of economic development instead of developing the philosophical critique with which he had started. Why? Obviously because his angle of vision had changed. He now attributed greater importance to the one than to the other. He was more interested in the next depression than in the depressed state of humanity; he banked on the coming crisis of capitalism instead of pushing the self-knowledge of society to a crisis. This is the old Marx who could write: Every step forward in the real (labor) movement is worth more than a dozen programs. The young Marx, by contrast, was concerned very much with "programs."

It would be a mistake to say that Marx forgot the early programs and goals. His ultimate aim, certainly, remained the liberation of man. But before the revolution of 1848 he saw this goal within reach, as the result of a

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rapid succession of revolutionary acts, deepening the revolution, broadening it, giving it intellectual and human content, leading it toward abolition of all forms of servitude, and eventually achieving liberation from man's historical curse, the regime of property —in brief, the permanent revolution. This again was the position of Trotsky in the early twenties. Such great expectations, of course, were justified only by constant projection of the socialist image of man against the existing situation. That was the reason why Trotsky wrote about literature in the midst of the civil war and opposed "Proletkult."

After the lost revolution, Marx no longer analyzed the totality of the human condition. His critique became fragmentary, concentrated on the cause immediately at hand, and was negative. As "negation of the negation" it reveals itself as part of the alienated world and no longer transcends it, as certainly did all the above-named utopians, including young Marx.

Fromm's claim that Marx did not teach anything different after 1848 does not tell the full story. Marx taught now in a different context which forced him to forgo the grandiose project of a five-volume encyclopedia of the human sciences (the three volumes of *Das Kapital* were to be its first volume) culminating in a new exposition of the dialectics; he now applied his critical method to the "objective" side of reality and suppressed his original utopianism. Unless one wants to dress Marx up as a national monument, superhumanly immovable and more omniscient than Hegel's Absolute Spirit, he cannot possibly deny the fundamental difference. Before 1848 Marx thought in terms of permanent revolution; thereafter he dealt with a today that was concrete and left the tomorrow in metaphysical suspense. In Marx, too, existence determined consciousness. Dialectically this was progress; but dialectically also such concretization implies alienation—in this case expressed as system fetishism.

Marx shivered before the "grotesque rock architecture" of the frozen Hegelian system which he no longer could learn from the master's mouth. It had lost its revolutionary impact by the very fact that it continued to exist as a system in a period for which it had not been designed. Marx had to renew it, if only to make it concrete, specific for his age. But likewise he had to renew his own system, if only to make it specific, concrete and applicable to the later years of the nineteenth century. There is no doubt that in this process of concretization it lost some of the humanist freshness and much of its claim to embrace the totality of human existence. It is in this sense that we may entertain the question whether, together with its phi losophical substance, Marxism did not lose its uniquely revolutionary meaning already in the hands of Marx. Though he denied being "a Marxist," no one else bears so much responsibility for "Marxism" as taught by Kautsky and Plekhanov.

Thus Marxism became ready for a complete reappraisal and renewal in the twentieth century. Unless it was to die it had to meet a new challenge. Such a challenge was provided by existentialism and the conditions it stands for. This was an opportunity to break out of the sterility of the system and to test Marxian thought: whether it can produce answers to the questions raised by this new movement.

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Decidedly it is not enough for us to prove that Marx, after all, was not so far away from Kierkegaard in his basic concerns. But by clearing the deck of misconceptions, by going back to the "young Marx" and discarding some of the systematic dross with which the later Marx burdened his disciples, Fromm has indeed liberated Marx from the Marxists, setting Marx free to answer the challenge for himself.

Thus after asserting that Marx was as responsible for the Marxists as Christ was for the Great Inquisitor, we are ready for another turn of the dialectical screw: I would like to compare Fromm's achievement in this little volume with the classical essay in which Unamuno took Goethe away from philologists and explicators. Written for the centenary of Goethe's death it was entitled: *"Um einen Goethe von innen bittend"* (Asking for a Goethe from Within). The Marx whom Fromm has shown us does not belong to the biographers and philologists whose views I have accepted. He rather is the Marx within, the companion of Zeno, the undogmatic, humanist, radical Marx. In a deeper sense, therefore, Fromm is right: philosophically he has restored Marx against himself; the "Marx von innen" will be eternally right against the historical Marx.

In denying the materialistic, dictatorial, totalitarian, collectivistic conclusions which some have drawn from Marx, Fromm has not done a polishing job, a canonizing whitewash. He has restored an original Marxian thought with all its sparkling reflections from humanist traditions throughout the ages.

To be sure, Marx would have preferred an original application of his method to the best interpretation of his meaning 115 years ago. And, here, as a footnote, I cannot refrain from a little carping. Neither Fromm nor Bottomore seems to be aware that Marx was a revolutionary, or that "radicalism" for him meant more than "going to the root"; it means "uprooting," too. Thus Bottomore consistently translates "Aufhebung des Privateigentums" by "supersession of property," which sounds so much nicer than "abolition." Likewise, in Fromm's introduction, Marx's revolutionary beard looks venerable rather than terrible between the existentialist beards from Zeno the Greek to Zen. By taking Marx away from the Marxist squares, Fromm has made him innocuous rather than hip. It's such a nice Marx he presents that I for one relish some little private information which Fromm withholds from his readers—Marx the avid reader of Paul de Kock, etc.; it makes the guy so much more human.

The term "humanist," which in his own time deepened his revolutionary thought, now makes it sound shallower. Marx could look down on liberal notions such as "justice," which to us now—or again—appear as more revolutionary than the existentialists' search for "authentic" man. Marx's message rather meant to say that such a thing is not possible within the limitation of class society.

HENRY PACHTER.

THE JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY and THE AFRICAN DILEMMA featured in **The Western Socialist**, No. 1-1962. Mail $1.00 for an 8-issue sub or $2.00 for an 18-issue sub, including above, to 11 Faneuil Hall Sq., Boston 9, Mass. FREE sample copies of old issue on request.

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From "AA" to Zyryanovsk

McGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, edited by Michael T. Florinsky. New York: A Donat Publication. McGraw-Hill. Illus., maps. xiv + 624 pp. $23.50.

With this new *Encyclopedia* at hand, it seems inconceivable that we had to make-do without something like it up to now. Apart from sampling its thousands of entries for purposes of this review, I have referred to it innumerable times to find an answer that would otherwise have taken endless (and possibly fruitless) poking through various sources.

It is very nearly ungenerous to cavil in any way about the results achieved in this scholarly undertaking. I find it incredible that a group of individuals, unsponsored by institution or foundation, were intrepid enough to assume a task of this dimension, and to bring it off with so much skill. Editor Michael T. Florinsky, and mnaging editors David S. Anin and Alexander Donat, are to be commended as are the consultants Harry Schwartz (New York *Times),* Theodore Shabad (New York *Times),* John Turkevich (professor of chemistry, Princeton) and Earl Ubell (New York *Herald Tribune).* While many of the 91 contributors are unknown to me, their biographic notes in most cases establish their authority, and some of them—for example, Richard Loewenthal, Solomon Schwarz, Alexander Dallin, Hans Kohn, Frederick C. Barghoorn, Robert V. Daniels, to cite a few—are familiar names to many of us.

From "AA: *see* GAUYA" to "ZYRYANOVSK, town in E.-Kazakhstan Oblast, Kazakh SSR, in Altay Mountains; pop. 16,000 (1939), 54,000 (1959). Lead, asphalt concrete. Founded 1794," the *Encyclopedia* ranges the gamut of Russian history from its earliest days to the present, and covers in its subjects every field from architecture to zoology. The writing is perhaps uneven, revealing some inconsistencies and an absence of uniform professionalism in editing.

In an effort to gain space the editors have resorted to an extreme use of abbreviation. They are to be forgiven, I suppose, for it no doubt permitted the addition of hundreds of entries, but it is distracting. After its first appearance in an entry, the subject is referred to only by initial in the remainder of the entry. Thus Railroads become "R" without a period. But Russia is always "R." with a period (and Education is "E" while East is "E."). Takes a little watching. Nevertheless, all of it is easily readable; and, it should be added, legibly set—compact, but not so small in type size as we often find in encyclopedias. The illustrations, where they lend themselves to line cuts, as in charts, are helpful. Where economy dictated line cuts in place of half-tones, as in portraits of individuals, they have an awkward look, and might possibly have been better omitted.

I found the geographic entries particularly useful, in many cases an essential supplement to the very best of atlases. Here the briefest entry serves a clear purpose. I am not, however, convinced that all the metallurgists, academicians, and bassos, rated inclu-

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sion, where they claim no special distinction of originality or excellence. In the pre-Revolution entries, they would have obviously have been pruned by the editing of time. But in the post-Revolution period, they would seem to belong more in a "Who's Who" than an encyclopedia. Their omission would surely have left space for elaboration of some entries, or the inclusion of entries that might have been forced out.

The editors have maintained a scrupulous, sometimes an excruciating, objectivity. An encyclopedia cannot be less than objective if it is to be anything at all. However, the editors legitimately affirm in their preface that while they have eschewed a "partisan approach," they have tried to do more than list facts and figures—to offer "interpretations of the principal developments discussed." I cannot help but feel that, wilfully or not (and probably not), the blandness of tone frequently runs the risk of being mistaken for its own kind of "editorializing." Does encyclopedic objectivity really require that Ehrenburg, Babel, Olesha, Pasternak, and Sholokhov receive the same dispassionate treatment? Would it be improper to mention many people think Ehrenburg is a rat? The contributor of the Pasternak article avoids an opinion—there are two schools of thought, so to speak. Why then is "S" unmistakably an "outstanding novelist"? And, allowing for the fact that the purges, the Opposition, and related matters, are treated extensively under separate entries, is it really the best encyclopedic practice to say of Christian Rakovsky, for example, that he was "found guilty of high treason, and sentenced to 20 years' hard labor," and leave it at that?

Here and there, too, the necessities of compression have produced simplifications which lend themselves too easily to dismay or confusion. So Robert Daniels writes that "the theme of bureaucratic degeneration has inspired a considerable neo-Trotskyist literature, represented by James Burnham's *Managerial Revolution* (1941) and Milovan Djilas' *New Class* (1957)." There is a literal accuracy here. But given Burnham's current renown as a leading ideologist of the most irrepressible Right, a wiser choice of available references to couple with Djilas could sensibly have been made.

The virtues of the *Encyclopedia* exceed by far the blemishes. If I cite the weaknesses at all, it is really in the hope that the Donat organization will keep at it, and ultimately produce a revised edition. E. G.

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LETTERS

The Family

Editors:

I had planned to let my subscription expire, but your Winter issue was so good that I changed my mind.

I was particularly interested in the correspondence between Irving Howe and Paul Goodman on the family. Apparently both men consider the family important—even if, as in Goodman's case, only because he is against it. After reading this little interchange, the idea occurred to me how valuable it would be if an entire issue of DISSENT were devoted to an exploration of the family: the "modern family," and the family as a social institution. I don't think a discussion of this type has ever been conducted in the pages of an American (socialist) publication. Such a discussion is long overdue for it may be that this one unexamined sector of our social experience is the fly in the ointment.

HARRY ZITZLER

At Northwestern

Editors:

Here at Northwestern University we have just had a symposium entitled "Commitment in an age of anxiety" which was totally student sponsored. It included discussions with such people as Norman Thomas, Hannah Arendt, Rollo May, Saul Bellow, and H. Stuart Hughes. It was a tremendous success in the eyes of students and faculty, and I am quite sure that the enthusiasm generated at the discussions will not be short-lived.

Political activity here at Northwestern is slowly beginning to grow. Both the conservatives and liberals have formed new groups. The liberal group is composed of both graduate students and undergrads. They picketed (the first in NU's history, I believe) a series of anti-Communist seminars held here. There has also been activity in the area of barber-shop discrimination against foreign students (Indians, West Indians, and Africans); an appeal for a general boycott has been issued in the *Northwestern Daily*. Although I am quite aware of the apathy on the campus, I do believe that eyes are opening—if only to peer through cloudy or colored glasses.

Let me congratulate you on an excellent issue (Winter, 1962). I thought that the article on "The Devolution of Democracy" was particularly good.

Irving Howe's article made one point that impressed me greatly: a vast number of liberals tend to group all the student conservatives in the classification of Birchers and Minutemen; I was very glad to see that Mr. Howe does not think so and admires some of them as students that "speak as men of principle, doomed to be a minority for a long time."

The main purpose that your magazine has served for me is to realize that I need not and *cannot* shy away from the world's problems because they are so numerous and complex, and that I can find a way in which I can put my resources to work.

STEPHEN CISLER

Who's Who?

Editors:

I am now reading your Summer 1961 issue on New York. It is the first time I ever read DISSENT, and I like it. While the viewpoint of some of your contributors may not be precisely mine, it is still written and edited from the same side of the street or barricades that I walk on.

I would like to make a suggestion. A number of the writers are unfamiliar to me. While the articles should be judged on their own merits, I keep asking myself, "Who is he? How come he is so well-informed about this?" If you printed a few biographical lines about each writer, I think it would be helpful.

RALPH KESSL

Many of our readers have written us about this. We intend to resume brief biographical identifications of our contributors. And, while we're "explaining," we promise a much larger "Letters" section next issue. Be patient.—Ed.

TELLE MERE, TEL FIS!

Mrs. George P. Walker, mother of ex-Maj. Gen. Edwin A Walker was cited here yesterday for "her great contribution to the formation of the character and attributes of her son. The award by the New York City Colony of New England Women was announced at a Waldorf-Astoria ceremony by Mrs. Elizabeth S. Cowles, president of the 200-member chapter.—From the New York *Times*.

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SURVEY

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of the

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Contributions include:

M. Philips Price—Witnesses of a revolution
Marcel Liebman—the Webbs and the New Civilization
Hugo Dewar—the British press and the Moscow trials
Daniel Aaron—American writers in the thirties
A. V. Sherman—Laski and Cole and the Popular Front
Max Shachtman—Trotsky and Stalin's Russia
Leopold Labedz—I. Deutscher: historian and prophet
and
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

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